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The Charter has transformed the way the policy process is conducted in Canada. It 
has ushered in a revolution focused on individual and collective group rights. The 
entrenchment of codified rights and freedoms has forced the legislatures to conform to 
the contents within the Charter and has reshaped Canadian socio-political values.
Various studies have attempted to explain the Charters role in this process, however the 
question left unanswered is how has the Charter reshaped the policy process and what is 
the impact to Canadian constitutionalism? This thesis seeks to answer this question 
through a detailed quantitative analysis. The body of this thesis will focus on three tenets 
of constitutionalism: First, the Constitution Act, 1982 implemented constitutional 
supremacy in Canadian law and policy, however, this shift raised many questions as to 
the relationship between the Court and legislatures. Second, the Charter was 
manufactured by Pierre Trudeau with a centralizing theme. Trudeau shaped the Charter 
to implement universal standards across Canada, which in effect was expected to 
decrease provincial autonomy. Trudeau’s nation building project focused on three areas: 
Mobility rights, Language and Education rights and Equality rights. This study seeks to 
assess whether the Charter has had the centralizing effects that Trudeau originally sought. 
Third the influence of the individual justice was analyzed to asses what role the each 
justice plays in the Court, and second whether ideological congruencies exist within the 
Court. The database for this study will be composed exclusively of Supreme Court 
Charter cases. This thesis produces an important and necessary contribution to Canadian 
judicial literature in that it updates the database an additional five years from James 
Kelly’s study. Moreover, this thesis created a more sophisticated approach to analyzing 
whether ideological congruencies and individual biases influence the Court’s decision 
making process. However, quite simply, this study is significant and unique because it is 
the first study to focus on the exclusive impact of the Charter, by only focusing on 
explicit Charter cases. Thus not only will this study update the previous studies, it has 
corrected and modified them.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
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Impact of the Charter 
A consensus exists in the academic realm that with the proclamation of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 into force a fundamental shift in Canadian law and 
politics occurred. The Charter “significantly increased the law-making power of
'j
Canadian Courts” and further challenged the controversial relationship between the 
judiciary and the other two branches of government.3 In the life of a country, twenty 
years is often an insignificant indicator of the historical, social or political impact a single 
document may create.4 However, the Charter has reshaped Canadian law and policy by 
delineating new roles for the judiciary and the legislatures, transforming the legal system 
at the bureaucratic and trial levels, and creating a new public sense of identity. Former 
Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, in a speech to the Canadian Bar Association said that the 
Charter represents “a revolution on the scale of the introduction of the metric system, the 
medical discoveries of Louis Pasteur, and the invention of penicillin and the laser.5
An individual’s preference and interpretation of the Charter legitimacy and role in 
Canadian law is often divided amongst three polarized and distinct groups6: the Charter
7 8 Qoptimist/enthusiasts; the Charter realists; and the Charter skeptic/critics. The Supreme
1 Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 o f the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c .l 1 [hereinafter Charter]
2 Sharpe, Swinton and Roach, The Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, 2nd edition (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 
2002), 1
3 Throughout this thesis “Court” refers to the Supreme Court o f Canada unless specified otherwise.
4 Vic Toews, “The Charter in Canadian society” in The Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms: 
Reflections on the Charter after twenty years, ed. Joseph Magnet, Gerald Beaudoin, Gerald Gall and 
Christopher Manffedi (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2003), 345
5 Antonio Lamer, as quoted in F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court 
Party. (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000), 13
6 adopted from the ideas presented by Kent Roach, “Twenty Years o f  the Charter and Criminal Justice: A 
dialogue between a Charter optimist, a Charter realist and a Charter Skeptic” in The Canadian Charter o f  
Rights and Freedoms: Reflections on the Charter after twenty years
7 The Charter optimist/enthusiasts, supports the Court’s as the final arbiter o f constitutional matters within 
the State, support due process protections o f the law, and believes that the protection o f minority rights 
should in certain circumstances, trump the will o f majority
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Court of Canada has further polarized these views through contentious Charter decisions 
which have strongly resonated in the public’s consciousness including abortion,10 gay
* 11 12  1 "3rights, hate propaganda, and more recently, child pornography. This has effectively 
placed the Court on trial by politicians and the media14 and has fueled an extensive 
database of qualitative literature on the impact of the Court and the Charter.15
To date, there has only been a relatively small body of quantitative research 
measuring the Charter’s impact on the Court and the justice system. This thesis corrects 
and updates three previous studies which have sought to analyze these important trends in 
the Court’s jurisprudence. Morton, Russell and Withey analyzed the Court’s first one 
hundred cases (1982-1989) and will be referenced throughout the remainder of this thesis
8 The Charter Realists encourages equality and views the Charter as a means to a liberally advancing State. 
However they approach the Charter from an objective stance where the rights o f  the minorities and the 
accused must be balanced against the rights o f  the majority and the overall effect and repute o f the 
administration o f  justice
9 The Charter skeptics look to the courts as an unelected, unaccountable entity which use the Charter to 
further personal agendas. Skeptics are often conservative in their approach to social equity and believe that 
the will o f  the majority should drive the direction o f the legislatures and the courts
10 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30
11 Vriendv. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [hereinafter VriendJ
12 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
13 R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45
14 Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Irwin Law: 
Toronto, 2001), 3
15 See Christopher Manfredi, Judicial power and the charter : Canada and the paradox o f liberal 
constitutionalism (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001); Bermard Funston & Eugene Meehan, Canada 
Constitutional Law in a Nutshell, (Toronto: Thomson Carswell Ltd., 1994); Ian Greene, The Charter o f  
Rights (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1989); Janet L. Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma o f  
Judicial Review  (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996); F.L Morton, “The Political Impact of 
the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms.” Canadian Journal o f  Political Science 20., 1987); F.L. 
Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party, Patrick James, Donald Abelson 
and Michael Lusztig. Ed., The myth o f  the sacred : the Charter, the courts, and the politics o f  the 
constitution in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002) and Patrick Monahan, Politics 
and the Constitution: the Charter, Federalism, and the Supreme Court o f  Canada (Agincourt: Carswell, 
1987)
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as “first study.”16 Morton, Russell and Riddell analyzed the first decade of Charter 
jurisprudence (1982-1992) and will be referenced as “second study” for the remainder of 
the thesis.17 Finally, James Kelly’s study (1982-1997) builds on both studies and is 
referenced as “Kelly’s study” for the remainder of the thesis.18 Despite some excellent 
quantitative studies on judicial behaviors and the Charter’s impact, the three 
aforementioned studies will provide the main focus of this thesis.19 However, the 
reporting style will differ substantially from the three main studies. The three studies 
compile their statistics according to the time period the study was undertaken in; this 
study will adopt Peter McCormick’s method of grouping according to the Chief Justice 
presiding over the Court during each time period. Since the Charter’s inception there 
have been four Chief Justices. However, Bora Laskin C.J., was ill for the greater part 
1984 and ruled in only one Charter case during his tenure as Chief Justice; thus when 
comparing the Courts, the Laskin Court is omitted. Moreover, in order to test whether 
“court packing” results in ideological congruencies Justices will be separately grouped
16 F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & M.J. Withey, “The Supreme Court’s First One Hundred
Charter o f  Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis” (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 1 [hereinafter 
“first study”]
17 F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & T. Riddell, “The Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms: A Descriptive 
Analysis o f  the First Decade, 1982-1992” (1994) 5 National Journal or Constitutional Law 1. [Hereinafter 
Second Study]
18 James Kelly, “Rebalancing Liberal Constitutionalism” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 3. 
[hereinafter Kelly’s Study]
19 The following studies have also contributed to the quantitative base o f this study: Peter McCormick, 
Canada’s Courts (Toronto: James Lormier and Company, 1994); Peter McCormick, Supreme at Last 
(Toronto: James Lormier and Company, 2000); Peter McCormick and Ian Greene, Judges and Judging 
(Toronto: James Lormier and Company, 1990); Patrick Monahan, Politics and the Constitution; P.H. 
Russell, “The Supreme Court in the 1980s: A Commentary on the S.C.R. Statistics” (1992) 30 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal; F.L Morton and Avril Allen, “Feminists and the Courts: Measuring Success in Interest 
Group Litigation in Canada” Canadian Journal o f  Political Science. 34, no.l (2001); C. Herman Pritchett, 
The Roosevelt Court: A study in Judicial Politics and Values (New York: Macmillan, 1948); Glendon 
Schubert, Quantitative Analysis o f  Judicial Behavior (Gelncoe: Free Press, 1960); Andrew Heard “The 
Charter in the Supreme Court o f Canada: The importance o f which judges hear an appeal,” Canadian 
Journal o f  Political Science 24  (1991); Christopher Manffedi, Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004)
20 Bora Laskin C.J., (1973-1984); Brian Dickson C.J., (1984-1990); Antonio Lamer C.J., (1990-2000) and 
Beverely McLachlin C.J., (2000-present)
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according to the Prime Minister which appointed them. The idea of ideology influencing
• • 91 » •the direction of the Court is a guiding premise to this study. The major assumption in 
ideological congruencies states that Justices who are appointed by a conservative Prime 
Minister will approach Charter jurisprudence in a more restrained and less active way 
than Liberal appointees. The more active judge is expected to utilize s. 1, the reasonable 
limitations clause and s. 24(2), the exclusion of evidence provision, to benefit the rights 
claimant. Thus, an active judge can be described four-fold: first, an active judge would 
deny the government’s attempts to limit rights through s. 1 ’s reasonable limitation clause 
and secondly, an active judge would exclude evidence, advancing victim’s rights and 
moving away from the conservative crime control methods. Third, an active judge is 
expected to show overall higher support rates for the Charter claimant. Lastly, an active 
judge is expected to show less deference towards the government in cases that test the 
constitutionality of government statutes and regulations through a “willingness to change 
the law.”22
This thesis seeks to explain the Charter’s role and influence in three specific areas 
of Canadian constitutionalism: First, as mentioned previously, the entrenchment of the 
Charter created new roles for the legislatures and the judiciary. This shift from 
parliamentary supremacy to constitutional supremacy brought a complex relationship 
between the two entities and created an institutional dialogue between them. This thesis 
seeks to discover whether this dialogue has made the judiciary more or less deferential to 
the legislature. Secondly, Canada’s federal structure was adopted in 1867 and took into
21 see David Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian Production o f  the Constitutional 
Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) for a further detailed explanation
22 L’Heureux-Dube, “Judicial Independence and Judicial Activism” in F.L Morton Law Politics and 
Judicial Process, 3rd edition (Calgary: University o f Calgary Press, 2002), 613
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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account the national, regional, religious, ethnic and linguistic structure of that era. The 
Charter was manufactured by Pierre Trudeau in response to Quebec’s succession threats 
and the nation wide concern that this structure was becoming outdated and ineffective 
and drastically in need of modernization. Trudeau drafted the Charter in response to this 
demand and viewed the document as the means to build a federal nation adaptable to the 
current sociopolitical culture. Trudeau’s nation building thesis has three main 
ingredients: language, education and equality rights. This thesis will analyze both the 
Court’s, and the individual Justices, approach to Trudeau’s nation building project and 
the overall effects the Charter has on federalism. Lastly, judicial decision making entails 
a mix of subjective reasoning and stare decisis', the interpretative nature of the Charter 
allows the judiciary to instill a degree of personal ideology into their rulings despite 
judicial power being institutional and requiring a majority decision amongst the judges in 
any given ruling. As John Griffith states, “for a judge to be completely impartial he or 
she would have to be like a political, economical and social eunuch and have no interests 
in the world outside the court.”23 This thesis will analyze whether judicial attitudes, 
biases and preferences sway the voting habits of the individual justices by discovering 
whether ideology and the Justices appointers influence decision making.
Statistical analysis, while still subject to interpretation, allows for “empirically
supported generalizations.. .of how the Charter is affecting the Supreme Court and how
the Court is shaping the Charter.”24 The first study states that
Statistical analyses of the Supreme Court’s Charter decisions can provide 
an overall picture of the main patterns of a court’s work and, in this way, 
provide a broader context for interpreting the significance of an individual
23 John Griffith, as quoted in Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges really make a Difference (Ottawa: 
Supreme Court o f Canada, 1990), 4
24 First Study, Supra note 16 at 3
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
case or the performance of an individual judge. Quantitative analyses can 
also increase our understanding of institutional features of court’s work, 
such as distribution and sources of its case load and the relationships 
among its members25
Regardless, it is important to note that “descriptive analyses of the Court’s use of
Ofthe Charter are not a substitute for jurisprudential analysis.” Moreover the conclusions 
drawn from this analysis are only based on quantitative trends of subjective data. The 
significance of this data is open to interpretation because a 5% deviation may appear 
striking to one individual, while insufficient to another. Nonetheless, it is the belief of 
this study that valuable generalizations about the Court and the individual justices who sit 
on the bench will be generated by quantitative analysis and that these will help to explain 
Canada’s current state of constitutionalism and the Charter’s overall impact on the justice 
system.
In short, this study assesses the impact of the first 460 Charter cases decided by 
the Supreme Court from 1983 to 2003. This thesis will apply strict criteria to case 
selection. This study excludes all cases decided on principles which are similar to the 
Charter, such as the language rights in the Constitution Act, 1867 or the Aboriginal rights 
in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The previous studies included these “like Charter 
cases” in their datasets. This thesis therefore produces an important and necessary 
contribution to Canadian judicial literature in that it will be the first study to focus on the 
exclusive impact of the Charter and will set out to address the secondary question of 
whether ideological congruencies influence the Court’s decision making.
25 Ibid., 3
26 Kelly, Supra note 18 at 627
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Chapter Overview
This study will be broken into 5 chapters, with a similar format and focus to the 
previous three studies. This first chapter represents the introduction, where the guiding 
arguments of the thesis are introduced and explained. The underlying questions of this 
thesis are two fold: first how has the Charter affected Canada’s constitutional order? And 
second, does the current appointment process of the Court influence the decision making 
of the individual justices? Traditionally, Canadian courts and the individual judges have 
been viewed as an almost superhuman entity, unattached to the political will of the time. 
However the recent dialogue between the Courts and the legislatures has been intensified 
over the debate of same sex marriages mirroring the political debate in Canada. The last 
three appointments to the Court27 have garnered a substantial amount of public attention 
under the suspicion that the current Liberal government was “packing” the court with 
individuals sensitive to the government’s position on same-sex marriages 28 Therefore 
the necessity of this study was encouraged by the recent preponderance in dialogue, the 
misguided and ill-defined statistical literature on ideology in the Court, the individuals 
voting habits of the past and the need to determine the actual impact of the Charter to 
Canada’s constitutional order.
27 Morris Fish J., Rosalie Abella J., & Louise Charron J.
28 See Sylvia LeRoy, “Convenient Judges for Liberal Aims” The Calgary Herald (August 27, 2004); Larry 
Zolf, “Summer Doldrums” CBC News: Analysis and Viewpoint, available online at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/viewpoint/vp zolf720040907.html: John Geddes. “Passing Judgment.” MacLean’s 
(September 6, 2004) 27; Jeffery Simpson, “Judging Gender and Political Optics,” The Globe and Mail 
(August 25, 2004) A 17.
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Chapter 2
The second chapter will help to establish the context of the study, through a
review of the relevant literature on the Charter. Judicial review is the primary role of the
judiciary and is method by which the courts, as a group, and as an individual, interpret
the law. Parliament’s recent propensity to defer certain contentious issues involving
Charter rights to the judiciary has intensified a debate over the role of the Charter and the
Courts in policy creation. However, as Gerald Baier correctly points out, judicial review
goes beyond Charter claims. Baier states that
Judicial review settles or prompts the settling of important jurisdictional 
disputes; enforces the constitutional accountability of both federal and 
provincial governments; and manifests a limited, but critical capacity to 
protect some of the weaker actors in what often appears to be an 
increasingly unbalanced federation.29
This chapter will develop the three parts of Canada’s constitutional order in order to set
the stage for an analysis of the Charter’s overall impact on Canadian law and policy.
The second chapter will explain in detail Canada’s three elements of
constitutionalism through an in-depth study of the relevant qualitative and quantitative
literature. The first part will discuss the allegations of a shift from parliamentary to
judicial supremacy. Parliamentary supremacy is a system where Parliament is unfettered
by constitutional constraints to its authority, and where the legislative and executive
branches are fused in one legislature, such that the members of cabinet perform both
administrative and law-making functions. Its defining feature is that the cabinet exercises
an unlimited power to determine policy, unchecked by judicial review, or legislative
checks and balances. “Judicial supremacy” is the belief that the judiciary is
29 Gerald Baier, “Judicial Review and Canadian Federalism,” in Canadian Federalism, Performance, 
Effectiveness, and Legitimacy, Ed. Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad (Don Mills: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 24
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unconstrained and inexorable in their role in social policy making. This is created 
through the weakening of Parliament’s constitutional check on judicial power through the 
notwithstanding clause, s.33 of the Charter. Ultimately this shift has created a dialogue 
between the legislatures and the judiciary which has led to a debate amongst the three 
schools of Charter analysts, over the legitimacy of not only the Charter, but the 
judiciary’s role as a policy maker. This debate will be analyzed through examining the 
Court’s use of the Charter. This study will evaluate the claim that the Court has used 
constitutional supremacy and the Charter to inflict a self imposed direction on the 
legislature’s, thus establishing the Court the supreme entity in the policy process.
The second part of Canada’s constitutionalism is its federal structure. Federalism 
is concerned with the political division of authority and more importantly, the 
jurisdictional allocation of government power within Canada. The Charter has often 
clashed with federalism as they are “institutional competitors, with federalism’s pursuit 
of diversity and the uniform application of rights in the liberal state standing in direct
T rj
conflict.” The driving force behind Trudeau’s Charter was to re-create the 
constitutional relationship between the two levels of government. However, it is widely 
held that the Charter’s effect on federalism is unequivocally negative.31 This section will 
analyze the “nation-building project” and argue that the Charter has created a shift in the 
relationship between the two levels of government. The previous studies point to the
30 James B. Kelly, Charter activism and Canadian federalism: Rebalancing liberal constitutionalism in 
Canada, 1982 to 1997, Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1998, 20.
31 See Alain Cairns, Charter Versus Federalism: The Dilemmas o f  Constitutional
Reform (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992);Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End o f a 
Canadian Dream  (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995) c. 6; A. Gagnon & G. Laforest, “The 
Future of Federalism: Lessons From Canada and Quebec” (1993) 28 Int’l J. 470 at 477-78,486-87; and 
P.H. Russell, “The Political Purposes o f the Charter: Have They Been Fulfilled?” in P. Bryden, S. Davis &
J. Russell,eds., Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter’s Place in Canada’s Political,
Legal, and Intellectual Life (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1994)
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nullification of statutes to establish which level of government the Court is more 
respectful towards by accepting the legislatures interpretation of the law. Although they 
found that the “quantitative impact of the Charter on federal and provincial statues was 
roughly equal,”32 they ultimately concluded that the invalidated provincial statutes were 
more “substantive.. .and more recently enacted.” This led to the assertion that the Court 
was more deferential towards the federal government. However, as the methodology 
section (third chapter) o f this study will explain, in the first study 4 of the 11 provincial 
statutes (36%)33 were nullified on non-Charter grounds, while in the second study 1 of 
the next 4 provincial statutes (25%)34 were nullified on non-Charter grounds, while in 
Kelly’s study 4 of the 8 (50%) provincial statutes were nullified on non-Charter 
grounds.35 In sum, 9 of the 23 (39%) provincial statutes declared invalid from the 
previous studies should not be counted as Charter victories because they are decided on 
non-Charter grounds. Therefore, the conclusions of the previous studies regarding the 
impact of the Charter on provincial legislation have been clearly overstated and thus the 
declaration that the court is more deferential to federal government must be challenged.
The third element of Canada’s constitutional order is the composition of the Court 
and the influence of the individual justice. The first study noted that individual Justices 
formed “identifiable voting blocks, with wide discrepancies between different Justices
32 Ibid., 26.
33 A.G. Quebec v. Greater Hull School Board, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 575, tried under s.93 BNA; R. v. Mercure 
[1988] 1 SCR 234, tried under S. 16 o f  Saskatchewan Act; Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, 
[1985] 1 SCR 721, tried under s. 133 o f the Constitution, 1867; and Bilodeau v. A.G. Manitoba, [1986] 1 
S.C.R. 449, tried under s. 23 of Manitoba Act
34 Quebec (A.G.) v, Brunet, [1990] 1 SCR 260, tried under s. 133 o f the Constitution Act 1867
35 R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771, tried under s. 35(1) o f Constitution Act 1982; R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 SCR 
1013, tried under s. 35(1) o f Constitution Act 1982; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101, tried under s. 35(1) o f  
Constitution Act 1982; R v Campbell, [1997] 3 SCR 4, statute nullified in Reference re remuneration o f  the 
Judges o f  the Provincial Court o f  P.E.I., [1997] 3 SCR 4
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support for Charter claims”36 This study seeks to explain why these voting blocks are 
formed and offers the conclusion that ideological congruencies influence the Court and 
the individual Justices voting trends. A detailed review of the literature relating to the 
themes of ideology and the appointment process of Supreme Court justices will be 
conducted in this section. Since the judiciary’s interpretation of the Charter ultimately 
has the greatest impact on Canadian constitutionalism, this section will receive a greater 
degree of scrutiny and attention in the statistical analysis portion of this thesis (chapter 4).
Through a detailed analysis of the literature relating to the three tenets of 
Canadian constitutionalism, a greater understanding of the judicial process and the 
Charter’s impact to Canada’s constitution order will be established.
Chapter 3
Chapter three will explain the methodology used throughout this study. For the 
most part, this study will adopt the methods used by the previous authors; however 
portions of this study will contain slight deviations from the former studies, while certain 
sections will be completely redefined. Specifically, three major revisions to the data 
selection criteria and reporting style will be undertaken.
First, the definition of a Charter case will be narrowed to include only cases
"37which fall exclusively under the Charter. Therefore cases which are tried on non- 
Charter grounds38 or other constitutional documents39 will be excluded from the study.
36 First study, Supra note 16 at 1
37 Specifically, this means only cases tried and decided on grounds established in the Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms (s. 1 through 34); no other sections o f the Constitution Act, or similar constitutional principles 
will be permitted or accepted
38 This includes cases decided on s. 35 and s. 52 of the Constitution Act 1982 and cases tried under the 
Canadian Bill o f  Rights (1960)
39 such as the Manitoba Act (1870), the Saskatchewan Act (1905), s. 91-93 o f the Constitution Act 1867
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Second, a more precise and procedural system of combining and separating cases
will be established. In each study, there are instances where cases raising similar issues
are grouped together and counted as a single case,40 while other cases that the Court
released concurrently are counted separately.41 This study will count all cases
individually, unless specifically grouped together by the Court.42
Third, the second study introduces the ‘Court party index’ which is a main focus
of the second and third studies. Morton and Knopff define the court party43 as a set of
mobilized, sociological-interest groups who appeal and lobby the Court in order to
“constitutionalize policy preferences that could not easily be achieved through the
legislative process.”44 Morton and Knopff believe that the Court party is composed of
small sub-groups of society representing minority opinions. This leads to minority
groups imposing policy change on the majority.45 Since this process takes place outside
of the legislative arena, the authors deem this to be a breach of the principles of
democracy. The Court Party hypothesis
argues that both the adoption and the success of the Charter reflect the 
growing ascendancy of these post materialist interests in Canadian society 
and their preference to pursue their policy agendas through judicial 
politics (litigation) rather than through electoral-legislative politics.46
40 For example the first study combined R. v. Meltzer, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1764; R. v. Heikel, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
1776; and R. v. Oulette, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1781, despite being indexed separately by the Court.
41 R. v. Campbell, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3., Reference Re Remuneration o f  Judges o f  the Provincial Court o f  
Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3., Reference Re Independence and Impartiality o f  Judges o f  the 
Provincial Court o f  Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3. And Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. V. 
Manitoba (Minister o f  Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.
42 For example see R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906
43 Methodologically, the Court Party is an extensions o f Alan Cairns “Charter Canadians” which he 
developed in “A defense o f the Citizens’ Constitutional Theory: A Rejoinder to Ian Brodie and Neil 
Nevitte” 26 Canada Journal o f  Political ScienceJJ993)
44 Morton and Knopff, Supra note 5 at 25
45 The second study, supra note 17 explains that minority groups include ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic 
and gender oriented groups whom seek equality.
46 Second study, supra note 17 at 42
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Both, the second and Kelly’s study utilize this index to discover whether certain Justices 
take a “different approach to legal rights/criminal law cases than to non-criminal cases”47 
and gauge the influence these minority groups have on the Court. However, as will be 
established in the methodology chapter, accepting this theory implies that equality 
seeking amongst groups and sub-cultures is a new phenomenon in Canadian politics. It is 
the contention of this study that the court party thesis is erroneous; for reasons explained 
later, it will be eliminated from the study.
Chapter Four
Chapter Four will be dedicated to reporting the study’s findings, interpretations 
and trends of the first 460 Charter decisions made by the Supreme Court from 1982 to 
2003. The style of this study will mostly mirror the previous three studies. The purpose 
of this chapter is to identify group and individual trends in the court that have contributed 
to constitutionalism in Canada. The study’s format is discussed in detail in the 
methodology chapter.
All three studies focus on the Charter’s overall impact on the Court system. Table 
1-1 shows the Charter’s effect to the Court’s total caseload, this is performed to 
determine the proportion of Charter cases in the Court’s overall work load. Secondly, 
table 1-1 lists the Charter’s success rate during each of the study’s time periods. Success
• • • 48is simply determined when the Charter claimant receives their desired outcome.
47 Ibid., 44
48 For a more detailed explanation o f wins and losses see chapter 3
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Table 1-1
Charter Decisions as a % of total Court caseload/Charter success rate
Study/ Years
Charter decisions as a % of total Court 
Caseload















From table 1-1, it is evident that the percentage of Charter decisions the Court 
accepts has dropped significantly since Kelly’s study, while the success rate increased 
substantially. From the outset, this may be explained due to the stricter criteria for case 
selection; however it may also suggest that the Charter’s impact is declining. Ultimately, 
this study is important because it will create more reliable generalizations of the Charter’s 
impact on the court system as a whole. In 1996 alone, Kelly’s study includes 9 cases that 
are not tried on Charter grounds.49 In 1996 the Court heard a total of 40 Charter cases, 
thus 22.5% of 1996’s totals were based on non-Charter cases. Of the 9 cases, the Charter 
claimant is victorious 4 times,50 with one claim being coded as inconclusive.51 Therefore 
with the amended data selection methods, the statistical conclusions about the Charter’s 
impact on the Courts and Canada’s state of constitutionalism may be significantly
49 R. v. Cote, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; 
R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 11 \\R . v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013; R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 
2 S.C.R. 672; R. v. Pamjewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683; R. v. Van der 
Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507:all cases are tried on s. 35(1) or s. 52(1) grounds o f the Constitution Act, 1982
50 R. v. Nikal, R. v. Gladstone, R. v. Adams, R. v. Cote
51 R. v. Badger
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different from the previous authors and therefore important to the study of judicial 
politics.
Chapter Five
The concluding chapter will allow for reflections of the amended and new data 
and will present an opportunity to link the findings with the broader understanding of the 
Charter’s actual impact on Canadian constitutionalism and judicial politics. The ultimate 
objective of the concluding chapter is to determine the validity of the hypothesis that 
through more stringent case selection, the impact of the Charter will appear less striking, 
while proving that ideological congruencies play a central role in the decision making 
process of the individual judge.
This thesis ultimately seeks to dispel the previous quantitative study’s conclusions 
as to the Charter’s effect on Canada’s state of constitutionalism. This study seeks to 
measure the Charter’s impact on judicial review and individual Justices voting habits.
The Charter has allowed the judiciary to assume a new role in policy arena, and with this 
role, has altered the equilibrium of power within Canada. It is with these issues at hand 
that this thesis is written, coupled with a concern to investigate the shaping of Canada’s 
constitutional order.
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Review of the Literature
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Legitimizing Judicial Review 
Parliamentary v. Constitutional Supremacy
In Canada, the Courts are not held to the ‘four corners of the legal text’ to the 
same extent as our American neighbors. This allows the judiciary to approach all 
constitutional documents in an interpretative approach. The difference between the 
American Bill o f  Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is that 
American rights are absolute, whereas Canadian rights are subject to reasonable limits 
under s. 1, and can be abrogated entirely by the legislature through the invocation of s. 
33, the notwithstanding clause. However, both documents help establish a judiciary that 
has a discretionary power over public policy through its approach to constitutional 
interpretation. This form of constitutional interpretation is formally defined as judicial 
review.
Former Supreme Court Justice Bertha Wilson stated that judicial review is
justifiable because:
The rights guaranteed in the Charter should be interpreted in accordance 
with the general purpose of having rights, which is to secure for the 
individuals and minority groups protection against the exercise of 
excessive power by the majority.1
Peter Hogg explains that judicial review is not solely the result of the Charter 
since the courts have invalidated constitutionally inconsistent laws since Confederation. 
Hogg notes that before the Charter, judicial review focused on invalidating 
inconsistencies in the distribution of legislative powers. The Charter added a new role 
for the Court, which was “more policy-laden” than the federalism cases. Hogg concludes
1 Hon. Bertha Wilson, “We didn’t Volunteer” in Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy, ed. Paul Howe 
and Peter Russell (Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001), 74
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that because “Charter rights are expressed in exceedingly vague terms” the Charter 
created a more discretionary role for the courts. Kent Roach agrees that the Charter did 
not change the parliamentary system of government because it has always had “the
-7
potential to produce legislative activism to counter judicial activism.” However, Roach 
explains that the Charter substantially increased the awareness of this relationship and 
created a new arena for judicial review.4
Case selection and Judicial Review
Both critics and advocates of judicial review often point to the 1975 amendment 
to the Supreme Court Act, which revolutionalized the Court by “eliminate(ing) most 
mandatory appeals and gave the Court wide discretion over which cases to review.”5 The 
amendment allowed the judiciary to grant leave to appeals in cases “by reason of [their] 
public importance.”6 Charles Epp also considers docket control crucial, asserting that a 
“rights revolution” has occurred because political pressures have been influenced by 
"deliberate (and) strategic...rights advocates."7 These advocates derive their power and 
influence from access to the judicial process which occurs when a country is embedded in 
constitutional supremacy. Epp argues that in Canada the "growth of a support structure 
for legal mobilization"8 and the ascendancy of civil rights and liberties, arose from the
2 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law o f  Canada, 4th Ed. (Carswell Publishing, 1997), 797
3 Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or D em ocratic D ialogue (Irwin Law: 
Toronto, 2001), 253
4 Ibid
5 Roy B. Flemming, “The Selection o f Cases for Judicial Review in the Supreme Court o f Canada”, in 
F.L.Morton, ed. Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in Canada, 3rd edition (Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press, 2002), 546
6 Supreme Court Act, R.S., c. S-19, 1985, s.40(l)
7 Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective 
(Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1998), 2
8 Ibid., 196
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democratization of access to the courts. Epp suggests that the rights revolution was
created from the bottom up, through access to the Courts and not through the Court’s
interpretation and application of the Charter. Therefore the rights revolution is
contingent upon the case selection methods of the Court. However, Charter critics
contend that the Court may choose to select more cases that test the contentious
relationship between the Court and legislatures by choosing a higher proportion of statute
and regulations cases.
Chief Justice Lamer clarified the Court’s policy on case selection in R. v.
Hinse? Lamer CJ.C. stated:
The ability to grant or deny leave represents the sole means by which this 
Court is able to exert discretionary control over its docket. In order to 
ensure that this Court enjoys complete flexibility in allocating its scarce 
judicial resources towards cases of true public importance, as a sound rule 
of practice, we generally do not convene oral hearings on applications for 
leave, nor do we produce written reasons for our grants and denials of 
leave... Given the hundreds of leave applications processed by this Court 
on an annual basis, it is simply not feasible for this Court to regularly 
second-guess its initial determinations of leave without significantly 
undermining this Court's indispensable role as a general court of appeal 
for the better administration of the laws of Canada. 10
The Supreme Court states that the purpose of controlling their docket is 
“to supervise the growth and development of Canadian jurisprudence.”11 Critics
like Morton and Knopff believe that this process allows the judiciary to set an
10institutional agenda, creating a “jurocracy” where the will of the Court prevails. 
Charter critics argue that the Court advances an agenda through choosing which
9 R. v. Hinse, [1995] 4 SCR 597
10 Ibid.
11 Supreme Court o f Canada, website, available from http://www.scc- 
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/role/indexe.asp
12 see F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party. (Peterborough: 
Broadview Press, 2000)
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cases it hears, allowing the Court to accept cases that they believe to have a
significant impact on Canadian law. Critics charge that this allows the Court to
create an agenda. However, this claim ignores cases that come to the Court as a
right and are mandatory for the Court to hear. Appeals as of right are “instances
where leave is not required.. .in criminal cases, for example, an appeal may be
brought as of right where one judge in the court of appeal dissents on a point of 
11law.” Table 2-1 shows that appeals as of right account for nearly 40% of the 
Court’s entire docket, both Charter and non-Charter cases. These are important 
because they show that the Court does not have absolute control over case 
selection.
Table 2-1
Proportion of Appeals as of Rightu




Right 40 37 49 37 30 19 14 17 16 16 275
By leave 79 70 69 67 76 56 64 79 56 66 682
Total by
leave 119 107 118 104 106 75 78 96 72 82 40%
Discretionary element o f  Charter interpretation
In the United States, judicial review is not explicitly recognized in the 
Constitution. The legitimacy for American judicial review is grounded on one of two 
claims: either this role was implicitly outlined through the 11th amendment15 or, 
alternatively, it was championed and implemented through the Marshall Court (1801-
13 Appeals as o f Right, Supreme Court website, available http://www.scc- 
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/role/index_e.asp
14 Statistics 1994 to 2004, Supreme Court o f Canada, Data compiled from http://www.scc- 
csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/HTML/cat3_e.asp
15 Ratified February 7, 1795
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1835).16 Conversely, in Canada the legitimacy of judicial review is overtly established in
s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. As explained in further detail in Chapter 3,
Section 52(1) enshrines the primacy of the constitution and creates constitutional
supremacy in Canadian law and policy. The powers conferred on the judiciary to protect
the supreme law of Canada often clash with the principles of parliamentary supremacy.
Chief Justice Lamer highlighted to this discrepancy while writing for the majority in
Reference re B.C Motor Vehicle Act
The overriding and legitimate concern that courts ought not to question the 
wisdom of enactments, and the presumption that the legislator could not 
have intended same... has led to the spectre of a judicial "super­
legislature" without a full consideration of the process of constitutional 
adjudication and the significance of ss. 1 and 33 of the Charter and s. 52 
of the Constitution Act, 1982. This in turn has also led to a narrow 
characterization of the issue and to the assumption that only a procedural 
content to "principles of fundamental justice" can prevent the courts from 
adjudicating upon the merits or wisdom of enactments..17
This interpretative approach that the Court has assumed in Charter cases is 
distinguished by a discretionary element “because the standard can never specify all the
1 o #
instances in which it applies.” The discretionary element of rights interpretation has 
fueled a myriad of Canadian and American normative academic studies which have 
developed and examined the term “judicial activism”, in order to describe the Court’s 
relationship with Parliament and its influence in the policy arena.19 Critics contend that
16 Marbury v. Madison (1803), 5 U.S. 137, gave the Court the power o f  judicial review. This was the U.S 
Supreme Courts first overturning o f a law by using the powers in the Judiciary Act o f  1789.
17 Reference re B.C Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486
18 Dickson C.J., in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G), [1989] 1 SCR 927
19 For a more detailed explanation o f Judicial Activism see; James B. Kelly, “The Supreme Court of 
Canada and the Complexity o f  Judicial Activism” in The Myth o f  the Sacred: The Charter, the Courts, and 
the Politics o f  the Constitution in Canada, ed. Patrick James, Donald E. Abelson and Michael Lusztig 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002); Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial 
Activism or Democratic Dialogue', Sebastien Lebel-Grenier, “The Charter and Legitimization o f Judicial 
Activism” in Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy, ed. Paul Howe and Peter Russell (Kingston:
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judicial activism occurs when the judiciary creatively reads the constitution, contrary to 
the legislative will, in order to advance the Court’s, or an individual Justice’s agenda, 
therefore limiting the legislature’s reach into public life. Critics of judicial activism 
contend that Justices who strike down or significantly amend laws passed by the 
legislature act outside their self-mandated role as “guardians of the constitution.” 20 
Since the Court is made up of non-elected, unaccountable individuals, the judiciary’s 
ability to reshape public policy is often deemed un-democratic by Charter critics. This 
creates the paradox of liberal constitutionalism, according to Christopher Manfredi. 
Manfredi explains that:
Constitutional supremacy requires that political power only be exercised 
according to the procedural and substantive rules laid down in a 
constitution. On the other hand judicial review means that one of the 
institutions in which political power is located bears primary responsibility 
for interpreting and applying those rules. The tension between these two 
features of liberal constitutionalism derives from the fact that judicial 
power to define constitutional language decreases the effective relevance 
of the constitutional text as the authoritative source of the rules governing 
political power.21
John Hart Ely, one of the leading constitutional thinkers, argues passionately that
judicial review is justified because it allows judges to intervene, ensuring that democratic
22institutions work as intended. Likewise, Dale Gibson has strongly defended what
McGill-Queens University Press, 2001); Janet L. Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma o f  Judicial 
Review (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996); Robert Ivan Martin, The Most Dangerous 
Branch: How the Supreme Court o f  Canada has Undermined our Law and our Democracy (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003); Sujit Choudhry and Claire E. Hunter, “Measuring Judicial 
Activism on the Supreme Court o f  Canada”, McGill Law Journal 49 (2004) 3-24; Bradley C. Canon, 
“Defining the Dimensions o f  Judicial Activism,” Judicature 66 (1983): 237; and Keith E. Whittington, 
“The New Originalism,” Georgetown Journal o f  Law and Public Policy 2 (2004)
20 Hunter v. Southam inc., [1984] 2 SCR 145
21 Christopher P.Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
169
22 J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory o f  Judicial Review  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1980).
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critics condemn as the anti-democratic character of judicial review. Gibson commends 
judges for actively interpreting the constitution, stating that he found no fault if judges 
were to “bypass the democratic process.” Ultimately, Gibson believes the judiciary
9Tshould have the final decision, so long as in the end they get the answer “right”
Law professor Brian Slattery advances the “Coordinate model”24 to describe the
Charter’s mandate and the relationship between the Court and the other two levels of
government. He suggests that the Charter:
.. .sets up a complex scheme of constitutional duties and review powers 
that are distributed among governments, legislatures, and the courts.
These bodies are equally mandated to pursue the Charter’s goals, which 
ultimately represents aspects of the common good of the community as a 
whole... Yet they differ somewhat in their assessment of what ails.. .the
9  ̂community and the proper course of treatment.
Slattery concludes that the legislative and executive branches have a crucial role in 
constitutional interpretation, and rejects the critique that judges have claimed and self­
instilled an exclusive power in Charter adjudication.
This study argues that the balance between judicial and parliamentary supremacy 
has shifted since the introduction of the Charter. As the power of the courts increases, a 
natural and entrenched shift towards constitutional supremacy replaces the previous 
parliamentary rule.
23 D. Gibson, “Founding Fathers-in-Law: Judicial Amendment o f the Canadian Constitution” (1992) 55:1 
Law and Contemporary Problems, 284.
24 The Coordinate model is divided into two parts: first order functions, which obliges a range of 
governmental bodies to assess the reasonableness o f their own anticipated acts in light o f  the Charter rights 
; While second order functions authorizes certain bodies to review the acts o f  others for conformity to 
Charter rights
25 Brain Slattery, “A theory o f the Charter” (1987) Osgoode Hall Law Journal [vol. 25, no.4], 706-101
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Understanding the Notwithstanding
Charter supporters often point to the constitutional safeguards contained in the 
Charter to protect the legislative will. These safeguards encourage constitutional 
supremacy, but acknowledge that the role of the legislatures must be protected. During 
the drafting process of the Charter, provincial Premiers insisted on the inclusion of s. 33, 
the notwithstanding clause, due to the “feared.. .impact of judicial review on their 
legislative agendas.”26 Section 33 allows Parliament or a provincial legislature to 
authorize a law which functions notwithstanding the fundamental freedoms, legal rights 
or equality rights27 enshrined in the Charter. The notwithstanding clause was seen as a 
guarantor for parliamentary supremacy by limiting the scope and power of the Charter 
and the courts.
In other words, a law containing a simple declaration from Parliament or a 
legislature that it is to have effect “notwithstanding” one of these sections 
will be protected from judicial review, and the law will remain in effect 
despite violating a Charter guaranteed right or freedom.28
As Lorraine Weinrib summarizes, the override “emerged as the final compromise on the
9QCharter, accepted by the premiers who opposed the Charter.” Jean Chretien, then 
Minister of Justice under the Trudeau government, summarized the framer’s intent for s. 
33 when he stated that “the purpose of an override clause is to provide the flexibility that 
is required to ensure that legislatures, rather than judges, have the final say on important
26 Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures”(1997) 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal [vol.35 n o .l ] , 79.
27 Section 2: Fundamental freedoms; s. 7-14: Legal rights; s. 15: Equality rights.
28 Kent Roach, Robert Sharpe and Katherine Swinton, The Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, 2nd edition, 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), 78.
29 Lorraine Weinrib, in Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy, 84
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matters o f public policy.”30 However, former Prime Minister Mulroney stated that he
“believed s.33 was both unacceptable and a mistake.”31 Mulroney stated that
The framers of the flawed Constitution Act of 1982 inserted the 
notwithstanding clause which limits our most fundamental 
freedoms.. .never before nor since in our history has a Prime Minister of 
Canada made a concessions of such magnitude and importance. Never 
before has the surrender of rights been so total abject.3
Critics like Howard Leeson suggest that s. 33 is more like a “paper tiger”, ferocious and
intimidating on paper, but rarely used in practice.33 Tsvi Kahana found that the
“notwithstanding mechanism” was used only 16 times and that in 7 of these instances the
declaration of notwithstanding was still in force by the end of this study.34 Morton
confirmed this finding and discovered that s. 33 had only been used 3 times outside of
o r
Quebec. This sparsely applied section has led critics to believe that Parliament is 
defenseless against the judicial will. Leeson argues that the agreement on s. 33’s 
inclusion in the Charter had more to do with the politics of bargaining than a compromise 
between constitiutional and parliamentary democracy. Leeson believes that the court has 
“wandered deeply into social decisions that they are ill-equipped to address.”36 Leeson 
states that s. 33 is not the right instrument to stop this problem; however, he believes it
• 5 7
should not be abandoned.
30 Jean Chretien, “The Notwithstanding clause o f the Charter” Parliamentary Information and Research 
Services, available from http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/librarv/PRBpubs/bp 194-e.htm
31 Brian Mulroney as quoted in Howard Leeson, “Section 33, the Notwithstanding Clause: A Paper Tiger?”, 
Institute fo r Research on Public Policy: Choices, Vol. 6, no. 4 (2000), 14
32 Ibid, 14
33 Ibid, 2
34 Tsvi Kahana, “The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion: Lessons from the Ignored 
Practice o f Section 33 o f the Charter” (2001) 44 Canada Public Administration Journal. 255
35 F.L. Morton, “Can Judicial Supremacy be Stopped?” Institute fo r  Research on Public Policy, October 
2003, 25.
36 Leeson, supra note 30 at 20
37 Ibid, 20
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The political ramifications of government’s limiting or overturning judicial 
decisions which grant certain rights to the public are significant. The events surrounding 
the Alberta government’s response to the controversial ruling in Vriendprovide an 
illustration of this point.38 Charter critics claim that the public fiercely demanded that 
Alberta Premier Ralph Klein use the notwithstanding clause to reverse the Vriend 
decision. However, despite Klein’s public disdain for the decision, legislative support for 
the invocation of s. 33 was relatively weak: Klein reported that no more than one third of 
his MLAs backed the use of the notwithstanding clause.39
Charter critics have long contended that the Vriend decision, the Alberta public’s 
reaction, and the government’s inability to institute the notwithstanding clause clearly 
shows a shift to judicial supremacy because the will of the majority was constrained by 
the Court. However, Charter supporters suggest that the Albertan public was not as 
“outraged” as some critics claim and that this was just another conservative attack on the 
rights revolution. Paul Howe and Joseph Fletcher conducted a national survey on public 
opinion of the Courts, the Charter and a select number of Charter decisions and found 
that 60% of respondents had not heard of the Vriend case. Howe and Fletcher conclude 
that “despite the publicity and the uproar, the decision was obviously not widely known 
among Canadians.”40 However, the authors’ findings are limited because they are based 
on a national survey which is not province specific. Charter critics claim that this 
controversy existed in Alberta and that public opinion in that province was strongly
38 In Vriend the Supreme Court ruled that exclusion o f homosexuals from Alberta's Individual Rights 
Protection Act is a violation o f the Charter and created sexual orientation as an analogous ground to s.
15(1) of the Charter. The Alberta government opposed this ruling and threatened to invoke the 
notwithstanding clause. However in the end the Provincial government withheld their right to invoke the 
legislative override presumably due to the political ramifications and fear o f societal reprisal.
39Joseph Fletcher and Paul Howe, “Public Opinion and the Courts” in Choices: Courts and Legislatures, 
Institute fo r  Research on Public Policy vol.6, no.3, May 2000., 38
40 Ibid., 39
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opposed to the decision. Howe and Fletcher do not exclusively focus any portion of their
test on the province; however, they do find that the Prairie Provinces and Reform Party
supporters exhibited the lowest support for the decision41 suggesting that the critics may
not be overstating the importance of this decision. This is supported by the Government
of Alberta’s findings: “almost half of Albertans were aware of the Supreme Court
decision in the Vriend case and two thirds of Albertans approve of government's decision
to abide by the Supreme Court decision.”42
Charter critics state that s. 33 is ineffective because even the prospect of its use is
widely construed as an attack on the Charter.43 Morton and Knopff believe that the
Charter has allowed the judiciary to step outside Canada’s long standing norms of
judicial neutrality and has enabled the judiciary to enter the policy arena of Canadian
law-making. In their view, the extreme caution that Parliament must exhibit when using
the override has contributed to the shift away from parliamentary supremacy towards
judicial supremacy.44 This relationship was best summarized by J.D Whyte:
The primary reason for wishing to do away with the override clause is that 
the anxiety that produced the political demand for entrenched rights 
cannot be rationally calmed in the face of the legislative power granted by 
section 33. The anxiety is simply this: political authority will, at some 
point be exercised to impose very serious burdens on groups of people 
when there is no rational justification for doing so.”45
Charter supporters of s. 33, headlined by Peter Russell, look to the framers intent 
for validation. Jean Chretien, the Justice Minister, stated that the clause would rarely be
41 Figure 4 in Fletcher and Howe, supra note 39 at 39.
42 Government o f  Alberta, “Report o f the Ministerial Task Force, March 3, 1999” available from 
http://www. solgen.gov. ab. ca/publications/report_of_ministerial_taskJ'orce/index. html
43 especially see J.D Whyte, “On Not Standing up for Notwithstanding” in F.L.Morton, ed. Law, Politics 
and the Judicial Process in Canada, 3rd edition (Calgary: University o f  Calgary Press, 2002)
44 F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, supra note 12
45 J.D Whyte, supra note 43 at 582-583
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used “except in non-controversial circumstances.”46 Supporters state that the minimal 
use of s. 33 acts as an unimposing check to judicial power and provides for a healthy 
dialogue between the two branches. Russell rejects Whyte’s “disdain for democracy”47 
and defends s. 33 because in his view, the judiciary is not infallible, and this clause acts 
as a sufficient legislative check to judicial interference and supremacy. As Howard 
Leeson explains, this creates a “policy of sober second thought, allowing each branch of 
government to correct the deficiencies in the work of the other.”49 Russell concludes that 
there must be a proper balance between parliamentary and judicial supremacy because 
complete judicial supremacy in his mind is a weaker system than one which “puts its 
faith as much in its politically active citizenry as in its judges to be the guardians of 
liberty.”50 Although the quantitative study does not analyze the notwithstanding clauses 
implications to Canadian constitutionalism, the discussion is crucial for two reasons: first, 
it helps establish the relationship between parliamentary and constitutional supremacy; 
and second, it lays the ground work for the dialogue theory, which further examines the 
relationship between the Court and the legislatures.
Revisiting the dialogue theory: examining the power o f  s. 3 3
This complex relationship between the legislature and the judiciary has created an 
institutional dialogue between the two branches of government. This dialogue 
acknowledges the discretionary element of Charter adjudication and adopts the American
46 Jean Chretien, Supra note 30
47 Peter Russell, “Standing for Notwithstanding,” F.L.Morton, ed. Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in 
Canada, 585
48 Peter Russell, Ibid., 586
49 Howard Leeson, “The Notwithstanding Clause” in Howe and Russell, Judicial Power and Canadian 
Democracy, 317
50 Russell, supra note 47 at 595
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aphorism that “we are under a constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it
is!”51 Hogg and Thornton explain that after a judicial decision, the legislative body is
then enabled to decide on a desired course of action -  the re-enactment of the old law, the
enactment of a different law, or the abandonment of the project.52 They explain that the
judiciary, in fact, never has the final word because of s. 33 which is the “most powerful
tool legislatures can use to overcome a Charter decision they do not accept.”53 As Kent
Roach suggests, this
.. .provides a carefully structured outlet.. .allow(ing) a legislature to 
reverse a Court decision with an ‘in your face’ reply that suggest(s).. .the 
Court wrongly interpreted the constitution or that its decision is simply 
unacceptable to the majority.. .(s.33) also allows the legislature (the 
opportunity) to cut off debate with the courts by a pre-emptive use of the 
override.54
Roach concedes that the override provision can result in a “legislative tyranny, but it is 
tyranny that is explicit for the entire world to see.”55
Supporters of this theory state that the Charter facilitates this dialogue four fold.56 
Concluding that most judicial decisions that strike down laws are followed by a 
“legislative sequel,”57 Parliamentary inaction is therefore included as a form of dialogue 
because Parliament is accepting the court’s decision. However this argument has been 
subject to intensive scrutiny both by Charter supporters and critics. Manfredi and Kelly 
contend that Hogg and Thornton’s critique is flawed in two respects:
51 Peter W. Hogg and Allison Bushell, supra note 26 at 77
52 Ibid., 79-80
*  Ibid., 81
54 Kent Roach, supra note 3 at 265
55 Roach, Ibid., 265
56 The Charter facilitates the dialogue through these four variables 1) The Notwithstanding clause 2) 
Section 1, reasonable limitations 3) non absolute status o f certain rights 4) other remedial methods within 
the Charter
57 Peter Hogg and Allison Thornton, “Reply to six degrees o f dialogue” 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 3., 
534
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First, the empirical demonstration on which the metaphor depends suffers 
from several flaws. Second, even without these flaws, the metaphor as 
constructed in the Hogg and Bushell study provides only a weak response 
to the normative issues implicit in the democratic critique of Charter- 
based judicial review.58
Manfredi and Kelly conclude that the most crucial flaw in Hogg and Bushell’s normative
argument is the “assumption of a judicial monopoly on correct interpretation(s).”59
Manfredi and Kelly conclude that the Court never subordinates “themselves to the
Charter per se, but to the Court’s interpretation of the Charter’s language.”60
Morton vehemently opposes Hogg’s “operationalization” of the dialogue concept,
stating that when the court recommends a course of action and the legislature adopts it,
the legislature is not engaged in dialogue; rather the legislature is doing what the Court
told them to do.61 In Morton’s view this creates a monologue between the Courts and the
other two branches of government. However, Morton asserts that in controversial
situations “political self-interest favors government inaction over action” and therefore
the notwithstanding clause is an unfavorable option, rendering Parliament vulnerable to
judicial interference.
Janet Hiebert believes that the hierarchical relationship between the legislatures
and the Court is part of a healthy policy production system. She believes that Parliament
has a crucial role in the direction of Charter jurisprudence and has a duty to respond to
the Court’s decisions. Hiebert states that Parliament must use the available constitutional
58 Christopher Manfredi and James Kelly, “Six Degrees o f Dialogue, a Response to Hogg and Bushell” 37 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 3., 515
59 Ibid., 523
60 Ibid., 523
61 Morton gives the example o f  Hunter v Southam where Parliament added a new search warrant requiring 
to the Anti-Combines Act according to the Court’s “recommendation”.
62 F.L Morton,"Dialogue or Monoluge?” in Paul Howe and Peter H. Russell, eds., Judicial Power and 
Canadian Democracy, at 115
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avenues available to them or they will "get the kinds of judicial rulings (they) deserve"63 
Thus if legislatures take a passive role in institutional dialogue, it will be the 
government’s fault if they can not pass legislation. Hiebert rejects the dialogue approach 
and introduces a “relational approach,” which contends that Parliament shares a role in 
interpreting the Charter.64
Charter critics contend that this relationship is more akin to a monologue, “with 
the judges doing most of the talking and legislatures most of the listening.” 65 Critics 
point to the 1988 Morgentaler66 ruling, and aftermath, to illustrate the monologue theory. 
In Morgentaler, Dickson C. J., writing for himself and Lamer J., declared s. 251 of the 
criminal code, which prohibited abortion except in exceptional cases where the life or 
health of a woman was at risk, violated the guarantee of “security of the person” in s. 7. 
For him, violation of security of person included, at the minimum, “state interference 
with bodily integrity and serious state-imposed stress.”
After the Morgentaler ruling, the Mulroney government attempted to reverse the 
judicial decision and reinstate the law. Mulroney’s solution was Bill C-43 which was 
defeated in the Senate through a tie vote. However the consequences of this defeat saw 
the judicial decision of “no law.. .continued by default, not because it commanded 
majority support in either Parliament or the public.”67 In Morton’s view this resulted in a 
“democratic process enlightened by a new rights dialogue between independent judges
63 Janet Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role, (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2002), 227
64 Ibid.
65 F.L.Morton, Dialogue or Monologue? A Reply to Hogg and Thorthon, in F.L Morton, Law Policy and 
Judicial Process, 608
66 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30
67 F.L Morton, supra note 62 at 115
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and accountable legislators.”68 This dialogue between the two levels exemplifies an 
instance where the legislature tried to respond to a judicial ruling, but was stopped.
The dialogue debate is sharply divided into two. Charter supporters contend that 
the judiciary and the Court work harmoniously to achieve “Charter-proofed” policy, thus 
justifying judicial review as a guardian role or a sober second thought. The Charter proof 
argument is based on the belief that the government has analyzed all possible legal 
challenges to the bill and is confident the courts will uphold the law. Thus the 
government is ensuring that legislation will meet any Charter challenges.69 “Charter 
proofers” usually rely on Court rulings, which effectively substitutes judicial rulings for 
the Charter itself. While Charter critics decree that the judiciary has used the Charter to 
advance an institutional mandate, usurping legislative power and creating a modem day 
jurocracy, where the judicial word is the last say in public policy.
Conclusion
The legitimacy of judicial review rests on a delicate balance between legislative 
and judicial powers. Court supporters defend judicial activism as the means to a liberal 
and advancing nation. James Kelly dismisses the claim that the Charter has judicialized 
politics, creating a “jurocracy”, but argues instead that the introduction of the Charter 
“broadened the potential impact of the phenomenon (of judicial review) to all aspects of 
the constitutional system in Canada.”70 Kelly believes that the “judicialization of politics
68 F.L Morton, supra note 65 at, 603
69 For a complete description o f the term Charter-Proofed see Kent Roach, (2001) “Dangers o f a Charter- 
Proof and Crime-Based Response to Terrorism,” In Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach eds., 
The Security o f  Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill. (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press,
2001)
70 James Kelly, “Rebalancing Liberal Constitutionalism” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 3., 627
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
was a development that predated the Charter.”71 Canadian Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Beverley McLachlin agrees with this claim: “from the beginning of Canadian democracy, 
courts have had the task of deciding whether laws challenged as going beyond the powers 
of the legislatures that enacted them were valid or not.”72 Charter supporters, such as 
newly appointed Justice Rosalie Abella, explain that pleas for judicial deference "may be
•70
nothing more than a prescription for judicial rigor mortis." Charter critics, on the other 
hand, believe that judicial review is merely liberal rhetoric for judicial activism and is 
fueled by the Court’s lack of deference to the legislature. Critics further charge that the 
reality of “monologue” has created an undemocratic relationship between the Court and 
legislature, leaving Canada’s duly elected members with few options beside adherence to 
the Court’s demands despite a few instances of legislative replies.
This study will detail the relationship between the Court and legislatures by 
analyzing the shift from parliamentary to constitutional supremacy. The legislature’s use 
of s. 33, and the dialogue theory both develop the qualitative groundwork for this shift. 
However, this study will provide the statistical base analyzing wins and losses by rights 
claimant and distinguishing between statute/regulation and procedural challenges, to 
measure the Court’s deference to the other two branches of government.
71 Ibid., 626
72 Beverley McLachlin, “Courts, Legislature, and Executives in the Post-Charter Era” in F.L.Morton, ed. 
Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in Canada, 3rd edition, 64
73 Jeffery Simpson, “Judging gender and political optics” available from The Globe and Mail, Wednesday, 
Aug 25, 2004
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Federalism and the Nation Building Thesis 
Historical Consideration to Federalism and the Charter
In a speech to the Quebec Conference on February 6, 1865, father of 
Confederation John A. Macdonald discussed the future structure of Canada in a spirited 
and personal address. Macdonald, a strong proponent of centralized government, 
believed that:
.. .a legislative Union would be preferable (when compared to a Federal 
Union). (Macdonald stated) I have always contended that if  we could 
agree to have one government and one parliament, legislating for the 
whole of these peoples, (a legislative union) would be the best, the 
cheapest, the most vigorous, and the strongest system of government we 
could adopt. But... with a desire to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, we 
found that such a system was impracticable... Therefore, we were forced 
to the conclusion that we must either abandon the idea of Union 
altogether, or devise a system of union in which the separate provincial 
organizations would be in some degree preserved.74
Feeling intense pressures from the provinces, Macdonald conceded that the current
federal system was a:
.. .happy medium.. .that formed a scheme of government which unites the 
advantages of both (federal and legislative), giving us the strength of a 
legislative union and the sectional freedom of a federal union, with 
protection to local interests.75
Despite Macdonald’s centralizing desires, in order to appease the provinces, he shaped
the Canadian government by accepting the principles and structure of federalism. As
Joyce Green summarizes:
Federalism is a structural arrangement enabling divided sovereignty, and 
the practice of relationship between disparate components, each unique
74 John A. Macdonald. Parliamentary debates on the subject o f the confederation o f the British North 
American provinces, 3rd session, 8th Provincial Parliament o f  Canada. - Quebec: Hunter, Rose & Co., 
Parliamentary Printers. 1865. pp. 29-45; excerpts o f the speech may be found at Canadian Confederation 
Documents, Library and Archives Canada, available at http://www.collectionscanada.ca/confederation/hl8 
272-e.html
75 John A. Macdonald, Ibid.
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but also attending to an encompassing state that is understood to be more 
than the sum of its constitutional parts.76
The highly centralized version that Macdonald envisioned, as Garth Stevenson 
explains, “lasted little more than a decade after Confederation.”77 The Constitution Act 
o f1867 clearly establishes the division of powers between the federal and provincial 
governments. “The list of powers is meant to be exhaustive and the federal and 
provincial governments are to be supreme within their own sphere.”78 In Hodge v the 
Queen,7916 years after Confederation, Lord Watson of the JCPC stated that “the 
Dominion Parliament has no authority to encroach upon any class of subjects which is 
exclusively assigned to provincial legislatures by section 92” In Hodge, the JCPC 
effectively began the process of decentralizing the country by narrowing the meaning of 
POGG and using s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867 as a residual-powers clause.
The JCPC was traditionally seen as a supporter of the provincial governments by 
advancing the compartmentalized approach to defining federal and provincial powers. As 
Gerald Baier notes, “the JCPC favoured the enumerated powers of the provinces.”80 The 
JCPC made 173 major judgments concerning federalism through the interpretation of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. The decisions of the first 50 years tended to weaken the central
O 1
powers of the federal government and strengthen provincial power.
76 Joyce Green, Self-determination, Citizenship and Federalism as Palimpsest (Regina: Saskatchewan 
Institute o f  Public Policy, 2002), 2
77 Garth Stevenson, “Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations” in Canadian Politics in the 21st Century, 
ed., Michael Whittington and Glen Williams (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd., 2004), 87
78 Elaine Hughes, Alastair Lucus and William Tilleman, Environmental Law and Policy, 2nd edition 
(Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 1998), 31
79 Hodge v the Queen, (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117
80 Gerald Baier, “Judicial Review and Canadian Federalism,” in Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad eds., 
Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, andLegitamacy (Don Mills: Oxford University Press,
2002)
81 Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions, “The Judicial Committee o f  the Privy Council” 
Canada in the Making available from http://www.canadiana.org/citm/specifique/jcpc_e.html
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Lord Atkin’s often quoted remarks on the division of powers in Canada arose 
while assessing the constitutionality of former Prime Minister Richard Bennett’s New 
Deal in the Labour Conventions case. Lord Atkin disagreed with Ottawa’s assumption 
that a treaty, as an international obligation, gave Parliament the authority to dictate 
provincial resources. Atkin believed that treaties should not alter the distribution of 
powers in the Constitution and that the new deal was ultra vires of Parliament by 
asserting that "while the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters 
she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original
jM
structure." The New Deal, although defeated by the JCPC, initiated a rights revolution 
that focused on the development of the welfare state, and introduced the concepts of 
equality, employment standards and individual rights, despite Bennett’s reluctance. 
However when the JCPC was abolished, the Supreme Court became the highest court of 
appeal. The effect in the eyes of many Canadians, both inside, and outside f  Quebec, was
Of
“a heyday for federal centralism” as the federal government-appointed Supreme Court 
became consistently more deferential to Parliament. Gerald Baier, expressed his concern
o / r  .
with the application of the POGG clause after the abolishment of the JCPC. Baire 
found that the Supreme Court defined “a broader scope for the POGG power under the
82 The New Deal promised a more progressive taxation system, a maximum work week, a minimum wage, 
closer regulation o f working conditions, unemployment insurance, health and accident insurance, a revised 
old-age pension and agricultural support programs. For a more detailed explanation see: Harvard Sitkoff, 
Fifty years later: the New Deal evaluated (New York: McGraw Hill Pub. Co., 1985); William R. Brock, 
Welfare, democracy and the New Deal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); J.Richard.H 
Wilbur, The Bennett new deal: fraud or portent (Toronto: Copp Clark Pub. Co., 1968); Ernest Watkins, 
R.B. Bennett, a biography (Toronto : Kingswood House, 1963)
83 Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.) [1937] A.C. 335 at 347-48 (J.C.P.C.) [hereinafter Labour Conventions 
Case]
84 Labour Conventions Case, Ibid.
85 Guy Lachapelle, Daniel Salee, Gerald Bernier & Luc Bernier, The Quebec Democracy: Structures, 
Processes and Policies (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1993), 35
86 The Peace, Order and Good Government clause granted by the preamble o f s. 91 o f  the Constitution Act, 
1867, gives the federal government plenary power in matters not exclusively assigned to the provincial 
governments in s. 92.
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national concerns branch”87 which led to expanded federal plenary power in the fields of 
aeronautics, atomic energy, a national capital region and seabed natural resources.88 The 
Court’s approach to POGG and the division of powers led to the belief that the Supreme 
Court was deferential to the federal government. The worry was that if the Court did not 
define the division of powers narrowly and exclusively, the doctrine of paramountcy 
(POGG) would give the federal government the final say. John Saywell substantiated 
this claim by concluding that through the transfer of power from the JCPC to the 
Supreme Court, Canada’s federal nature became more balanced by the Court’s
o n
predilection for a strong national government. From 1950 to 1984, Patrick Monahan 
found that the focus of judicial review in federalism cases was primarily on the provinces 
and led to a greater proportion of provincial statutes being nullified. Monahan noted that 
from 1950 to 1960 “federal laws were virtually immune”90 This, in effect, encouraged 
decentralization and saw provincial demands for greater autonomy becoming 
increasingly prevalent.
Quebec’s Quiet revolution of the 1960’s, fueled by the assumption that Canada 
was made of two linguistically distinct nations, inaugurated an era of provincialism and 
regional demands for authority and autonomy. As Richard Simeon states, “linguistic 
duality and regionalism [is] the organization of political life according to territory and 
culture [and has become] the dominant concern”91 of Canada. The drive towards 
decentralization was “rooted not just in cultural or historical difference, but in the drive
87 Baier, supra note 80 at 26
88 Ibid., 26
89 John Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping o f Canadian Federalism (Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press, 2002)
90 Patrick Monahan, “The Law and Politics of Federalism: An Overview”, in Making the Law: The Courts 
and the Constitution, eds., Johy Saywell and George Vegh (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991), 280
91 Richard Simeon, Political Science and Federalism: Seven Decades o f  Scholarly Engagement. (Kingston: 
Queen’s University Press, 2002), 14
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
of provincial political, bureaucratic, and economic elites to mould provincial societies
» » • O')
and undertake responsibility for managing provincial development” The argument of a
QO
nation within a nation became a preoccupation of scholarly analysis. However not all 
scholars were in support of recognizing dualism within Canada. In a provocative 1972 
article, Walker Connor suggested that the failure of academics and political leaders to 
distinguish between nation and state created intense pressures on minorities to assimilate. He 
argued that many social theorists in the 1950s and 1960s conformed to the American 
influenced “melting pot” and that ethnic identity would “wither away” with 
“modernization”94
As Andre Laurendeau argued, the historical exclusion of French Canadians from all 
levels of the federal government, and ongoing discrimination of provincial governments 
towards their Francophone minorities, fueled the spread of neo-nationalism and threats of 
secession in Quebec.95 Effectively, this argument represents the challenges in state-building 
and influenced the secessionist movement.
Provincial fears of exploitation, aggravation with the Supreme Court and its level 
of deference to Parliament, and demands for constitutionally recognized rights led to a 
rights revolution based grounded in social advancement and change. John Diefenbaker’s 
government in 1960 enacted the Canadian Bill o f  Rights96-, however this was, as Peter 
Hogg explains, “merely a statutory instrument. It did not apply to the provinces. And it
92 Ibid., 17
93 see Alan C. Cairns, “The Governments and Societies o f  Canadian Federalism,” Canadian Journal o f  
Political Science 10 (1977)
94 Walker Connor, “Nation-building or Nation-destroying?” World Politics, 24:3, (April 1972): 321
95 Michael Behiels, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Legacy: The Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms” in 
Magnet, Beudoin, Gall and Manfredi, The Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms (Markham: 
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2003), 148
96 Canadian Bill o f  Rights, ( 1960, c. 44 )
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Q7had been given little effect even in its application to the federal government.” Enter one 
Pierre Trudeau, who was a strong advocate of individual rights and often labeled as a 
“hard lined centralist.”98 Trudeau, elected as Prime Minister in 1968, ran on the slogan 
“a strong united Canada founded on a policy of equal opportunity for all.”99 Upon taking 
office Trudeau turned his attention to reshaping the Canadian federation and continued to 
work towards his vision of Canada throughout his 16 year reign, interrupted only once by 
Joe Clark’s minority government of 1979.
The Nation Building Project
Trudeau enacted the Constitution Act, 1982 which included an amending formula
for constitutional change and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter differed
two-fold from the Bill of Rights: first it could only by altered by a constitutional
amendment, and secondly, the Charter included a supremacy clause which allowed the
Charter to override any inconsistent legislative statutes.100 Ian Greene explains that:
.. .according to the Trudeau government’s strategy for nation building, the 
Charter’s primary purpose was to promote national unity.. .it was also 
hoped that the Charter would cultivate national rather than regional 
loyalties through providing a common base of language and mobility 
rights.101
Trudeau’s nation-building thesis stated that “the value with the highest priority in 
the pursuit of a Just Society... [was] equality.”102 In pursuit of building an equal nation,
97 Hogg, supra note 2 at 794
98 Pierre Trudeau, “The Values o f a Just Society” eds., Trudeau and Thomas Axworthy, Towards a Just 
Society (Markham: Penguin Books Ltd., 1990), 359
99 Ibid., 359
100 Hogg, supra note 2 at 794-795
101 Ian Greene, The Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1989), 210
102 Trudeau, supra note 98 at 358
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Trudeau’s Charter focused on three rights: mobility rights; language and education rights;
and equality rights. As Kelly notes:
.. .the Charter sections identified with Trudeau’s nation building thesis 
deserve special attention, simply because they are uniquely Canadian and 
they impact federalism to a higher degree than other sections of the 
Charter.103
Mobility Rights
First, mobility rights, (s. 6 of the Charter) give “all Canadians the right to take up 
residence and earn their living anywhere in the country.”104 The ability to move to and 
work in other provinces without “prejudice” to a citizen’s “province of origin” is 
“fundamental to a sense of national citizenship”105 Mobility rights were seen as a way to 
address the growing sense of regionalism and provincialism fostered by creating an 
internally borderless country.106 The primary focus of mobility rights under the nation 
building thesis is interprovincial travel and eliminating the restrictions on interprovincial 
trade. Therefore, mobility rights were seen as a centralizing agent because they removed 
the autonomy of the provinces to regulate immigration and trade.
Despite an early victory in Black v Law Society o f  Alberta, 107 s. 6 has had 
relatively little success in establishing a strong central government. In effect, mobility 
rights have had the opposite effect, maintaining borders within the nation. As Kelly 
notes, from 1982 to 1997, mobility rights were challenged 6 times, with Black being the
103 Kelly, supra note 70 at 649
104 Trudeau, supra note 98 at 363
105 Roach, Sharpe and Swinton, supra note 28 at 172
106 Frank Iacobucci, “The Charter Twenty years Later” in Joseph Magnet, Gerald Beudoin, Gerald Gall and 
Christopher Manfredi, The Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, 382
107 In Black v. Law society o f  Alberta, [1989] 1 SCR 591 [hereinafter Black] The Supreme Court struck 
down Alberta’s Legal Professions Act, Rules 75B & 154 which prohibited Law Society members from 
entering into partnership with non-resident lawyers and from being members o f dual or multiple firms
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only Charter win.108 Of the 5 losses, 3 involved the extradition of criminals to the United 
States109 and one involving the rights of non-Canadians110; issues that are “peripheral to
the nation-building objectives.111 The only mobility rights case to focus on Canadian
/ / *)interprovincial travel since Black was Walker v. Prince Edward Island. However, in
Walker the Court departed from the Black ruling concluding that “restrictions on 
nonresidents were not a violation of the Charter, and allowed an interprovincial barrier to
113escape a successful Charter challenge.” Therefore, despite the implications of mobility 
rights implications for federalism, it has appeared that the Court is unwilling to accept a 
borderless nation, one of the central components of Trudeau’s vision. Thus suggesting 
that the Court is capable, and willing, to be sensitive to the policy goals of the Provinces.
Language and Education Rights
The tensions between the English and the French have been a constant in Canada 
since the mid 18th century. As Maureen Covell explains, “a language and its community 
of speakers may be in a minority position in numbers and/or in status, defined as having 
lesser prestige or being excluded from important sectors of public and private 
discourse.”114 The goal of entrenching language and education rights was to enable 
“francophones as well as anglophones [to] feel free to move to any province without fear
108 Kelly, supra note 70 at 649
109 USA v Controni, [1989] 1 SCR 1469; USA v Whitley, [1996] 1 SCR 467 and USA v Ross, [1996] 1 SCR 
469
110 Law Society o f  Upper Canada v Skapinker, [1984] 1 SCR 357
111 F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & M.J. Withey, “The Supreme Court’s First One Hundred 
Charter o f  Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis” (1992) 3 0 Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 1 ., 22
112 Walker v. Prince Edward Island [ 1995] SCR 407
113 Kelly, supra note 70 at 649
114 Maureen Covell, “Minority Language Policy in Canada and Europe: Does Federalism make a 
difference?” in Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad, Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, 
and Legitimacy, 239
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of losing their linguistic heritage.”115 The Charter, enacted just two years after the 1980 
Quebec sovereignty referendum, had to approach Canada’s dualistic nature cautiously. 
Language rights differ significantly from other Charter rights “because they are positive 
in nature.”116 As Roach, Sharpe and Swinton explain “they entitle an individual to certain 
action on the part of the government, such as funding for schools, printing of bilingual
117statues, and service from government offices in one’s chosen official language.”
Trudeau believed this would alleviate the fears of Quebecers and francophone minorities 
in other provinces, over the gradual erosion of their language and heritage. Education
1 1 o
and language rights, since Confederation, have been a provincial responsibility.
Provincial legislatures were apprehensive about the inclusion of these rights because they 
had an ability to nationalize traditional provincial powers. If the Supreme Court ruled 
against provincial autonomy in language and education cases, a centralizing effect was 
expected to occur because provincial autonomy would be threatened.
Kelly found that language and education rights attracted the second highest 
support rate in the Court, succeeding in 41% of the cases.119 Kelly suggests that “the loss 
of autonomy for the provinces in education policy was not an enduring feature of the 
Charter’s effect of Canadian federalism, but a characteristic of the Court’s initial 
activism.”120 Kelly suggests that the Court’s early propensity to rule in favour of the 
Charter claimant in language and education cases shows an interpretative approach to 
Charter adjudication. However Morton, Russell and Withey point to the political
115 Greene, supra note 101 at 212
116 Roach, Sharpe and Swinton, supra note 28 at 278
117 Ibid., 279
118 see s.93 and si 33 o f  the Constitution Act 1867
119 Kelly, supra note 70 at 649
120 Ibid., 649
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consequences of the early language cases and suggest that the decision in Quebec
191Protestant School Boards forced Quebec “to realize that they had lost control of
1 99education and culture.” The authors point out that the Court has been supportive of 
minority language rights, although they argue that the government has been active with 
the section 33 override in this subject area negating judicial rulings through enacting new 
legislation.123
This conclusion is flawed in two ways: first, s. 33 only applies to section 2 and 
sections 7 through 15; secondly, only the Protestant School Board case is decided by s.
23, while the other cases the authors produce as evidence are decided by s. 2(b)124 and 
non-Charter grounds.125 Nonetheless, language rights were designed to encourage 
nationalism and create a national identity founded on linguistic dualism. Language rights 
represent “a cultural compromise designed to enable linguistic communities to coexist in
196one federal country.” The Court has shown support for Trudeau’s intent; however in 
doing so it has challenged provincial autonomy in key areas such as language policy and 
education. Despite s. 33’s limited application, the provinces’ insistence on a 
notwithstanding clause in fear of a strong central government encroaching on provincial 
autonomy has, in the view of the provinces, reduced the potential harm and significance
197of the language and education cases not tried on ss. 16-23. This led Yves de Montigny
121 Quebec (A.G) v Quebec Association o f  Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 SCR 66 [hereinafter 
Protestant School Boards]
122 Morton, Russell and Withey, supra note 111 at 23
123 The Quebec government responded three times to judicial nullifications in Protestant School Boards', 
F ordv Quebec (A.G) [1988] 2 SCR 712 and Devine v Quebec (A.G), [1988] 2 SCT 790 while the 
Saskatchewan government overturned the ruling in Mercure v. Saskatchewan (A.G), [1988] 1 SCR 234
124 Ford; and Devine
125 Mercure v. Saskatchewan (A.G) was decided by the Saskatchewan Act, S.C. 1905, c. 42, s. 16
126 Greene, supra note 101 at 186
127 The Quebec’s government invocation o f s.33 in Ford and Devine
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to conclude that the Charter “has not had the devastating impact on the legislative
198autonomy of Quebec (and of the other provinces) that some may have feared.”
Equality Rights
Since the rise of the welfare state after the Great Depression, a liberal and 
progressive ideology of human equality has led Canadian social policy. The force and 
protection of the Charter’s equality rights were withheld for three years until 1985, “to
• * 129give governments time to bring their laws into line with section 15.” Section 15 
embodies the three fundamental values at the foundation of the Charter: equality, dignity 
and respect. As the Supreme Court stated in R. v. Turpin130 equality rights must be 
interpreted in accordance with “the purposes of s. 15 in remedying or preventing 
discrimination against groups suffering social, political or legal disadvantage in our 
society.”131 Trudeau believed that equality rights “implicitly established the primacy of 
the individual over the state and all government institutions, and in doing so, recognized 
that all sovereignty resides in the people.”132 Provinces were wary of Trudeau’s 
insistence on the primacy of the individual. The threat to the provinces was the 
possibility of a weakened government through the imposition of national standards in 
several policy fields. Since equality rights were universal and applied nationally, they 
were believed to have centralizing tendencies. Equality rights were expected to
128 Yves de Montigny, “The Impact (Real or Apprehended) o f the Canadian Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms on the Legislative Authority o f Quebec” in D. Schneiderman and K. Sutherland, eds., Charting 
the Consequences: The Impact o f  Charter Rights on Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1997)
129 Canada Heritage Department, “The Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms” Human Rights Programs available 
from http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/pdp-hrp/canada/freedom_e.cfm
130 R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR 1296
131 Ibid.
132 Trudeau, supra note 98 at 363
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fundamentally reshape the socio-political culture of Canada by protecting the rights of 
minorities and embracing a multi-cultural “mosaic”, while dismantling provincial 
autonomy over the rights of its citizens. As Patrick Monahan explains, s. 15 was clearly 
distinct from the Bill of Rights equality protections. The guarantee in the Bill of Rights 
of “equality before the law” was amended to provide for “equality before and under the 
law”, while the guarantee of “equal protection of the law” under the Bill of Rights was 
amended to provide for the “equal protection and equal benefit of the law.” Monahan 
states that these amendments signaled “to the courts that the equality jurisprudence 
developed under the Bill was not to be followed in the interpretation of the Charter.”133 
However equality rights are not absolute, providing the “notion that sometimes individual 
rights must give way to the need to protect the rights and the identity of particular groups 
within society.”134
n r
The Court’s decision in Andrews was expected to “set the stage for dramatic 
new developments in s. 15 litigation.” However, the real impact of equality rights still 
may not be folly realized. As the first study and another study conducted by Morton and 
Withey find, by the early 1990’s the lower courts were “flooded” with equality 
litigation.137 As the second study states “ ... ‘official’ minorities have used the Andrews 
reading of section 15 to try to leverage policy reforms out of Parliament and provincial
133 Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law, 2nd Edition (Toronto: Irwin law, 2002), 391
134 Beverly McLachlin, “Protecting Constitutional Rights: A Comparative view o f the United States and 
Canada,” (April 5, 2004) available from http://www.scc- 
csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/speeches/ComparativeView_e.asp
135 Andrews v. Law Society o f  British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143
136 F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & T. Riddell, “The Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms: A Descriptive 
Analysis o f  the First Decade, 1982-1992” (1994) 5 National Journal or Constitutional Law 1, 16
137 Morton, Russell and Withey, supra note 111 at 23; and F.L. Morton and M.J. Withey, Charting the 
Charter, 1982-1985: a statistical analysis (Calgary: University o f Calgary Press, 1986)
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legislatures.”138 Equality cases in the Court have continued to rise, as these recognized 
minority groups work their way through the Court system. With the recent advancements 
of unemployment benefits for seniors,139 voting rights for non-resident aboriginals140 and 
gay rights141 these “official minorities” appear to be enjoying the benefits of Trudeau’s 
vision for a nation founding on equality, dignity and respect. However “official 
minorities” are not the only groups to benefit from s. 15 protections. In Trociuk v British 
Columbia (A.G)142 women’s rights to “unacknowledge” the biological father on birth 
registrations forms was declared unconstitutional on the basis of sex.143 Therefore, 
Trudeau’s idea that equality rights would protect all minorities and ensure the equal 
access to dignity, respect and protections from state tyranny have remained the hallmark 
of the nation building thesis because they protect everyone in the state, including men.
In short, Kelly concludes that the nation-building sections of the Charter exhibit 
the “sharpest downward trend in success rates for Charter rights.. .thus, the Charter’s 
effect on federalism has become more marginal over time.144 However, despite the 
Court’s reluctance to impose national policy standards and the relatively minimal impact 
of mobility rights: the growing influence of equality right cases and the Court’s high 
support for language and education rights suggest the centralizing effect of Trudeau’s 
nation building components may be overlooked by Kelly. Ultimately, this study will 
statistically analyze the Charter’s impact on federalism by paying specific attention to the 
components in the nation building project.
138 Morton, Russell and Riddell, supra note 136 at 17
139 Tetreault-Gadoury v Canada, [1991] 2 SCR 22
140 Corbierev. Canada (Minister o f  Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203
141 see Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 SCR 418; Vriendv. Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493; M  v. H, [1999] 2 SCR 3,
142 Trociuk v British Columbia (A.G), [2003] SCR 34 [hereinafter Trociuk]
143 Ibid., Trociuk
144 Kelly, supra note 70 at 653
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The Individual Judge:
Independence, the Appointment Process and Ideological Congruency
Judicial Independence
An independent judiciary has often been heralded as the core principle of the rule
of law.145 The judiciary must be free of fear or favour in order to uphold constitutional
supremacy and offer an impartial court of appeal. “An independent judiciary has long
been recognized as the foundation upon which a true democracy rests because it allows
judges to make impartial decisions without fear of consequence.”146 Most importantly,
the Court must be independent from any and all forms of coercion, threat or harassment,
direct or indirect, whether from government, politicians, or any other source of improper
influence. As former Chief Justice Brian Dickson declared, the root principle of judicial
independence involves “the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide cases
that come before them.147 In a recent journal contribution, Patrick Monahan quoted Sir
William Holdsworth, the distinguished British legal historian. Holdsworth stated:
The judiciary has separate and autonomous powers just as truly as the king 
or parliament; and in the exercise of these powers, its members are not 
more in the position of servants than the King or Parliament in the 
exercise of their powers ... The judges have powers of this nature because, 
being entrusted with the maintenance of the supremacy of law, they are 
and long have been regarded as a separate and independent part of the 
Constitution.148
However, the balance between an impartial and balanced Court, and a Court 
susceptible to individual intentions and preferences, can at times be hard to distinguish.
145 Justice F.B. William Kelly, An Independent Judiciary: The Core o f  the Rule o f  Law (Vancouver: 
International Centre for Criminal Justice Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, 1995)
146 Honorable John D. Richard , Challenges Facing The Judiciary Today, available from http://www.fct- 
cf.gc.ca/bulletins/speeches/chaHenges e.shtml
147 Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 SCR 56
148 Patrick Monahan, “Is The Pearson Airport Legislation Unconstitutional? The Rule o f Law as a Limit on 
Contract Repudiation by Government” (1996) Osgoode Hall Law Journal [Vol. 33, No.3], 427.
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Charter critics point to the recent ruling in the Provincial Judges Reference149 where the
judiciary used the premise of judicial independence to establish de facto control over
their own salaries.150 At issue was whether legislation allowing the government to
control and fix the salaries of provincial judges was unconstitutional. The majority of the
Court held that if  the government controlled judicial remuneration, than the judiciary was
on the same level as the bureaucracy and thus parallel to civil servants who “are
expected to carry out the governments wishes and are paid to do so; judges (however) are
not.”151 In a spirited dissent La Forest J., charged that the majority’s decision was:
.. .not mandated by s. 1 \(d). To read these requirements into that section 
represents both an unjustified departure from established precedents and a 
partial usurpation of the provinces' power to set the salaries of inferior 
court judges pursuant to ss. 92(4) and 92(14) of the Constitution Act,
1867. The guarantee of judicial independence inhering in s. 11 (d) 
redounds to the benefit of the judged, not the judges. Section 11 (d) 
therefore does not grant judges a level of independence to which they feel 
they are entitled.152
Critics charge that the Court’s decision “unilaterally extend[ed] its constitutional power 
of control considerably,”153 and was based on loosely supported constitutional 
principles.154 They claim that this decision shows the judiciary acts for its own benefit, 
pursuing a self-serving agenda. Judicial control “only remains legitimate when it operates
149 R. v. Campbell, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3., Reference Re Remuneration o f  Judges o f  the Provincial Court o f  
Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3., Reference Re Independence and Impartiality o f  Judges o f  the 
Provincial Court o f  Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3., Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. V. 
Manitoba (Minister o f  Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.. [hereinafter Provincial Judges Reference]
150 The Judges argued it was essential that they not be recognized as civil servants because they do not 
carry out the governments demands. Hence, to ensure and independent judiciary, salaries could not be 
fixed by the government.
151Gerald Seniuk, “Judicial Independence and the Supreme Court o f  Canada”, Canadian Bar Review 77 
(1999), 388
152 Provincial Judges Reference, Supra note 119
153 Pierre Patenaude, “The Provincial Court Judges Case and Extended Judicial Control” in Howe and 
Russell, Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy, 99
154 s. 11 (d) o f  the Charter states that a person charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty “according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.”
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within the parameters set by the Constitution.”155 Since the judiciary allegedly 
overlooked the constitutional principles set in the Constitution Act, 1867, critics have 
suggested that judicial independence has gone too far. However, supporters of judicial 
action point to the legislative override as an available option in this case because the 
judiciary based its opinion on s. 11(d) of the Charter. Thus if the government felt its 
jurisdiction was being encroached, constitutional remedies were available.
Appointment Process
A cloak of secrecy has shrouded the Court since its inception. With the Court’s
new found public attention, increasing criticism over the appointment process and calls
for reform have expanded rapidly.156 Currently:
The constitutional authority for the appointment of Supreme Court judges 
rests with the executive branch of the federal government by way of Order 
in Council appointment, and the executive remains responsible and 
accountable for the exercise of this important power.15
Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin stated in a speech to the Council of the Canadian Bar 
Association in August, 2004 that “the most important goal in appointing new members of 
the Supreme Court remains to ensure that only persons of the highest merit are selected, 
independently of any and all political or ideological considerations.”158
155 Pierre Patenaude, Supra note 153 at 99
156 Jacob Ziegel, Merit, Selection and Dem ocratization o f  Appointments to the Supreme Court o f  Canada 
(Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1999); David Beatty, Talking heads and the Supremes: 
the Canadian production o f  constitutional review (Agincourt: Carswell, 1990); F.LMorton, “To Bring 
Judicial Appointments Out o f  the Closet” in F.L.Morton, ed. Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in 
Canada, 3r edition (Calgary: University o f Calgary Press, 2002)
157 Department o f Justice, “Supreme Court Appointment Process” Government o f  Canada: Backgrounder 
available from http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2004/doc_31208.html
158 Beverly McLachlin, “Remarks to the Council o f  the Bar Association” Supreme Court o f  Canada: 
Judges o f the Court available from http://www.scc- 
csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/speeches/CBAWinnipeg_e.asp
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The Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness in an introductory report found that:
.. .whatever the quality of judgements produced by the Supreme Court, the 
process by which Justices are appointed to that body is secretive or, at the 
very least, unknown to Canadians. This could lead to the perception that 
appointments may be based upon improper criteria. The Committee agreed 
that more credibility in the appointment process would be beneficial to the 
Supreme Court and lend it more legitimacy in the eyes of Canadians159
Since the government’s search for a replacement for retired Justice La Forest in 1997, 
Charter critics have been lobbying for a revised appointment process which holds public 
hearings before a parliamentary committee which were expected to “politicize the 
process.”160
However, Alan Hutchinson supports the assumption of this study that ideological
congruencies play a factor injudicial decision making. Hutchinson states:
Judicial appointments will always be political, even when they 
masquerade under the dubious label of "merit." The choice is not between 
a political and a non-political process of judicial appointments; rather, it is 
a straightforward choice about which should prevail.. .the politics of the 
judiciary, or the politics of the public at large as expressed by its elected 
representatives1 1
Under the Chretien government, reform to the judicial process went untested. However 
in Paul Martin’s bid for democratic reform, self touted as the “cornerstone” of his 
government, he set his sights on implementing a public review process of “Supreme
159 Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, “Improving 
the Supreme Court o f  Canada Appointment Process Introduction”, available from 
htp://www.parl.gc.ca/InfocomDoc/Documents/37/3/parlbus/commbus/house/reports/justrp01/07-rap-e.htm 
[hereinafter Standing Committee on Justice]
160 F.L. Morton, "Reforming the Judicial Appointment Process for the Supreme Court o f  Canada" Excerpts 
from the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, available from 
http://www.canadianjusticereviewcouncil.ca/Justice%20Committee%20TM.htm
161 Allan Hutchinson, “Let's try democracy when choosing top judges” The Globe and Mail (March 3,2004)
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1 f\0
Court.. .appointments.” In order to bring more transparency into the appointment 
process of the judiciary, Martin created an ad hoc committee163 on Supreme Court 
appointments, where the Minister of Justice was to “describe.. .how and why the 
nominees were chosen and to answer questions in an effort to increase public awareness, 
confidence and understanding of the process for selecting the nominees.”164 The 
committee then wrote a report on their views and suggestions. However, the report does 
“not have any binding effect on the Prime Minister. The PM may choose to accept it in 
his decision, accept parts of it, or reject it completely.”165 Judicial candidates are selected 
by the Prime Minister from a pool of candidates on the basis of recommendations made 
by the Minister of Justice. These candidates usually have extensive experience in the 
lower courts or in rare circumstances are nominated from the field of academia. The new 
ad hoc committee was expected to bring some legitimacy to the process, however even 
though judges can now be reviewed, they cannot be vetoed. The appointment of 
individual Justices remains clearly at the prerogative of the Prime. Critics charge that this 
substantial amount of latitude for the Prime Minister in the appointment process is thus 
unjustified and dangerous.
Critics pointed to the fact that neither of the newly appointed Justices (Abella and 
Charron JJ.) was made available for questioning, as is the practice in the American
162 Office o f the Prime Minister, “Martin government tables Democratic Reform Action Plan” Government 
o f Canada, available from http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=52
163 The committee was made up o f these 9 individuals: Derek Lee, Liberal MP for Scarborough-Rouge 
River; Sue Barnes, Liberal MP for London West; Denis Paradis, Liberal MP for Brome-Missisquoi; Vic 
Toews, Conservative MP for Provencher; Peter MacKay, Conservative MP for Central Nova; Richard 
Marceau, Bloc Quebecois MP for Charlesbourg; Joe Comartin, New Democratic Party MP for Windsor- 
Tecumseh; Julian Porter, Law Society o f Upper Canada; and Chief Justice o f the Federal Court o f Appeal 
John Richard, Canadian Judicial Council
164 Department o f Justice, supra note 157
165 Mapleafweb, University o f  Lethbridge, “Prime Minister Paul Martin’s Appointments: The nominees and 
selection process” available from http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/judical/supreme- 
court/appointment/appointments.html
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confirmation process. Morton explained that this may just be a government public
relations move to mask the power of the exclusive power of the Prime Minister.166
However as government supporters suggest, this is only the first step in reforming the
appointment process and shedding the veil of secrecy. The disdain for this process was
exemplified by the chair of the the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Liberal M.P Paul DeVillers. Devillers wrote that:
(The) Committee expresses its great disappointment with regards to the 
proposed reform of the appointment process for the Supreme Court 
Justices by the government and denounces the overly broad discretion 
given to the Justice Minister and the Prime Minister in the suggested 
process. (The) Committee recommends that the government reconsider its 
position and come back to the Committee.. .with a new and more 
ambitious reform proposal, including a more important role for 
parliamentarians and the provinces.167
However, as the Standing Committee on Justice suggested, this process was not a long­
term solution. The committee and this interim procedure was established to “to shed as 
much light as possible on how the two new Justices were chosen.” Therefore the 
amendments to the appointment process and its effects on the administration of justice 
have yet to be fully realized. Nonetheless, it is crucial to qualitatively analyze the 
appointment process to substantiate this study’s premise that ideological congruencies 
play a factor injudicial decision making.
166 F.L. Morton, supra note 160
167 House o f  Commons Reports, 7th report, “Study on the Processes by which Judges are appointed to the 
Supreme Court o f Canada” available from
http://www.parl.gc.ca/committee/CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=l 10039
168 Standing Committee on Justice, supra note 159
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
Ideological Congruency
Peter Russell concludes that the government has shown little progress in 
“modernizing the Supreme Court.”169 Russell found that the government had a tendency 
to make “judicial appointments on the basis of party political affiliation rather than on the 
basis of merit,”170 however this was more prevalent in the lower Courts than in the 
Supreme Court, as it is generally accepted that the Supreme Court is completely devoid 
of partisan appointments. Professor Lederman echoed this claim, stating that “loyalty to 
the political party in power is given priority over merit pure and simple.”171 The 
perception of judicial biases and ideological influences within the Court has continued to 
gain support since the introduction of the Charter172, while the notion of patronage 
appointments has received little attention from Canadian scholars. It is the intention of 
this study to examine ideological congruencies between the individual justice and their 
appointer.
Since judges are appointed to the Court by the Prime Minister, it is a reasonable 
assumption that the appointee may hold similar philosophies to the appointer, both 
legally and morally. Evidence of “court packing” in the United States has been 
consistent since Franklin Roosevelt’s judicial reorganization bill of 1937 and has since
169 Peter Russell, “Modernizing the Supreme Court” in Gerald Beaudoin ed., The Supreme Court o f  Canada 
(Cowansville: Les Editions YvanBlais, 1985)
170 Ibid., 123
171 Bill Lederman, “Current Proposals for Reform o f the Supreme Court o f  Canada” (1979), 57 Canadian 
Bar Review, 688.
172 see Allan Hutchinson, Dwelling on the threshold: critical essays on modem legal thought (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1988); Simon Potter, “Judging the Judiciary : The Rule o f Law in the Age o f  The Charter” Policy 
Options, IRPP, October 2003; Rainer Knopff and F.L. Morton, "Ardour in the Courts" The Globe and Mail 
(April 7, 2000 p. A 17); Andrew Heard “The Charter in the Supreme Court o f  Canada: The importance of 
which judges hear an appeal,” Canadian Journal o f Political Science 24 ( 1991), Jeffery Simpson 
“Patronage in Judicial Appointments” in F.L Morton, ed., Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in 
Canada-, David Beatty, supra note 156
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became commonplace in American politics.173 Despite little evidence in Canada, Heard 
notes that in the 1960’s, exclusive voting blocks in the Supreme Court were discovered in 
three separate studies.174 However linkages to political favours and patronage have yet 
to be discovered in Charter jurisprudence. Jeffery Simpson claims that the Court is now
1 7^“completely devoid of patronage, or even the tinge of partisan appointments.” While 
quantitative studies have found a linkage between the governing party and the appointed 
judge, the definition of liberal and conservative justices is rather vague and subjective.
David Beatty suggests that a liberal approach to adjudication is realized through 
the Charter’s success.176 Beatty’s argument makes the assumption that the Charter was 
created to change social policy, thus when the judiciary does not read the Charter in a 
broad and interpretive manner “they (are) acting unconstitutionally.” 177 Since the 
Charter was meant to be read to advance individual rights and freedoms, Beatty believes 
that when the judiciary steps away from this role they are applying a conservative, rights 
restrictive approach to interpretation.
This thesis makes two major assumptions when approaching ideological 
similarities in the Court. First, a Prime Minister will appoint judges that share similar 
values and ideologies to his or her own. Second, a “conservative” judge will approach
173 Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind Revisited: Psychometric Analysis o f  Supreme Court Ideology 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall, “Neo-Institutionalism and 
Dissent in the State Supreme Courts,” Journal o f  Politics 52 (1990); Susan Phillips, Ideology in the 
language o f judges : how judges practice law, politics, and courtroom control (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998)
174 Doneal E. Fouts, “Policy Making in the Supreme Court o f Canada, 1950-1960” in Schubert and 
Danelski, eds., Comparative Judicial Behavior (1969); Sidney R. Peck, “A Scalogram Analysis of the 
Supreme Court o f Canada, 1958-1967,” in Schubert and Danelski, eds., Comparative Judicial Behavior 
(1969); Peter H. Russell, The Supreme Court o f  Canada as a Bilingual and Bicultural Institution, Vol. 1 of 
the Documents o f  the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa: Queens Printer,
1969)
173 Simpson, supra note 172 at 133
176 Beatty, supra note 156
177 Ibid., Preface vi-vii
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the Charter in a more restrained fashion, supporting the Charter claimant less often than
liberal appointees, show greater amounts of deference to the government and be less
likely to advance the rights of the accused. Andrew Heard discovered that the outcome
of an individual Charter case may be determined by which combination of judges hear an
appeal. Heard concluded that
The recognition of the unspoken but tangible role of the personal 
predilections of judges will have to be accounted for in general theorizing 
about the degree of judicial activism to be tolerated.178
Although the Court is guided by the doctrine of stare decisis, decision 
making in the Court can still be influenced by ideology. Justice Bastarache, a 
Chretien appointee, stated that he has been “more conservative than the majority 
of the court over the last few years.” Furthermore he stated that the Court must be 
wary of having its legitimacy frequently questioned by being “consistently seen 
by a majority of the people as going too far, as extending rights, (and) as 
having.. .an agenda.”179 The interpretative nature of adjudication and the fact the 
Judges are only human, creates a possibility that ideological influences affect the 
Court. All reasonable people make deductions and conclusions based on their 
personal understanding and morals; to ignore this would be injudicious. It is only 
natural that the Prime Minister would appoint individuals who view social change 
in a similar fashion. Therefore this study will analyze the individual justices 
voting habits and group the justices according to their appointee to establish the 
influence of the individual and the influence of ideology in the Court.
178 Andrew Heard supra note 172 at 307
179 Hon. Justice Michael Bastarache, as quoted in Roach, supra note 3 at 4
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Conclusion
In short, this thesis seeks to explain the Charter’s role and influence in 
three specific areas of Canadian constitutionalism. First, the shift from 
parliamentary to constitutional supremacy has raised questions to the legitimacy 
of judicial review. Since the Charter establishes the Court as the ultimate 
institution in determining the extent of this relationship, a critical analysis of this 
relationship is exigent. Secondly, the Charter was drafted with centralizing 
intentions. The impact of mobility, language and education and equality rights 
dictate the Charter’s impact to federalism; further describing the relationship 
between the Court and the legislatures. Lastly, the influence of the individual and 
the lasting impact of appointing Prime Ministers must be analyzed to answer the 
question if it matters which judge hears an appeal.
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Methodology
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As noted by Heard, a well defined methodology allows the reader to appreciate 
the differences in data collection, “since they often account for apparent variations in 
(the) results.”1 This chapter will serve a two-fold purpose. First, the format of the paper 
is presented; the second section will discuss the parameters and taxonomy for choosing 
the cases for the dataset.
Thesis Format
This thesis will be divided into six variables which will be modeled after Kelly’s 
analysis in the Osgood Hall Law Journal. However this thesis will revise the structure by 
eliminating sections that are deemed unnecessary, while expanding on the sections that 
evaluate individual judicial approaches and receptiveness to the Charter. As Kelly notes 
in his PhD dissertation, Canada is governed under a “constitutional triumvirate,” 
combining parliamentary democracy, federalism and judicial review. These three pillars 
of Canadian constitutionalism will be the focal points of this study; each section of the 
thesis will help establish quantitative conclusions explaining the Charter’s effects on 
these three themes. As discussed in the first chapter, while analyzing quantitative data 
can produce worthwhile statistical generalizations, the results are not a substitute for 
jurisprudential analysis.
The following paragraphs will outline the design of this thesis. This design will 
produce the statistical evidence to support the normative assumptions outlined in the first
1 Andrew Heard “The Charter in the Supreme Court o f Canada: The importance o f which judges hear an 
appeal,” Canadian Journal o f  Political Science 24 (1991), 295.
2 James B. Kelly, “The Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms and the Rebalancing o f  Liberal Constitutionalism 
in Canada, 1982-1987” Ph.D. Dissertation., McGill University, 1999; available online from
http ://www.yorku. ca/ohl i/PDF s/3 7 ,3/kellv.pdf. 31.
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chapter which will guide this paper specifically, and its concern with judicial attitudes 
and the effect of the Charter on Canada’s pillars of constitutionalism.
(I) The Charter’s Impact on the Supreme Court
This section determines the Charter’s overall impact on the Supreme Court’s caseload 
from 1982 to 2003. Presenting the Charter caseload as a percentage of the Court’s total 
docket will give a general outline of the Charter’s actual impact on the Court. Peter 
Hogg suggests that with the advent of the Charter, a new role was created for the Court. 
Hogg claims that the Charter monopolized the Court’s docket, thus creating a 
“constitutional Court.”3 Kelly argues that with the increasing number of Charter cases, 
“the Supreme Court (has) increasingly becoming a public law court under the Charter.”4 
However, as appendix M3 shows, this trend is declining as the Charter is playing a lesser 
role in the Court’s workload. This decline is highlighted by a lifetime low of Charter 
cases heard by the Court at 8% in 2000.
(II) Outcomes o f Supreme Court Charter Decisions
This section will measure the success of the Charter by comparing the winning 
percentage of rights claimants from year to year. However, as is discussed later in the 
methodology, this study will incorporate a more sophisticated taxonomy for determining 
wins and losses in the Court. The previous studies coded multiple cases as inconclusive 
when there was a clear winner. By redefining “wins and losses,” a more complete case 
assessment will be created.
3 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law o f  Canada, 4th Ed. (Carswell Publishing, 1997)
4 James Kelly, “Rebalancing Liberal Constitutionalism” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 640 
[hereinafter Kelly study]
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Kelly determines that there has been a relatively consistent success rate for Charter 
claimants, which he attributes to the uniting of the Court’s grey middle.5 This grey 
middle includes Justices who do not vote on either of the ideological extremes and do not 
consistently choose the same position; statistically this is represented by the average of 
the Court. However, Kelly’s findings may only describe the Justices appointed by former 
Prime Minister Mulroney. Kelly’s evidence consists of only one Trudeau appointed 
Judge (Lamer), while the rest of the “grey middle” is composed of Mulroney 
appointments (McLachlin, Sopinka, Cory, Major, Iacobucci, La Forest, and L’Heureux- 
Dube). Since 1997, only Justice Major and Chief Justice McLachlin remain on the 
current bench, with 8 new Justices being appointed by Jean Chretien.6 Justices Abella 
and Charron were appointed by current Prime Minister Martin, on August 30, 2004, and 
thus do not fall under the umbrella of this study. Nonetheless, since the Charter’s impact 
is such a highly debated topic, it is constructive to analyze the Court’s support for the 
Charter and see if the recent McLachlin Court will continue the trend of its predecessor 
or take the Court in a new direction.
(Ill) Treatment o f  Different Rights and Freedoms
The specific section of the Charter challenged determines which part of Canada’s 
triumvirate is contested. As appendix M4 explains, for the purpose of this thesis, Charter 
rights and freedoms are divided into nine categories. Kelly concludes that certain rights
n
and freedoms act as a limiting factor to federalism and pluralism. As was discussed in 
Chapter 2, the Charter is believed to have centralizing tendencies which confront the
5Kelly study, Ibid., 640
6 For a complete list o f former and current Justices to sit on the bench since the Charter see appendix M-2
7 Kelly study, supra note 4 at, 646
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relationship between Parliament and the legislatures. By analyzing the Charter sections 
covered in Trudeau’s nation-building project, the Charter’s effect on federalism will be 
discovered and the role of the Court as arbiters of federal/provincial relations will be 
analyzed.
Kelly points to the Court’s handling of language and education rights as an 
indicator of the centralizing impact of the Charter on Canadian federalism. The 
centralization thesis is believed to reduce federal diversity and contribute to a centralized 
state.8 Conversely, Kelly declares that the Court is becoming more sensitive to federalism 
because “the Charter’s entanglement with the politics of language in Canada has 
significantly declined as (the Court’s) activism has declined.”9 However, this causal link 
between language rights in the Charter and the impact on federal/provincial relations is 
seriously slanted. Nearly 75% of the language and education cases used in all three 
studies are based on non-Charter rights10 and therefore will be excluded from this 
analysis. The only cases which will fall under this section will include sections 16-23 of 
the Charter. Therefore, since the numbers will be altered significantly, this section will 
attack the conclusions that the Charter has been deleterious to federalism and will present 
a proper indication of the Charter's impact on Canada’s federal/provincial relations.
Furthermore, by analyzing legal rights, conclusions as to the purposive effect of 
the Charter on the legal system will be drawn. As Herbert Packer explained, there are
8 See Peter Hogg, “ Federalism Fights the Charter," in David Shugarman and Reg 
Whitaker, eds., Federalism and Political Community (Peterborough: Broadview
Press, 1989), Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End o f  a Canadian Dream (Montreal: McGill- 
Queen’s University Press, 1995) and F. L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the 
Court Party (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000)
9 Kelly study, supra note 4 at 647
10 Including section 93 and 133 o f the Constitution Act, 1867; section 23 o f the Manitoba Act, S.C. 1870, c. 
3; and section 16 o f the Saskatchewan Act, S.C. 1905, c. 42.
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generally two approaches to the application of the law: due process and crime control."
All three studies have discovered that legal rights account for nearly two-thirds of all
1 0rights cases brought before the Court. Analyzing the Court’s application of the Charter 
to legal rights will permit conclusions to be drawn about the state of Canada’s legal 
system. Moreover, this section will address the claim that the Court has become a public 
law court focusing on legal rights and police conduct.
The Object o f  Charter Challenges and the Nullification o f  Statutes
Institutional supremacy in the Canadian policy arena is a contentious issue that 
has fostered an extensive quantity of literature based on normative assumptions of power
1 3and superiority. In this section, Charter cases are divided into three types of challenges: 
statute/regulatory, references, and conduct cases. By tracking the object of the Charter 
challenge, substantive data on the Court’s relationship with the policy makers will be 
created.
Statute and regulatory cases have been combined because both involve the 
relationship between the Courts and the legislative will in the Canadian policy process. 
Although regulations are mostly made by the executive branch alone, the judiciary still
11 Herbert Packer, “Two Models o f the Criminal Process” University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review 113: 
1964, 1.
12 F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & M.J. Withey, “The Supreme Court’s First One Hundred 
Charter o f  Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis” (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 1., 21, 
[hereinafter First study]; F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & T. Riddell, “The Canadian Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms: A Descriptive Analysis o f the First Decade, 1982-1992” (1994) 5 National Journal or 
Constitutional Law 1., 12, [hereinafter Second study]; Kelly study, supra note 4 at 648.
13 See Christopher P. Manffedi, Judicial Power and the Charter (Don Mills: Oxford University Press,
2001); F. L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough: 
Broadview Press, 2000); Epp, Charles R. 1996. "Do Bills o f Rights Matter?: The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms." American Political Science Review.90:765-779; John Hart Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust (London: Harvard University Press, 1980) and Janet L. Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma o f  
Judicial Review (Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1996)
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interprets the constitutionality of the declaration. Statutes and regulations are further 
divided into 2 categories: provincial and federal. However, challenges to municipal by­
laws will be included in the provincial category because as a “creature of the province”, 
cities have no inherent powers, only powers given to them by the province through 
provincial statutes. Kelly argues that statute cases place the Court in a “confrontational 
relationship with democratic actors for control of the policy process in Canada.”14 
Second, in reference cases the Court is asked “to consider important questions of law 
such as the constitutionality or interpretation of federal or provincial legislation, or the 
division of powers between the federal and provincial levels of government.”15 Although 
relatively infrequent, governments usually bring a reference case to the Supreme Court 
when it is unclear whether a proposed law is constitutionally valid, thus testing the 
relationship between the legislative and judicial branches. On the other hand, a challenge 
to a conduct case involves procedural rights; it addresses the behaviour of the police and 
government officials. Conduct cases do not test the relationship between the legislatures 
and the judiciary on the scale that statute cases do. Since conduct cases require judgment 
on the application of the law, it is widely held that the Court is more justified in 
interpreting these cases because they have the “capacity to address (them) effectively.”16 
Kelly discovered that the proportion of conduct cases has risen over time, suggesting that 
the Courts focus has shifted.17
Secondly, this section will compute the nullification rate of statutes and regulations 
by level of government. As table 3-1 shows, provincial statutes (40%) are more likely
14 Kelly study, supra note 4 at 654
15 The Supreme Court o f  Canada, “Role o f the Court” available from http://www.scc- 
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/role/index_e.asp
16 Kelly study, supra note 4 at 655
17 Ibid., 655
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to be nullified than federal (27%); however from 1984 to 1997 the federal government 
has encountered a greater degree of scrutiny in the Court with 110 statutes being 
challenged compared to 70 for the provinces.
Table 3-1




1984-1989 Federal 8 (33) 24
Provincial 11 (39) 26
1984-1992 Federal 23 (32) 75
Provincial 18 (41) 44
1993-1997 Federal 7 (20) 35
Provincial 10 (39) 26
1984-1997 Federal 30 (27) 110
Provincial 28 (40) 70
Kelly explains that this “disproportionate effect on the provinces” is declining and the 
Court is “acting in a more balanced fashion towards both levels of government.”18 Kelly 
suggests that the Court, despite striking deviations, is acting in a neutral fashion in 
federalism cases. On the other hand, Janet Hiebert states that the Court is deferential to 
the federal government because the provincial statutes struck down were of more force 
and importance, usually involving new provincial regulations, compared to the older and 
less important federal statutes.19 In short, this section will evaluate the centralization 
theory which states that the Charter will be utilized by the Court to create universal 
policy conformity within Canada.
18 Ibid., 657
19 Hiebert, supra note 13
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Judicial Discretion: The Court’s Use o f  Section 1
Sharpe, Swinton and Roach ask the important question guiding s. 1, the 
reasonable limitations clause: “when should the courts intervene to protect rights and 
when should they leave decisions about rights and limits to the legislatures?”20 As 
explained in the literature review, Charter critics claim that the level of deference the 
Court exhibits towards the legislatures stipulates the legitimacy of judicial review. When 
the Court goes strikes down government created statutes, they are going against the will 
of the legislature and becoming a major player in the policy arena. However as Charter 
supporters suggest, this is exactly what the Charter was created for, as demonstrated by s. 
52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 52(1) establishes the primacy of the 
constitution in Canada and states that “any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Constitution is.. .of no force or effect.”21 For Charter supporters, s. 52(1) legitimizes 
the Court’s role in the policy process and state that ignoring the importance of the review 
functions of the court would be unconstitutional. However, s. 52(1) creates a 
discretionary role for the Courts, since the Court must interpret the Charter to the best of 
their abilities to establish any inconsistencies between the law and the Charter.
Section 1 is often portrayed as a “highly discretionary balancing test between the
policy interests of the government and the interest of the litigant in having Charter rights
22upheld. This segment of the thesis will summarize the government’s success when 
using s. 1 to justify Charter infringements as reasonable limitations by analyzing the 
government’s success rate. This section will also look at the broader issue of
20 Robert J. Sharpe, Katherine E. Swinton and Kent Roach, The Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms 2nd edition 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), 62
21 Part VII, Constitution Act, 1982
22 Second Study, supra note 12 at 8
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parliamentary democracy by measuring the Court’s deference to parliament. Through
section 1, the courts
were entrusted with the gatekepping of the legislative limitations on rights, 
through the application of a text that encompasses not one but three of the most 
open-ended concepts in any language: ‘reasonable limits,’ demonstrably 
justifiable,’ and ‘free and democratic society.23
Kelly claims that the Court’s growing support for the government in s. 1 defenses shows
a shift from “activism to moderate activism.”24 When the Court accepts the
government’s explanation, they are accepting parliamentary supremacy because they are
either accepting the legislative will, or alternatively, accepting the legislature’s approach
to the Charter. Therefore this section will further analyze the relationship between
parliamentary supremacy and judicial supremacy.
The exclusion o f  evidence under s. 24(2)
All three studies analyzed the Court’s discretionary powers through the invocation of 
s. 24(2), which provides a procedural guarantee of trial fairness by allowing the Courts to 
determine the admissibility of “tainted” evidence. Prior to the Charter, Canadian Court’s 
followed the “rule of English common law” and thus any evidence obtained in illegal 
manners was “admissible if relevant.”25 This created a judicial system that followed the 
precepts of “crime control.” Section 24(2) gave the Court the ability to include or 
exclude evidence based on three principles developed in Collins 26 Part three of the
23 Andrew Lajoie and Henry Quillinan, “The SC Judges Views o f  the Role o f  the Courts in the Application 
o f the Charter" in Phillip Bryden, Steven Davis and Peter Russell eds., Protecting Rights and Freedoms: 
Essays on the Charter’s Place in Canadian Political, Legal and Intellectual Life, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1994), 93.
24 Kelly study, supra note 4 at 663
25 Peter Hogg, supra note 3 at 932
26 In R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 the Court declared that three factors must be examined in s. 24(2)
cases which are: 1) The effect o f the admission of the evidence on the fairness o f  the trial; 2) The
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Collins test established that Court must consider “the effect of excluding the evidence on 
the repute of the administration of justice.”27 This affords the judiciary an interpretative 
approach to the exclusion of evidence, and stands in stark contrast of the absolutism of 
the American exclusionary rule.
Sharpe, Swinton and Roach explain that s. 24(2) is “the most commonly ordered 
remedy for a breach of a Charter right in the criminal process.”28 Hogg suggests that 
since Collins, the Court has developed a “nuanced approach to the exclusion of 
evidence.” Excluding evidence allows for a substantial element of discretion and 
therefore will help establish the judiciary’s approach to the Charter. Moreover, s. 24(2) 
cases are primarily concerned with police practices and the Court’s application of the 
common law, therefore analyzing this section will help establish if Canada’s legal system 
has continued to operate under the crime control approach or has shifted to a system 
guided by due process of the law.
(V) Charter Consensus in the Court
There are two competing viewpoints on the value of Court consensus. Former Justice 
Iacobucci explains that unanimity is desirable to the public, the lower courts and the law 
society in certain instances when contentious issues are brought before the court because 
it leaves a clear indication of the Court’s will. However, he explains that dissenting 
opinions offer opposing viewpoints and interpretations of constitutional principles which 
can lead to confusion in the lower courts and leave the public with mixed messages as to
seriousness o f  the Charter violation; 3) The effect o f the exclusion o f the evidence on the repute o f the 
administration o f justice.
27 R. v. Collins, Ibid.
28 Sharpe, Swinton and Roach, supra note 20 at 239
29 Hogg, supra note 3 at 944
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the direction and understanding of the Court.30 In this section the number of unanimous 
decisions will be calculated and compared with the previous studies to see if the 
Chretien- appointed Court has produced more dissent or unanimity.
Peter McCormick’s research details how the Court performed under each Chief 
Justice. His study ranged from the Rinfret Court (1949) to the present McLachlin 
Court.31 McCormick found that the rate of unanimity within each court differed 
significantly: “the Laskin Court was much more unified than the Rinfret or Kerwin 
Courts and as or more unified than the Courts of the preceding period.”32 However, he 
found that under the Dickson Court a significant shift occurred with the number of 
opinions per case rising “gradually but steadily through the period.” The Lamer Court 
“continued the gradual retreat” away from unanimity in the Court.34 From his findings, 
McCormick found that each court, when dealing with the Charter, the number of 
unanimous decisions declined gradually since the Laskin Court.35 The McLachlin Court, 
which has not yet been critically analyzed, may return to greater consensus.
Beatty believes that the decision making process on the Court is “highly 
individualistic and emphasizes the separate personality of each judge.” Therefore the 
individual judge and the composition of the Court may have profound implications for 
the Court’s direction and unity. Unanimity shows cohesiveness in the court and more
30 Frank Iacobucci, “The Charter 20 years later” in Joseph Magnet et all., eds., The Canadian Charter o f  
Rights and Freedoms: Reflections on the Charter after Twenty Years (Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2003), 395
31 This book was published in 2000 the year that McLachlin was appointed Chief Justice; therefore 
McCormick was unable to fully analyze the impact McLachlin has had on the court.
32 Peter McCormick, Supreme At Last (James Lorimer and Company Ltd., Publishers, 2000), 89
33 Ibid., 111
34 Ibid., 132
35 The shift from the Laskin to Dickson Court saw a 1.9% drop in dissenting opinions. While the transition 
from the Dickson to Lamer Court saw an additional 1.6% drop in dissension.
36 David Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes (Agincourt: Carswell, 1990), 272.
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importantly demonstrates the methods and principles justices use to decide cases. This 
section will also allow for an analysis of individual judges and their propensity to agree 
with the majority.
(VI) Individual Approaches to Rights and Freedoms
Separate articles from former Justice Bertha Wilson and Andrew Heard articulate 
the guiding question of this section: whether an individual judge makes a difference in 
the decision of the court.37 This section will focus on the 23 individual Judges who made
•5 0
up the court from 1982 to 2003 and will analyze their voting patterns in order to 
identify personal views and preferences within the Court. As Christopher Manfredi 
explains, it is well accepted that “individual justices.. .exhibit varying attitudes toward(s) 
different types of Charter claims.”39 However, analyzing individual approaches to the 
Charter will illustrate whether ideology is a guiding factor injudicial decision-making.
The first table calculates each Judge’s support rate for Charter claims. This is 
calculated by dividing the number of times a single Judge agrees or concurs with a 
Charter claim by the total number of Charter cases the Judge participates in. This 
percentage will show which judges are more supportive of the Charter, and whether the 
Chretien appointees have established themselves outside the “centre-dominat(ed)”
Court.40 This section will also test if there is an ideological influence in the Court by 
comparing Trudeau-appointed Judges to Mulroney and Chretien appointees. If the
37 Hon. Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference” in F.L.Morton, ed. Law, Politics 
and the Judicial Process in Canada, 3rd edition (Calgary: University o f  Calgary Press, 2002)
and Andrew Heard “The Charter in the Supreme Court of Canada: The importance o f which judges hear an 
appeal,” Canadian Journal o f  Political Science 24 (1991)
38 see appendix M-2
39 Christopher Manfredi, Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 3.
40 Kelly study, supra note 4 at 670
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Mulroney government’s Conservative appointments are less supportive of the Charter 
than the two Liberal Prime Ministers’ appointees, a link between ideology and support 
rates may be found. The previous studies were limited by having only two courts to 
analyze; however, this study will benefit by analyzing and comparing the Chretien 
appointments.
The second table analyzes the propensity for each Justice to write or voice a 
dissenting opinion. Dissent within the Court can show a form of creative reasoning 
through differing legal interpretations. Dissenting opinions are not always encouraged in 
Canada because they have the ability to confuse the law and cloud the accepted legal 
definition. Nevertheless, United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalla defended 
the merits of dissent by attacking Justices who consistently sign on to the concurring 
opinions, saying that this practice “is certainly convenient for the lazy, the modest and the 
incompetent. It saves them the trouble of developing their own opinion methodically and 
even of making up an opinion at all.”41
This study will take the view that dissenting opinions show divisions in the Court 
and through studying them, voting blocks and patterns may be discovered. Interestingly, 
the women Judges on the Canadian Supreme Court have a higher propensity to dissent 
than their male colleagues, obtaining the three highest percentages of dissention in 
Kelly’s study.42 With two more women being appointed during the study’s time period43, 
it is necessary to see if this trend continues.
41 Antonin Scalla, “The Dissenting Opinion, ” Journal o f  Supreme Court History 33 (1994)
42 L’Heureux-Dube, 22%; Wilson 19%; McLachlin, 16%
43 Madam Justice Louise Arbour and Madam Justice Marie Deschamps have both taken part in Charter 
Cases between 1997 and 2003. Madam Justice Rosalie Abella and Madam Justice Louise Charron were 
appointed on August 30, 2004
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The third table will calculate each Judge’s handling of the discretionary section 1 
by calculating the individual judge’s support rate for s. 1 defenses to test the relationship 
between constitutional and parliamentary supremacy. In these challenges, when the 
Court accepts the government’s reasoning they are showing a level of deference to the 
government’s sovereignty in the policy-making field. This section will calculate a simple 
support rate percentage which will be listed from year to year. Kelly states that “the most 
activist Judges would be expected to use the discretionary powers in a way that benefited 
the rights claimant, and the most restrained judges in a way that supported government 
action.”44 Two benefits are realized by calculating the probability of the individual 
Justice’s section 1 support. First, an ideological link may be discovered if the 
Conservative-appointed Justices support government action over the rights claimants 
more frequently than the Liberal appointees. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that 
conservative justices will be more deferential to state power and will be less likely to 
overturn government statutes and regulations. Secondly, as the discussion of the Oakes 
test in the literature review explains, s. 1 involves a degree of judicial creativity: the 
results will show which judges are the most “active” in their decision making. A less 
“active” Judge is expected to side with the government because this does not usurp the 
role of parliamentary supremacy, while the rights claimants often challenge the 
legislative will at the time the law was passed. Ultimately this section will answer the 
question “does it matter which Judge hears an appeal?”45
44 Kelly study, supra note 4 at 675
45 Heard, supra note 37
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The Make up o f  the Court
Morton, Russell and Riddell found that the Court sat in panels of seven or fewer 
Justices approximately 80% of the time during the first 195 decisions, the disinclination 
towards plenary panels was exacerbated due to the poor health of several justices. The 
authors noted that social sensitivity towards recent Court decisions was creating “the 
growing perception of different Judges, different rights” which they predicted would 
force the judiciary to move to more plenary panels.46 Kelly substantiated this prediction 
and found a growing tendency towards plenary panels.47 This section will record the size 
of each panel in each case, to see whether this tendency has continued.
Major Exclusions and Non-Duplicated Settings
(I) Courts o f Appeal
The Supreme Court of Canada, as the apex of the entire legal system, supercedes the 
Provincial Courts of Appeal and the Federal Court in the judicial hierarchy. However, 
the lower Courts of Appeal have a rather important and meaningful purpose within the 
system since, as trial courts, they are the starting point for Charter challenges. The 
previous studies analyzed the treatment of the Appeal Courts through a discussion of 
reversal rates and the percentage of cases decided by the lower courts being upheld and 
dismissed by the Supreme Court. However, this discussion does not clearly illustrate the 
importance or significance of Appeal Courts to the legal system. Kelly concludes that the 
“have” provinces are more likely to experience higher support rates, whereas the have not 
provinces are more likely to have their appeal decision overturned by the Court. The
46 Second study, supra note 12 at 52
47 Kelly study, supra note 4 at 684
48 Peter McCormick, Canada’s Courts (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company Publishers, 1994), 55
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‘have provinces’ are Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia, while the remaining 
provinces, including Quebec, make up the ‘have not provinces.’ 49 Methodologically, 
asserting conclusions based on these comparisons is flawed. The “have” provinces are 
larger in population and therefore place a larger burden on the judicial system. It is only 
natural for them to have a higher support rate due to the number of cases argued at the 
Supreme Court level. Analyzing the relationship between the Courts requires another 
study in itself and therefore this section has been omitted.
(II) The Court Party analysis
The second and third studies examine different approaches to criminal and non­
criminal cases by testing a “court party” and “rights index”. The Court Party hypothesis
.. .agues that both the adoption and the success of the Charter, reflect the growing 
ascendancy of these post-materialist interests in Canadian society and their 
preference to pursue their policy agendas through judicial politics (litigation) 
rather than through electoral-legislative politics.50
Court party members “attempt to reform society as a whole”51 by forming high-profile, 
media-seeking groups which often intervene in cases before the Court and attempt to go 
above the supremacy of Parliament and the provincial legislatures by lobbying the Courts 
directly for policy change. Kelly explains that this index acts as an “important indicator 
of whether the judiciary has used the Charter in a manner that promotes a confrontational
co
or deferential relationship between the judicial and legislative branches of government.” 
However, to accept the “court party” argument, one must accept that equality seeking
49 Archer, Gibbins, Knopff, Maclvor, Pal, Parameters o f  Power, 3rd Edition (Scarborough: Nelson ltd.,
2002), 90
50 Second study, supra note 12 at 18
51 Kelly study, supra note 4 at 678
52 Kelly study, supra note 4 at 678
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amongst groups and sub-cultures and their mobilization are new phenomena in Canadian 
politics. It is the contention of this study that the court party is erroneous and best 
described as manufactured rhetoric to divert attention away from the primacy of the 
constitution and the power of the minority. Roach states that the “difference under the 
Charter is not that minorities take their claims to court or that litigants are assisted by 
organized advocacy groups, but that they win the odd case.”53 Alan Cairns explains, the 
Charter elevated the civic identities and collective self-conceptions of all Canadians, as 
well as entrenched certain clauses that singled out “particular groups or categories for 
individualized treatment.”54 These groups were labelled by Cairns as “Charter 
Canadians” to denote the politicising effect of the Charter. Cairns states that these 
“Charter Canadians” have gained intervener status in the Courts, which has encouraged 
the public to participate in the judicial process. However according to Cairns this shift 
was caused by the Charter and not individual groups: the groups merely used the 
document to advance their own causes. Therefore to include a section which compares 
the “court party” to criminal cases would be superfluous and would not help describe the 
relationship between the government and the Court or Canada’s constitutional order.
Data Selection Methods 
This study will focus exclusively on cases decided by the Supreme Court that deal 
with a specific challenge to the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms. The definition of a 
Charter case in the previous studies is somewhat ambiguous and misleading because it
53 Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Irwin Law: 
Toronto, 2001), 35.
54 Alan Cairns, Reconfigurations: Canadian Citizenship and Constitutional Change: (Toronto: McClelland 
& Stewart, 1995), 45
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includes non-Charter cases; hence it must be redefined. The dataset is composed of cases 
heard from 1982 to 2003. The total number of cases in the dataset is 460.55 The database 
was formed by searching all Supreme Court cases that referenced the Charter, then 
narrowing the field by applying the following methods. Although this dataset builds on 
the previous three studies, a number of cases have been excluded and others added for the 
reasons listed below.56 This dataset and subsequent analysis will serve as the empirical 
background to test whether the re-categorization of Charter cases will affect the 
conclusions of the previous studies.
Defining "Charter Cases Cases dealing with constitutional rights established outside 
the Charter
Morton et. all and Kelly’s studies define Charter cases as challenges that include 
all constitutionally entrenched rights, not just those guaranteed by the Charter.57 Kelly’s 
working definition of a Charter case “refers to all cases involving the assertion of
CO
constitutional rights” guaranteed or protected through some act of Parliament.
However, to include cases that are not explicitly based on a Charter right misrepresents 
the true impact of the Charter. It is assumed for the purpose of this study that a Charter 
case is exclusive to opinions rendered and decided upon by the Supreme Court of Canada 
based on sections 1 through 34 of the Charter. The first study recognizes the degree of 
difficulty in deciding what counts as a Charter case and accepts that there is not “one
55 See appendix M l for complete dataset
56 Kelly’s analysis listed 352 cases at the end of 1997 while this analysis lists 375 cases for the same time 
period
57 See the discussion in the First study in appendix 1, Rules fo r counting Supreme Court Charter cases: 
specifically sections 4-7.
58 Kelly study, supra note 4 at 628. [emphasis added]
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correct way of handling these issues.”59 In the spirit of scholarly dissent, this study will 
focus exclusively on Charter cases and will dismiss any case involving the assertion of 
constitutional rights on similar Charter grounds. Appendix M-5 lists all cases that were 
removed from the previous studies and presents a brief explanation for their exclusion.
Language and Education Rights
This study will exclude language and education rights cases based on ss. 93 and 
133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.)60, 30 & 31 Viet., c. 361; s.23 of the Manitoba 
Act, S.C. 1870, c. 362; and s. 16 of the Saskatchewan Act, S.C. 1905, c. 42.63 Morton 
explains that it would be “superficial to exclude these cases when the jurisprudential 
issues they raise and their constitutional significance are so akin to those involved in 
Charter cases.”64 Whether there is truth in this statement, an accurate depiction of the 
Charter’s significance cannot be determined by including non-Charter cases. Maclvor 
discovered while critiquing the second study that “of the six cases involving minority 
language rights, only two were decided on Charter grounds.”65 Within the Charter, 
sections 16 through 2366 were considered strong components of the Charter’s acceptance 
and key elements of Trudeau’s nation building project.67 Moreover, their inclusion in the 
Charter was seen as a way to expand the limited scope of s. 133 and s.93 of the
59 First study, supra note 12 at 149.
60 Section 93 is education rights, while section 133 is in regards to the use o f  English and French languages
61 French Constitutional Drafting Committee, Parliament o f  Canada Act 1875
62 s 23 is concerned with language rights and ensuring that all acts and debates o f  the Manitoba legislature 
be printed and spoken in either French and English
63 Saskatchewan education rights and Parliaments authority.
64 First study, supra note 12 at, 52.
65 Heather Maclvor, Canadian Politics and Government in the Charter Era (Toronto: Thompson Nelson, 
2006), 224
66 Official language o f Canada section 16-22, minority language educational rights section 23
67 See Pierre Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (St.Martin’s Press: New York, 1968) and 
Pierre Trudeau, The Essential Trudeau, edited by Ron Graham (M&S: Toronto, 1998)
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Constitution Act, 1867. Sharpe and Swinton explain that prior to the Charter, section 133 
“did not prevent provinces from restricting the use of minority languages in areas other 
than those mentioned in the constitution.”68 The pressing need for language and 
education rights to be absolute and guaranteed is illustrated through sections 16 through 
23’s exemption from section 33’s scope.69 This exemption from the notwithstanding 
clauses has sent “the clear message.. .that French and English minority-language 
communities were to be supported and fostered throughout the country.”70 Therefore, to 
include cases based on the latter Acts and sections as Charter cases creates a misleading 
study, because its data includes cases tried on non-Charter provisions.
Aboriginal Rights
Section 35 of the Constitution Act 198271 is included in both the second and third 
studies and is often considered an analogous Charter right. Neither study recognizes that 
section 35 is not part of the Charter; rather, it is Part 2 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
Kelly concludes that aboriginal rights “represent the largest growth area in rights-based 
litigation heard before the Supreme Court.”72 He notes that victories in cases like R. v.
7 5 7 /̂ 7 C 7/C
Gladstone , R. v. Badger , R. v. Nikal , and R. v. Cote have resulted in “stronger 
protections for Aboriginal fishing and hunting rights.”77 Although these cases represent 
strong victories for aboriginal rights, they should not represent a victory for the Charter
68Sharpe, Swinton and Roach, supra note 20 at 280-281.
69 The notwithstanding clause, s. 33 (1) is applicable only to sections 2 or sections 7 through 15.
70 Sharpe, Swinton and Roach, supra note 20 at 281.
71 Rights o f  the Aboriginal Peoples o f Canada
72 Kelly study, supra note 4 at 649
73 R. v Gladstone, [1998] 2 SCR 723 (hereinafter Gladstone)
74 R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 (hereinafter Badger)
75 R. v. Nikal, [ 1996] 1 SCR 1013 (hereinafter Nikal)
76 R. v. Cote, [1995] 3 SCR 139 (hereinafter Cote)
77 Kelly, supra note 4 at 650
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because they are all decided on the basis of section 35. Section 35 judgements should not 
be included as Charter cases because they are clearly “distinct from the Charter of Rights
78and Freedoms.” Patrick Monahan explains:
Rights pursuant to section 35 are not subject to limitation under section 1 
nor are they subject to legislative override through the use of a 
notwithstanding clause enacted under section 33. Further the rights 
guaranteed by section 35 are binding on private parties and not just 
legislatures or governments, since section 32...does not apply to section 
35.79
Moreover section 35 does not “provide absolute protection for Aboriginal rights from the
application of inconsistent federal or provincial laws.”80 Section 35 is also distinct in that
81it can not be “enforced under s. 24 of the Charter.” To count non-Charter cases in a 
study dedicated to outlining the Charter’s actual impact would ultimately distort the 
overall Charter success rate; therefore s. 35 cases must be eliminated from this study.
Primacy o f the Constitution
Part VII of the Constitution Act 1982 is entitled General. Section 52 (1) 
specifically establishes the rule of law for Canada and is included in the previous three 
main studies due to its effect and meaning to the constitution and the Charter. This 
section establishes the supremacy of the Constitution and declares that “any provision of 
any law which conflicts with the provisions of the constitution is of no force or effect to
78 Bernhard W. Funston and Eugene Meehan, Canada's Constitutional Law in a Nutshell (Toronto: 
Thomson Canada Limited, 1994), 142.
79Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law, 2nd edition (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), 464.
80 Ibid., 464.
81 Meehan, Cuddly, Elkin, Failey, Fera, Martland, Rankin, Richard, Wake, Loignon and Purchase, The 
2000 Annotated: Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms (Scarborough: Carswell, 1999), 855
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R7the extent of the inconsistency.” In the most basic sense of political and legal theory, 
the rule of law is expressed in that “the government shall be ruled by the law and subject 
to it.”83 This section of the Constitution gives the courts the power to rule that a 
particular law is not valid if it violates the Charter. While section 52(1) is not part of the 
Charter, it provides courts with an important power to strike down laws that violate
• Rd.Charter rights In R. v. Big M. Drug Mart, the court defined the scope of this section and 
stated that no person could be convicted under an unconstitutional law.85 In Reference re
n /
Manitoba Language Rights the court establishes that s. 52(1) has replaced the “Colonial
• . . .  R7  .Laws Validity Act as the foundation of judicial review.” Appendix M-l lists a few cases
RRthat test or make an s. 52 claim. In RJR-MacDonald the court relied on s. 52 to declare 
the provisions of the Tobacco Products Control Act invalid, after a section 1 failure. 
Despite some important rulings and in light of the impact this section has made to 
constitutional law in Canada, this section will be dismissed. Like s. 35, s. 52 is not part 
of schedule B of the Constitution Act, 1982 and therefore is not considered a Charter 
guarantee.
82 Ibid., 869.
83 Joseph Raz, “The Rule o f  Law and Its Virtue”, in Readings in the Philosophy o f  Lawa edited by Keith 
Culver (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1999)
84 Human Rights Program, “Guide to the Charter o f Rights and Freedom’s: s. 52” Government o f Canada, 
accessed online; http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/pdp-hrp/canada/guide/constitution e.cffn
85 R. v. Big M. Drug Mart [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295
86 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721
87 Peter Hogg, supra note 3 at 51
88 Including cases such as R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013; R. v. Morales [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711; Vriend v. 
Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493; and R v Gladstone, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 723
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
Charter Cases vs. Charter Values
Every study referenced thus far has included cases that are not specific Charter 
cases. The previous studies justify their inclusion because of “similar constitutional 
principles” or because they rely on “Charter values” not specifically outlined in the 
Charter. An extensive set of cases discuss the Court’s role in interpreting the law,89 
however the Courts are rather silent on the legal conditions needed to differentiate 
between a Charter case, and one that rests solely on its values. Charter values require “the 
judiciary to interpret and develop the common law in a manner consistent with the 
fundamental values of Canadian society enshrined in the Charter.”90 In cases that rely on 
Charter values, the spirit of the Charter is considered, but no specific section is 
challenged. For example, each study includes R v. Stinchcombe91 in their dataset. 
Stinchcombe is often considered the leading case on the accused’s right to full answer and 
defense and the Crown’s responsibility of disclosure. At issue in Stinchcombe the 
fairness of trial in regards to evidence collected by the Crown and not being disclosed to 
defendant’s counsel. However, this case was not decided on Charter grounds: despite 
arguments which were synonymous with section 7 and 11 (d) rights to a fair trial, the final 
decision rested on grounds outside the Charter, despite the nature of the Charter being 
taken into consideration. Charter consideration will not warrant inclusion into this study 
because it is not based exclusively on the Charter and does not test the actual principles.
In R v. Salituro, Iacobucci J. warned that while the common law should be 
developed in light of Charter values, the courts should be reluctant to modify
89 For example see Hill v. Church o f Scientology o f  Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R 1130; RWDSU v. Dolphin 
Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 SCR 573; R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 [hereinafter Salituro]
90 John D.R. Craig, “Invasion.ofprivacy and Charter values: the common-law tort awakens.” McGill Law 
Journal v. 42 no. 2 (June 1997) p. 355-99
91 R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 SCR 326 [hereinafter Stinchcombe]
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dramatically the common law, and should leave matters of complexity to the
• Q?legislatures. In Bell express vu Ltd. Partnership, Charter values were once again used
to determine the outcome of the decision. In the majority decision Iacobucci wrote that
A blanket presumption of Charter consistency could sometimes frustrate true 
legislative intent, contrary to what is mandated by the preferred approach to 
statutory construction, and wrongly upset the dialogic balance among the 
branches of governance. Where a statute is unambiguous, courts must give effect 
to the clearly expressed legislative intent and avoid using the Charter to achieve a 
different result.9
Ultimately the danger of identifying Charter value cases with actual cases is that the 
interpretation may become too liberal and broad, thus allowing a plethora of related 
Charter claims to be considered as actual Charter cases which will distort the Charter’s 
actual effect. Therefore cases which are decided on Charter values rather than specific 
Charter guarantees will not be included in this study.
Additional Reasons for Dismissing Cases
Concurrent Decisions
Since the Court has the authority to choose its docket, related appeals from 
different jurisdictions are sometimes heard concurrently. These appeals usually test 
essentially the same principle, so the court can apply its reasoning in one ruling to others. 
Throughout Charter jurisprudence, the Court has used this authority to group several like 
cases, such as the Therens trilogy,94 the definition of criminal offence cases,95 and a
92 Salituro, supra note 89
93 Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 SCR 559
94 Therens trilogy is comprised o f R v. Therens, [1985] 1 SCR 613 [hereinafter Therens]; Trask v. R., 
[1985] 1 SCR 655 [hereinafter Trask] and R. v. Rahn., [1985] 1 SCR 659 [hereinafter Rahri].
95 R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987]] 2 SCR 636 and R. v. Laviolette, [1987] 2 SCR 667.
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series of cases that tested judicial independence and the remuneration of judges.96 The
challenge with these related appeals is to determine if they should be reported as a single
collaborative case or treated as individual cases and counted separately. Only the first
study addresses the methodology and reasoning behind combining or separating these
cases. The first study concluded that in
...situation(s) like this, where the Court finds no significant difference in 
the facts of the cases and decides them at the same time and for the same
07reasons... [they will be] counted... as a single case.
The authors state that the precedent established through the decision is what “really
QO
counts in assessing the impact of... [the] decisions.” However this analysis ignores the 
reality that the Court has the ability to combine separate cases into single decisions such 
as in R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen. "  All cases that are decided separately by the Court must 
be recognized individually because it will create a more reliable database. Andrew Heard 
found that in rare circumstances Judges have changed their decision within the group of 
cases. Heard shows that in the police disciplinary quartet,100 Justice Estey dissented in 
Wigglesworth, but sided with the rest of the panel in the remaining three verdicts.101 
There is always the chance that a justice will change his or her mind, or realize that he or 
she has made a mistake. In Bliss v. Attorney General o f Canada,102 the Court held that s. 
46 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, which disentitled pregnant women from
96 R. v. Campbell, [1997] 3 SCR 3., Reference Re Remuneration o f Judges o f  the Provincial Court o f  Prince 
Edward Island, [1997] 3 SCR 3., Reference Re Independence and Impartiality o f  Judges o f  the Provincial 
Court o f  Prince Edward Island, [ 1997] 3 SCR 3. And Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. V. Manitoba 
(Minister o f  Justice), [1997] 3 SCR 3.
97 First study, supra note 12 at 50.
98 Ibid., 50-51.
99 For example, R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906
100 Estey dissented in R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 514 but sided with the rest o f the panel in 
Burnham v. Metropolitan Toronto Police, [1987] 2 SCR 572; Trumbley and Pugh v. Metropolitan Toronto 
Police, [1987] 2 SCR 577; and Trimm v. Durham Regional Police, [1987] 2 SCR 582.
101 Heard, supra note 37 at 295-296
102 Bliss v. Attorney General o f  Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 [hereinafter Bliss]
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receiving basic unemployment benefits, did not deny women the right to equality, free 
from discrimination on the basis of sex, guaranteed by s. 1 (b) of the Canadian Bill of
7/13
Rights. However, in Brooks v Canada Safeway Ltd. , Chief Justice Dickson stated “that 
Bliss was wrongly decided or, in any event, that Bliss would not be decided now as it was 
decided then.” 104 Dickson’s admittance and reversal of Bliss shows that each decision is 
important in itself because the attitude of the court can change. Therefore these 
“companion cases”105 must be treated and analyzed separately.
The exception to this rule is found in Kelly’s reporting of the judges remuneration 
and independence series of 1997.106 Oddly, Kelly choose this quartet as the only 
“companion cases” to receive separate designations in his dataset. Nonetheless, what 
makes this series differ from the others is in the courts indexing of the cases. The four 
cases are all referenced as 3 S.C.R. 3, meaning that they are all the same and the Court 
itself combined these cases. Therefore, unlike Kelly, this study will count cases 
referenced identically as one case.
Conversely, any case that is referenced differently, yet challenges a similar 
constitutional principle will be included in the dataset. It is believed that this will give a 
more accurate indicator of the Charter’s impact because it will show how each case is 
handled. Even though one precedent is set, each case is still reviewed and could have 
been decided differently; therefore the Court’s work and interpretation should be 
recognized accordingly.
103 Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 SCR 1219 [hereinafter Brooks]
104 Brooks, Ibid.
105 First study, supra note 12 at 51.
106 Ibid.,
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Cases decided on the basis o f non-entrenched rights
There is one case that each study treats as a Charter case which is not exclusively 
based on an entrenched right. Each study treats Singh v. Ministry o f  Employment and
J 07Immigration as a Charter case. In Singh, the majority of the court allowed the appeal 
“in accordance with principles of fundamental justice.”108 However the court divided in 
determining the source of these principles. Dickson C.J., Lamer and Wilson JJ concurred 
with the majority through the Charter, whereas Beetz, Estey and McIntyre based their 
ruling on Bill o f  Rights jurisprudence. Justice Ritchie, however, abstained from taking 
part in the judgment.109 In all three studies the Singh verdict was accepted and counted as 
not only a Charter case, but a Charter victory. The first study states that their analysis 
will exclude cases “decided solely on the basis of the Canadian Bill o f  Rights, federal and 
provincial human rights statutes or charters, or common law rights.”110 This study will 
go one step further and exclude cases that are even partially tried on these grounds. It is 
widely recognized that the Bill o f  Rights had relatively minimal impact on civil liberties 
and rights in Canada. Former Justice Le Dain summarized the impact of the Bill of 
Rights and its overall failure as a broad and liberal piece of legislation in Therens.111 Le 
Dain stated
“ ...the courts have felt some uncertainty or ambivalence in the 
application of the Canadian Bill of Rights because it did not reflect a clear 
constitutional mandate to make judicial decisions having the effect of119limiting or qualifying the traditional sovereignty of Parliament.”
107 Singh v. Minister o f Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [hereinafter Singh]
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 First Study, Supra note 12 at 51.
111 Therens, supra note 94.
112 Ibid.
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Moreover, the Bill o f  Rights was only an act of Parliament and not entrenched into the 
Constitution Act, 1867, thus its status when compared to the Charter is subordinate. If a 
case can be decided in part by the Bill o f Rights, than the Charter's impact and supremacy 
is not being fully realized. Cases which are not exclusively based on Charter grounds 
should therefore not be counted. If the verdict can be supported and determined through 
the Bill of Rights, then the Charter’s impact has not been fully recognized. Singh is the 
only case that falls under this category; ultimately it will be excluded from the study 
because it is not based on an exclusive Charter ground.
Cases in which there was no specific Charter claim
A number of appeals since the Charter’s inception have brought forth a Charter 
claim that the Court has chosen to decide on non-Charter grounds. There is a number of 
cases in which a Charter claim was made, yet the Court either resolved the case on other 
grounds, or dismissed the Charter claim entirely. In the database these cases have been 
coded as NSC which means that “no specific Charter claim” was made. The first study
1 1 q
gives the example of Westendorp, where the Court held that the by-law in question was 
“ultra vires as invading exclusive federal power in relation to the criminal law.”114 The 
Court “side-stepped” the section 2(b) claim and ultimately decided the case using section 
91 of the Constitution Act 1867. The first study concluded that although including cases 
such as this may show the Court’s ultimate “reluctance” to deal with Charter claims, the 
authors exclude them because they “do not establish jurisprudential precedents on
113 Westendorp v. the Queen. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 43
114 First study, Supra note 12 at 47.
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constitutional rights.”115 Therefore the three main studies exclude cases such as 
Westendorp. Heard, on the other hand, states that cases where the Court ignores the 
Charter claim and decides it on other grounds, or when the Court refuses to hear a 
Charter argument in an oral presentation, fall into which he calls a “grey area”116 Heard 
includes these grey area cases and defends their inclusion by reasoning that “the judges 
had the discretion to hear or not to hear the Charter arguments, and certainly had the 
discretion to refer substantively in their decisions to the Charter claims that were 
heard.”117 Heard believes that if the Court refuses to hear a Charter case it is still an 
expression of their attitudes towards the Charter. Heard includes these grey areas in his 
analysis.
The difficulty of choosing between the conflicting methods is challenging at best 
because it requires a form of inductive reasoning; however, for clarity, a solution is 
considered necessary. In cases like Westendorp, where the case is decided outside of the 
Charter, this study will rely on the designation by the Court to determine whether the case 
is a Charter case or not. When accessing case law via the internet, indexed cases have a 
brief summary at the beginning of each case. The headline summarizes the type of law 
challenged (Constitutional, environmental, tort etc.), then lists all applicable statutes and 
regulations which the case will be tried on. It is argued here that these “grey area” cases 
can be distinguished by relying on the wisdom of the Court. If the Court indicates a 
Charter case through electronic indexing, like Westendorp, then these cases will be 
included in the data set.
115 Ibid., 52.
116 Heard, supra note 37 at 295.
117 Ibid
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Declaring a winner 
Redefining the Taxonomy for Wins and Losses
In the past statistical studies, each case’s overall social impact ia overlooked 
because they are grouped together into a rigid win, loss or inconclusive category. When 
cases are grouped in a limiting way, the societal implications of the cases can be 
dismissed.
A single decision on a right or freedom -  because of the far-reaching 
implications of its supporting reasons -  can outweigh in importance 
dozens of other decisions of the same right or freedom which go in the
1 1 0
opposite directions.
The second study recognizes that their study treats all cases equally “when in fact they 
are clearly not all of equal significance.”119 The first study summarizes the methodology 
of classifying the wins and losses by asking “did the Charter claimant get what he or she
wanted from the Court?” This study will adopt the first study’s recording of reasonable
1 1 0  1 1 0 0
limitations , the exclusion of evidence and multiple claims. However this study
will simplify the categorization of wins and losses.
When assessing the categorization of wins and losses there are various approaches
a study may follow. The most recent study to step beyond the “claimant getting what
I
they want” was Morton and Allen’s article on Feminists and the Courts. Morton and 
Allen recognized the importance of the social ramifications each case created prior to
118 Second study, supra note 12 at 2
119 Ibid., 2
120 Cases upheld through reasonable limits will be counted as a loss
121 Cases where the Court refuses to exclude evidence when a violation has been made by the police will be 
recorded as a loss.
122 Cases where a claimant brings forth multiple Charter claims, and where only one or more claims is 
successful will be counted as a victory
123 F.L Morton and Avril Allen, “Feminists and the Courts: Measuring Success in Interest Group Litigation 
in Canada.” Canadian Journal o f  Political Science, 34, no.l (2001)
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declaring the case as a win or a loss. For example, in Egan v Canada124 “the court upheld 
the challenged legislation even as it added sexual orientation to the list of prohibited 
grounds of discrimination in section 15 of the Charter.”125 Including sexual orientation as 
an analogous section 15 ground would clearly be defined as a social victory for 
homosexual rights. However, since the plaintiffs lost their appeal for spousal pension 
benefits, the outcome was recorded as a loss. In order to assess the societal impact of 
each case the authors introduce a four-part taxonomy. This classification divides wins 
and losses into four parts, starting from the best outcome to the worst: offensive win, 
defensive win, offensive loss, and defensive loss.126
Morton and Allen believe this classification will create a better assessment of the 
policy consequences created through each case. They list an offensive win as the most 
valuable because it forces social change through nullifying unconstitutional legislation 
such as in Morgentaler.127 Defensive wins, on the other hand, do not change policy; they 
leave the legislation intact. However, they may re-affirm a legislative principle such as
198  190the pro-choice stance on abortion as seen in Borowski and Daigle. An offensive 
loss is less serious than a defensive loss because nothing has changed; therefore the social 
impact is virtually constant. However, a defensive loss usually affords stricter legislative 
powers and limits Charter rights. An example is Seaboyeruo where the elimination of the 
rape-shield provision made sexual assault more challenging to prosecute thus leaving a
124 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513
125 Morton and Knopff, supra note 8 at 16
126 Morton and Allen, supra note 123
127 R. v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30
128 Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 342
129 Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 2 SCR 530
130 R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] 2 SCR 577
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negative effect on society. However as Hogg and Bushell point out “Parliament 
resurrected the “rape shield” by amending its provisions in 1992, and adding procedures 
for a closed court judicial examination of whether evidence will be admissible.”132 This 
“legislative sequel” differed substantially from the majority opinion.
Classifying Charter claims like this creates a more subjective study. A loss is still 
a loss, no matter where the claim originates. Moreover this approach is more useful 
when there are intervening groups in the case, because this helps show the public’s 
position. Therefore this study will adopt the previous study’s taxonomy in regards to 
wins and losses. However the fault of the previous study’s taxonomy is two fold: first, in 
reference cases, the government does not always know what it wants, therefore the 
claimant is unrepresented; secondly, this taxonomy leads to a substantial amount of cases 
being coded as inconclusive. This study will adopt a taxonomy that reflects the Charter’s 
success; thus it is not completely contingent on the claimant, but rather on the success of 
the Charter right. Thus in reference cases, if a statute is overturned the case will be coded 
as a win. In addition, the second study determined that a case coded inconclusive meant 
the “Charter claim (was) argued but not addressed by the Court.”133 This definition 
magnifies the number of cases that the Charter is actually used in and does not appear to 
be a reliable standard. If a Charter claim is made and not addressed by the Court, it will 
not be included in this database. On the other hand, the first study declared a case 
inconclusive when the claimant received “some, but not all of the remedies requested.”134 
If the claimant receives the majority of their requests or obviously benefits from the
131 Morton and Allen, supra note 123 from 65-69
132 Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (1997) 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal [vol. 35, no.1], 119
133 Second study, supra note 12 at 13
134 Ibid., 20
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decision it will be classified as a win, therefore inconclusiveness will only be applied in 
rare circumstances where there is no clear indication of the claimant’s gains or losses.
In short, it is believed that this approach to codifying Charter cases will produce 
more accurate and factual results and will contribute strongly to the understanding of the 
Charter and its affect on the constitutional structure of Canada.
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The Charter’s Impact on the Supreme Court 
The Charter’s impact on the Supreme Court’s total caseload has decreased 
significantly over the last ten years. The Charter’s influence on the Court was most 
significant between 1987 and 1993, when Charter cases consumed 29% of the Court’s 
docket. Over the last 10 years (1993-2003) the Charter has consumed 21% of the Court’s 
work load, and the proportion of Charter cases accepted by the Court has steadily 
decreased from a high of 51 cases in 1993 to a low of 8 in 2000. Throughout the 
Charter’s first twenty years, the average number of Charter cases heard yearly was 
approximately 23. However the Court has consistently worked below this standard since 
1996, averaging 17 cases per year, indicating that the Charter’s impact is declining.
Table 4-1
Charter Decisions as a Per Cent of Total Supreme Court Decisions
Year Total Decisions Charter Decisions
Per Cent o f Total
(%)
1983 117 1 0.85%
1984 87 3 3.45%
1985 63 12 19.05%
1986 83 9 10.84%
1987 81 27 33.33%
1988 104 24 23.08%
1989 126 32 25.40%
1990 137 51 37.23%
1991 106 30 28.30%
1992 111 29 26.13%
1993 140 40 28.57%
1994 119 23 19.33%
1995 107 29 27.10%
1996 118 32 27.12%
1997 104 19 18.27%
1998 106 21 19.81%
1999 75 17 22.67%
2000 78 8 10.26%
2001 96 17 17.71%
2002 72 18 25.00%
2003 82 18 21.95%
Totals 2112 460 21.78%
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Kelly’s study found that over the first fifteen years of Charter jurisprudence, the 
Charter represented 21% of the Court’s case load.1 Likewise, this study discovered that 
Charter cases consumed 22% of the Court’s docket from 1983 to 2003. The Charter did 
not come into full effect until April 17, 1985 when section 15 became operative.2 Since 
1985, the Charter has consumed nearly one-quarter (24%) of the Court’s overall case 
load, and the docket has averaged 25 Charter cases per year.
All three of the main studies attempt to assuage the fear that the Canadian 
Supreme Court had transformed into an exclusive “constitutional court” similar to the 
European model. A more accurate and complimenting comparison, as Manfredi 
suggests,4 would be to the United States Supreme Court. As Lee Epstein discovered, 
challenges to the American Bill of Rights from 1985 to 1994 composed nearly 27% of 
the Court’s yearly docket. Moreover, a similarity between the American and Canadian 
high courts was the decline in constitutional cases heard per year. The American Court 
averaged 33 Bill of Rights cases per year over the ten year span, hearing a high of 50 
cases in 1985 compared to a low of 19 cases in 1993. This decline in Bill of Rights cases 
closely mirrors the Canadian trend and therefore is a better international comparison.5
1 James Kelly, “Rebalancing Liberal Constitutionalism” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 3., 639. 
[hereinafter Kelly study], 639
2 Section 15 came into effect 3 years after the Charter to allow government’s time to update and modify 
their statutes to conform to the provisions in S. 15.
3 F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & M.J. Withey, “The Supreme Court’s First One Hundred 
Charter o f Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis” (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 1., 4 
[hereinafter First study]', F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & T. Riddell, “The Canadian Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms: A Descriptive Analysis o f the First Decade, 1982-1992” (1994) 5 National Journal or 
Constitutional Law 1., 6 [hereinafter Second study]', Kelly study, supra note 1 at 639.
4 Christopher Manfredi “Rights an the Judicialization of Politics in Canada and the United States” in 
Canada and the United States : differences that count, ed. David M. Thomas (Peterborough: Broadview 
Press, c2000) and Christopher Manfredi, Judicial power and the charter : Canada and the paradox of liberal 
constitutionalism (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001)
5 Lee Epstein, Jeffery Segal, Harold Spaeth & Thomas Walker, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data 
decisions and developments, 2nd ed., (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1996)
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Table 4-2 compares the impact of the Charter under each of the respective Chief 
Justices.
Table 4-2
Charter Decisions as a Per Cent of total Supreme Court Decisions by Era
Total Charter # o f Charter Per Cent of Total
Era Decisions Decisions cases (%)
Dickson Court (84-90) 681 158 23 23.20%
Lamer Court (91-99) 986 240 27 24.34%
McLachlin Court (00- 
03) 328 61 15 18.60%
Totals 1995 459 24 23.01%'**
**Excludes the Laskin Court since they only had 1 Charter decision
Kelly asserts that the Lamer Court, especially between 1993 and 1997, observed 
dramatic increases of the Charter’s application, reaffirming Morton, Russell and Riddell’s 
findings that the Charter has contributed to the Court’s “transformation into a decidedly 
public law court.”6 However, since McLachlin was appointed Chief Jusitce, her Court 
has experienced substantial decreases in both the average number of Charter cases heard 
per year (15) and the per cent of overall cases (19%). Patrick Monahan has suggested 
that "the court under Chief Justice McLachlin has been giving a robust interpretation of 
the Charter."7 Monahan noted that under McLachlin, the Court has shown tendencies to 
move in different directions from its predecessors.8 Nonetheless, Charter adjudication 
has yet to play a large role in the McLachlin Court, suggesting that the conclusions of the
6 Second study, supra note 3 at 5.
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previous authors that the Charter will continue to consume a large portion of the Court’s 
workload is outdated.
Outcomes of Supreme Court Charter Decisions 
The success rate of the Charter throughout the years has been somewhat 
analogous to a roller coaster with constant rises, drops and even a few loops. Scholars 
have offered numerous explanations and theories for these volatile shifts. David Beatty 
concluded after his five year study, that judges appointed by Prime Minister Mulroney 
were applying a more conservative approach to Charter adjudication than the Trudeau 
appointees. Beatty was convinced through his findings that patronage appointments 
explained the early activism of the Court. However, as explained in the previous chapter 
the notion of patronage in the Court has minimal acceptance within academia. 
Alternatively, Andrew Heard suggested that ideological congruency is a contributing 
factor injudicial decision making. Heard, asserting that while Judges carried the name 
“honorable” their decisions and reasoning were not infallible.9 Morton, Russell and 
Riddell explained the early success of the Charter as a “honeymoon” stage when the court 
was sending a clear message “to the legal profession and lower court judges that it was 
much more receptive towards rights claimants and an activist exercise of judicial review” 
when compared to the Court’s Bill of Rights jurisprudence. James Kelly, on the other 
hand, noted that beyond the first two years, the Court remained stagnantly consistent with
9 Andrew Heard “The Charter in the Supreme Court o f Canada: The importance o f  which judges hear an 
appeal,” Canadian Journal o f  Political Science 24 (1991), 6.
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its support for the Charter claimant due to the stabilization of the Court’s “grey 
middle.”10
Table 4-3
Outcome of Supreme Court Charter Decisions, 1983-2003
Year Wins Win as a % L osses(%) Inconclusive Total
1983 0 0% 1 (100) 0 1
1984 2 67% 1 (33) 0 3
1985 7 58% 4 (33) 1 12
1986 3 33% 6 (67) 0 9
1987 8 30% 19 (70) 0 27
1988 6 25% 18 (75) 0 24
1989 11 34% 21 (66) 0 32
1990 17 33% 34 (67) 0 51
1991 12 40% 18 (60) 0 30
1992 8 28% 21 (72) 0 29
1993 11 28% 29 (73) 0 40
1994 11 48% 12 (52) 0 23
1995 8 28% 20 (69) 1 29
1996 4 13% 27 (84) 1 32
1997 9 47% 10 (53) 0 19
1998 7 33% 13 (62) 1 21
1999 6 35% 11 (65) 0 17
2000 3 38% 5 (63) 0 8
2001 8 47% 9 (53) 0 17
2002 8 44% 9 (50) 1 18
2003 11 61% 7 (39) 0 18
1983-2003 160 35% 295 (64) 5 460
Kelly’s study found the Charter’s support rate over the first 15 years to be 34%n, 
one per cent higher than the findings of Morton, Russell and Riddell (33%) during the 
first 12 years. 12 Kelly’s assertion of overall consistency has been affirmed: this study 
finds an overall support rate of 35% during the Charter’s 20 year history.
10 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 640
11 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 641
12 Second study, supra note 3 at 5
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According to table 4-3 A, the hypothesis that ideology is a factor injudicial decision 
making is supported. The McLachlin court has produced Charter support rates not seen 
since the early “honeymoon stages.” The Lamer Court (which was mostly made up of 
Mulroney appointments) had the lowest support rate for the Charter, while the more 
liberal McLachlin Court, with its dedication to equality, has seen the largest support rates 
since the first two years that the Charter was proclaimed into force.
Table 4-3A
Outcome of Supreme Court Charter Decisions by Court
Court Wins (%) Losses (%) Inconclusive Total
(%)
Laskin (83) 0 (0) 1 (100) 0 (0) 1
Dickson (84-89) 37 (35) 69 (64) 1 (1) 107
Lamer (90-99) 93 (32) 195 (67) 3(1) 291
McLachlin (00-03) 30 (49) 30 (49) 1 (2) 61
The McLachlin Court’s unusually high support for the Charter suggests a new era 
of Charter adjudication. Though the sample size is much smaller when compared to the 
other courts, the results are substantial and may indicate an institutional shift supporting 
Charter claimants. These findings undermine the previous conclusions that Charter 
support is stagnant and that a rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism has occurred. 
However, it is critical to analyze the individuals on the court before conclusive comments 
can be made about ideological congruencies in the Court. Assessing the Court as a 
collective whole shows the direction of the Court as a unit, however by analyzing the 
individual Justice’s approach to Charter adjudication, the influence of ideological 
congruencies within the Court will be further explained.
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Treatment of Different Charter Rights 
Table 4-4 illustrates which specific rights or freedoms have determined the
1 -3
Court’s first twenty years of Charter jurisprudence. As Morton, Russell and Withey 
explain in civil cases, a “win” represents the Charter claimant receiving what they sought, 
such as an impugned statute being declared void. Likewise, in criminal matters, a “win” 
signifies an accused obtaining a new trial or a directed verdict of acquittal after 
succeeding on a Charter issue, such as seeking to have evidence excluded.14 The 
difference between this study's coding procedures and the former is the use of the 
“inconclusive” term. The second study determined that a case coded inconclusive meant 
the “Charter claim (was) argued but not addressed by the Court.”15 This definition 
magnifies the number of cases in which the Charter is actually used and does not appear 
to be a reliable standard. If a Charter claim is made and not addressed by the Court, it 
will not be included in this database. On the other hand, the first study declared a case 
inconclusive when the claimant received “some, but not all of the remedies requested.”16 
If the claimant receives the majority o f their requests or obviously benefits from the 
decision it will be classified as a win, therefore inconclusiveness will only be applied in 
rare circumstances where there is no clear indication of the claimant’s gains or losses.
13 For the methodology behind the grouping o f Charter sections please see pages 23-28 o f the methodology 
chapter
14 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 20-22
15 Second study, supra note 3 at 13
16 Ibid., 20
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Table 4-4
Different Categories of Rights Cases By Result 1983-2003
Rights/Freedoms Wins (%) Losses Total
Fundamental Freedoms 19 (30) 44 63 (13)
Democratic Rights 3 (50) 3 6 (1)
Mobility Rights 1 (13) 7 8 (2)
Legal Rights* 123 (35) 231 354 (71)
Equality Rights 12 (26) 35 47 (9)
Language/Education Rights 5 (71) 2 7 (1)
Aboriginal/Minority Rights 0 (0) 1 1 (0.2)
General Rights/Application 4 (29) 10 14 (3)
Total 167 (33) 333 500
* Legal Rights do not include challenges to s. 1.
** The total is higher than 460 because several cases contain 
multiple Charter issues and are counted in more than one category
Crime Control v Due Process: The Case o f Ideology
As expected, legal rights “designed primarily to protect persons subject to the 
criminal process,”17 still constitute more than two-thirds of the Court’s Charter cases. Ian 
Greene suggests that the heavy use of the Charter’s legal rights section is a result “of the 
familiarity lawyers have with legal rights in that most of these rights are simply 
codifications of common-law principles.”18 Other scholars have suggested that the Court 
chooses more legal rights cases because “judicial expertise and authority are highest in 
this area.”19 The Court’s propensity to choose legal rights cases has been suggested to 
“enhance the legitimacy of judicial review.”20 Kelly argues that legal rights allow the 
Court to be an effective policy actor due to judges’ knowledge and expertise, and that this
17 Bernard Funston & Eugene Meehan, Canada Constitutional Law in a Nutshell, (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell Ltd., 1994), 169
18 Ian Greene, The Charter o f  Rights (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1989), 125
19 First study, supra note 3 at 21
20 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 647
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91weakens the right-wing critics’ argument on the legitimacy of judicial review. 
Nonetheless this argument may over-amplify the Court’s ability to choose their 
caseload.22 However, as Kent Roach points out, the entrenchment o f formalized legal 
rights in the constitution provoked a “due process revolution,”23 causing a considerable 
shift in the judicial process. Sharpe, Swinton and Roach state that the Charter has 
“increased the Court’s responsibility to delineate the line between crime control and due 
process,”24 but conclude that as a result of legal rights the courts have moved Canada 
towards “the due-process end of the spectrum.”25 Critics such as Morton and Knopff 
point to this insurgency as detrimental to the justice system because victims’ rights are 
being dismissed due to the focus on the rights of the accused.26 The Court’s handling of 
legal rights has often caused consternation when procedural mistakes lead to the acquittal
97of the factually guilty. Landmark decisions such as R. v. Daviault, where the Court 
permitted the defense of “self voluntary, extreme intoxication” by overturning a previous
“JO
ruling in R. v. Leary, advanced the accused’s rights substantially. The accused sexually 
assaulted a 65 year old, partially paralyzed woman and was permitted to use the defense 
of extreme intoxication. In R. v. Seaboyer29 the court protected the accused’s right to full 
answer and defense at the expense of the victim’s dignity by striking down the rape 
shield provisions in the Criminal Code which limited the accused’s ability to cross­
21 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 647
22 See the discussion o f Appeals o f Rights in Chapter 3
23 Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims Rights: The new law and politics o f  criminal justice (Toronto: 
University o f  Toronto Press, 1999)
24 Sharpe, Swinton and Roach, The Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, 2nd edition (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 
2002), 207
25 Ibid., 208
26 Rainer Knopff and F.L. Morton, "Ardour in the Courts," The Globe and Mail, (April 7, 2000 p.A17); 
F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party. (Peterborough: Broadview 
Press, 2000).
27 R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 SCR 63 [hereinafter Daviault]
28 Leary v. The Queen, [1978] 1 SCR 29 [hereinafter Leary]
29 R. v. Seaboyer; Rv Gayme, [1991] 2 SCR 577 [hereinafter Seaboyer]
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examine the victim on her prior sexual conduct. Lastly, in R. v. Vaillancourt,30 due to the 
“stigma” of a murder conviction, an accomplice to a murder was acquitted and s.213 (d) 
of the Criminal Code struck down due to the meaning of “intent.” Decisions like these 
support the right-wing critics’ claims and weaken Kelly’s conclusion that the Court has 
used legal rights to “advance diversity in the implementation of the Criminal Code.”31
The two models of criminal justice were most influentially analyzed by American 
legal scholar Herbert Packer. Packer claimed that the crime control process was like an 
“assembly-line conveyor belt” where the desired result was a guilty plea; the police and 
prosecutors worked in accord to expediently demonstrate the guilt of the accused. By 
contrast, the due process model is analogous to an “obstacle course” where defense 
counsels seek acquittals on the basis of an infringement of the accused’s rights.32 
Traditionally, the crime control model has been adopted by right wing proponents, while 
liberals and left-leaning commentators have favoured the due process model. As table 4- 
4C shows, the McLachlin Court has approached legal rights quite favourably suggesting 
a shift towards the due process model of criminal justice.
30 R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 SCR 636 [hereinafter Vaillancourt]
31 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 647
32 Herbert Packer, “Two Models o f the Criminal Process” University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review 113: 
1964, 1.
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Table 4-4C
Different Categories of Rights Cases by Result 
McLachlin Court
Rights/Freedom s Wins (%) Losses Totals (%)
Fundam ental Freedom s 4 (40) 6 10 (15)
Dem ocratic Rights 2 (100) 0 2 (3)
Mobility R ights 0 (0) 2 2 (3)
Legal R ights 21 (49) 22 43 (62)
Equality Rights 2 (20) 8 10 (15)
Language/Education Rights 2 (100) 0 2 (3)
Aborig ina l/M inority R ights 0 (0) 0 0 (0)
General R ights/Application 0 (0) 0 0 (0)
Totals 31 (45) 38 38
** The tota l is higher than 61 because several cases contain 
m ultiple Charter issues and are counted in m ore than one category.
The McLachlin Court has shown unprecedented support for legal rights (49%) 
when compared to the Dickson Court (36%) and the Lamer Court (31%). The McLachlin 
Court has utilized the legal rights section to advance accused rights in key rulings such as
TO
R. v. Ruzic where they overturned s. 17 of the Criminal Code, permitting the defense of 
compulsion by threats, and U.S. v. Burns,34 where the Court affirmed the necessity of 
obtaining an assurance that a fugitive will not receive the death penalty upon extradition. 
The McLachlin Court’s propensity to support Charter claims of legal rights suggests that 
the transformation from the crime control model to due process is accelerating and 
indicates a continuing trend.
Political Freedoms
Fundamental Freedoms remain a distant second, with 63 cases being tried under 
s.2 during the 20-year period, accounting for 13% of the Court’s case-load, which is
33 Rv Ruzic, [2001] 1 SCR 687 [hereinafter Ruzic]
34 United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 SCR 283 [hereinafter Burns]
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identical to Kelly’s findings (52/396). Kelly found that fundamental freedom cases were 
successful 27% of the time, leading him to the conclusion that the Court has not been 
active in cases dealing with “traditional political freedoms of a liberal society.”35 
However according to table 4-7, six statutes have been overturned vise-a-vie fundamental 
freedoms since 1997. Moreover, s. 2 has had a 40% (6/15) success rate, which is 
significantly higher than Kelly’s findings. Specifically, the McLachlin court has 
exhibited increased support to the Charter claimant at 40% (4/10), suggesting that these 
“traditional political freedoms” are being tried more copiously under the McLachlin 
bench than the previous Courts.
Table 4-4A
Different Categories of Rights Cases by Result 
Dickson Court
Wins Totals
Rights/Freedom s (%) Losses (%)
Fundam ental Freedoms 6 (24) 19 25 (15)
Dem ocratic Rights 0 (0) 0 0 (0)
M obility Rights 1 (33) 2 3 (2)
Legal R ights 42 (36) 76 118 (72)
Equality Rights 3 (38) 5 8 (5)
Language/Education Rights 1 (33) 2 3 (2)
Aborig inal/M inority Rights 0 (0) 0 0 (0)
G eneral R ights/Application 1 (17) 5 6 (4)
Totals 54 (33) 109 163**
** The total is higher than 223 because several cases contain 
m ultiple Charter issues and are counted in more than one 
category
35 Kelly, supra note 1 at 648
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Table 4-4B
Different Categories of Rights Cases by Result
Lamer Court
Wins Totals
Rights/Freedoms (%) Losses (%)
Fundamental Freedoms 9 (32) 19 28 (11)
Democratic Rights 1 (25) 3 4 (2)
Mobility Rights 0 (0) 3 3 (1)
Legal Rights 60 (31) 132 192 (72)
Equality Rights 7 (24) 22 29 (11)
Language/Education Rights 1 (100) 0 1 (0.3)
Aboriginal/Minority Rights 0 (0) 1 1 (0.3)
General Rights/Application 3 (38) 5 8 (3)
Totals 81 (31) 185 266**
** The total is higher than 223 because several cases contain 
multiple Charter issues and are counted in more than one 
category
Equality
The Andrews36 decision was a dramatic development in s. 15 litigation and as the 
first equality case to reach the Court, was expected to encourage a substantially higher 
proportion of equality right Charter claims. In Andrews, Section 42 of the Barristers and 
Solicitors Act (B.C) was nullified by the Court. The Court ruled that the requirement of 
citizenship in order to be called to the bar was discriminatory and denied equal rights to 
qualified Canadian residents who are not citizens. Since Andrews, equality claims have 
consistently gained ground in the courts, increasing from 5% of the Court’s total Charter 
cases under the Dickson Court to 15% under the McLachlin Court, with 8 statutes being 
struck down since the 1989 ruling. Peter McCormick suggests that a new Charter phase 
has commenced and that s. 15 may be at the forefront. McCormick believes this phase
36 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 [hereinafter Andrews]
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started after the decision in Eldridge37 and that the court, since this time, has shown a 
“willingness to tackle hot issues in ways that challenge political orthodoxies.” 
McCormick notes that the later years of the Lamer courts tenure and the McLachlin court 
have both shown a propensity to be “active” under s. 15 by “reading words into statutes 
that legislatures had deliberately omitted.”39 However it is important to point out that the 
McLachlin Court has shown the lowest support in s. 15 appeals, supporting the claimant 
in 20% (2/10) of cases. Equality rights found the greatest support under the Dickson 
Court at 38% (3/8), while the Lamer Court supported the claimant in 24% (7/29) of s. 15 
cases. Socially, the Lamer Court has had the most dramatic impact to s. 15 jurisprudence 
with more culturally significant decisions.
Most notable has been the Lamer Court’s advancement of homosexual rights 
through key decisions in Miron v. Trudel40 which rendered the definition of “spouse” in 
the Ontario Insurance Act null and void; Vriend 41 and Egan42 which both established 
sexual orientation as an analogous ground deserving Charter protection under s. 15; and 
M v H 43 which altered the definition of marriage by stating that gay couples should have 
the same rights as heterosexuals who qualify for support payments when common-law 
relationships fail.
These findings suggest that the greatest activism under s. 15 was exhibited by the 
Lamer court because the foundations for social change were laid out between 1997 and 
2000. Nonetheless, the increase in s. 15 cases suggests an institutional shift in attitudes
37 The Court ruled that the B.C medi-care system violated equality rights by not providing interpreters for 
the deaf.
38 Peter McCormick, Supreme at Last (Toronto: James Lormier and Company, 2000), 167
39 Ibid., 167
40 Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 SCR 418 [hereinafter Trudel]
41 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 [hereinafter Vriend]
42 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513 [hereinafter Egan]
43 M. v. H, [1999] 2 SCR 3, 1999
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towards equality; with a Chief Justice who is dedicated to the advancement of equality, 
s. 15 can be expected to play a greater role within the Justice system. However the effect 
on nation-building, as explained in chapter 3, remains dependent on the province’s 
willingness to implement the legislative override (s.33).
Federalism
Jennifer Smith writes that
Judicial review settles or prompts the settling of important jurisdictional 
disputes; enforces the constitutional accountability of both federal and 
provincial governments; and manifest a limited, but critical capacity to 
protect some of the weaker actors in the often appears to be an 
increasingly unbalanced federation.44
As Kelly notes, the Charter sections identified in Trudeau’s nation-building project 
(equality, mobility rights and language/education rights) warrant special attention 
because they are “uniquely Canadian and impact federalism to a higher degree than other 
sections of the Charter.”45 From the above it is evident that equality rights have become 
a major player in the constitutional arena and their increasing success indicates a shift 
towards stronger nation building. However, mobility rights have remained unaffected by 
the Charter’s influence.
44 Jennifer Smith, “Informal Constitutional Development: Change by other means” in Canadian 
Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness and Legitimacy, eds. Heman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad (Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002)
45 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 649
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Mobility Rights under the Charter
In Black v Law Society o f  Alberta46 rules 75B and 154 of the Legal Professions 
Act were nullified by the Court and represent the only successful s. 6 claim. Overall s.6 
claims have been successful in only 13% (1/8) of cases brought before the Court. From 
the outset, this indicates that the Court has been more deferential to the provinces; 
however as noted in Chapter 3, the majority of s.6 cases have dealt with the extradition of 
individuals and the rights of non-citizens. Therefore this aspect of Trudeau’s nation 
building thesis has “produced mixed results.”47
Language and Education Rights
On the other hand, language and education rights, an integral part of the nation 
building project, have enjoyed the greatest support from the court at 71% (5/7).
Language and education rights “represent a cultural compromise designed to enable two 
linguistic communities to coexist in one federal country.”48 Kelly states that “support of 
these Charter claims has steadily declined.”49 However, since 1997 the court has heard 
two language and education cases, both relating to the creation and management of 
French schools, where the claimant was successful in both appeals.50 This trend 
contradicts Kelly’s claim of a decline in the success rate of claimants; however, it lends 
merit to the claim that the language and education cases have contributed to a “loss of 
autonomy for the provinces.”51
46 [1989] 1 SCR 591 [hereinafter Black]
47 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 649
48 Ian Greene, supra note 18 at 186
49 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 649
50 Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [1999] 3 SCR, 851 and Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, 
[2003] 3 SCR 3.
51 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 649
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Aboriginal Rights
According to Kelly’s study Aboriginal rights represented the “largest growth 
area”52 in Charter litigation. As noted in the methodology chapter, all previous studies 
rely on s. 35 of the Constitution act 1982 as the constitutional source for aboriginal 
protections. Since s. 35 is not subject to limitations under section 1 and is outside the 
actual Charter of Rights and Freedoms, all previous cases decided on these grounds will 
be excluded. This leaves Native Women's Assn. o f  Canada (NWAC) v. Canada,53 which 
challenged the equality provision of section 28 in the Charter, as the only Aboriginal 
case. The question presented in NWAC was whether the Government of Canada violated 
the freedom of expression of the individual respondents or of Aboriginal women 
represented by the respondent, as guaranteed by s. 2(b) read together with s. 28. This was 
an appeal from the dismissal of the appellant’s application for an order prohibiting the 
Canadian government from making further payments to certain aboriginal organizations 
until it had provided equal funding to NWAC. The court found that the government did 
not need to consult anyone in funding requirements and that female rights were not being 
infringed, thus dismissing the appeal. However this decision means the court has yet to 
successfully rule in an aboriginal rights case, contradicting Kelly’s findings that the Court 
was the most active under this section.
In short, the findings since 1997 have highlighted the shift from the Lamer Court 
to the McLachlin Court, and have indicated that a new level of activism, not seen since 
the early honeymoon stages, has ensued. McLachlin’s due process approach has
52 Ibid., 649
53 [ 1994] 3 SCR 627 [hereinafter NWAC]
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expanded legal rights, protecting the accused’s rights significantly more than the Lamer 
and Dickson Courts. This increase injudicial review may have significant effects upon 
the sensitive nature of federalism since the criminal law’s application and enforcement is 
divided between the federal and provincial governments. The success of the language 
and education rights suggests provincial autonomy is continuing to decline. However, 
McLachlin’s low support for equality and mobility rights suggest greater deference to 
Parliament than the previous Courts. Therefore, to fully measure the Charter's effect on 
federalism it is important to see how the court approaches appeals from both levels of 
government.
Object of Charter Challenges and Statute Nullification 
The wording of s.32 establishes that the Charter is applicable to “all matters 
within the authority of Parliament.”54 This means that the Charter pertains to all actions 
of the legislative, executive and administrative branches of government “whether or not 
their action is invoked in public or private litigation.”55 Key decisions in McKinney56 and 
Dolphin Delivery57 show the challenges in distinguishing between state and private 
action. Although the court’s interpretation of state action has matured since Dolphin 
Delivery, the distinction is nonetheless demanding. The three previous studies have 
divided government action into three forms: statutes, administrative rules and regulations, 
and the conduct of government officials. As explained in the methodology chapter,
54 Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms
55 Canadian Charter o f Rights Decision D igest, Section 32(1); available from 
http://www.canlii.org/ca/com/chart/s-32-l.html
56 McKinney v. University o f  Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229 [hereinafter McKinney]
57 RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 SCR 573 [hereinafter Dolphin Delivery]
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statutes and regulations have been combined in this study because both challenge the
legislative will and both reflect Parliament’s policy direction.
The subject of Charter challenges directly confronts the legitimacy of judicial
review. Conduct cases involve the behaviour and competence of public officials to
comply with Charter provisions; therefore, when the court reviews public conduct cases
they are ensuring that the other branches of government perform their job properly and
constitutionally.58 However, cases which challenge the constitutionality of statutes and
regulations create a confrontational relationship between the courts and the legislators.
Justice McIntyre stated in Dolphin Delivery that:
.. .while in political science terms it is probably acceptable to treat the 
courts as one of the three fundamental branches of government.. .1 cannot 
equate for the purpose of Charter application the order of a court with an 
element of government action.59
In Kelly’s study, he found that the court had shifted its focus from statutes60 to 
conduct cases. Morton, Russell and Riddell found that challenges to statutes and 
regulation accounted for 54% of the cases decided by the court from 1984 to 1992. Kelly 
discovered an institutional shift in focus between 1993 and 997, finding that conduct 
cases accounted for 62% of all Charter challenges.61
58 See Brian Slattery, “A theory o f the Charter” in [1987] 25:4 Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 701.
59 Dolphin Delievery, supra note 57 at 600.
60 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 654.
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Table 4-5
Object of Charter Challenges, 1983-2003
Wins (%) Losses Inconclusive Total (%)
Statute/Regulation 65 (33) 132 0 197 (43)
References 3 (33) 6 0 9 (2)
Conduct 94 (36) 161 5 260(57)
Total 162 (35) 299 5 466**
**Total is higher than 460 because some Charter challenges involve both a challenges to both 
statute and conduct cases
Kelly discovered that conduct cases absorbed the majority of the Court’s time 
between 1984 and 1997, representing 53% of all cases (208/396). This analysis 
confirmed this discovery; finding that from 1983 to 2003 conduct cases have accounted 
for 57% (260/466) of all Charter cases. However, by comparing Tables 4-5A, B and C, it 
is apparent that each Court has adopted a distinctive balance between the proportion of 
conduct and statute cases. This balance dictates the level of deference the Court employs 
towards the legislatures. If the Court hears a greater proportion of statute cases, they are 
assessing legislative wisdom and testing their role in the policy process of Canada.
Table 4-5A
Object of Charter Challenges, Dickson Court
Wins (%) Losses Inconclusive Total (%)
Statute/Regulation 24 (32) 50 0 74 (46)
References 1 (20) 4 0 5 (3)
Conduct 30 (37) 51 1 82 (51)
Total 38(35) 70 1 161
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Table 4-5B
Object of Charter Challenges, Lamer Court
Wins (%) Losses Inconclusive Total
Statute/Regulation 29 (32) 61 0 90 (38)
References 2 (40) 2 0 4 (2)
Conduct 45 (31) 98 3 146 (61)
Total 93 (32) 196 3 240
Table 4-5C
Object of Charter Challenges, McLachlin Court
Wins (%) Losses Inconclusive Total
Statute/Regulation 12 (38) 20 0 32(50)
References 0 (0) 0 0 0
Conduct 18 (56) 13 1 32(50)
Total 30 (47) 33 1 64
The proportion of statute and regulation cases heard by the McLachlin Court (50%) 
contradicts Kelly’s predictions that conduct cases will continue to consume nearly two- 
thirds of the Court’s Charter docket.62 The Lamer Court appeared to favour conduct 
cases, suggesting that they were more deferential to the legislatures than the other Courts. 
Morton, Russell and Riddell concluded that when the court hears more statute cases than 
conduct cases it is thrusting itself “into a more competitive relationship with Parliament 
and provincial legislatures, and make the legitimacy issue more explicit and thus more 
difficult to ignore.”63 However the nullification rate for statutes and regulations has 
remained constant throughout the years, hovering around one-third. The McLachlin 
Court has become slightly more active: they have nullified the statute or regulation in
62 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 655
63 Second study, supra note 3 at 16
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question 38% of the time, compared to 32% for both the Lamer and Dickson Court’s. 
What is possibly more significant is the McLachlin Court’s support rate in conduct cases. 
The Dickson and Lamer Courts, when combined, supported the claimant in conduct cases 
33% of the time (75/228). The McLachlin Court, on the other hand, has sided with the 
claimant in approximately 56% (18/32) of the conduct cases. Despite the court’s 
“knowledge and expertise” in this area, a 56% support rate is quite high and threatens to 
institutionally reshape the way the government and the bureaucracy treat procedural 
rights. Kelly asserts that the “legitimacy of judicial review under the Charter has 
benefited from the Court’s decisions to select more cases that involve the conduct of 
public officials.”64 If these cases have a higher success rate, legitimacy may be 
questioned. Nonetheless, the Court’s attention has shifted once again under the 
McLachlin Court. The higher support rates and the predisposition to adjudicate statute 
cases leaves the impression that the anti-democratic critique seen in the Charter’s early 
years may be partially revived.
Table 4-6
Nullification of Statute & Regulations, 1983-2003
Nullified (%) Upheld Total
Federal 37 (29) 89 126
Provincial 20 (32) 43 63
Reference (Fed) 0 (0) 2 2
Reference (Prov) 3 (43) 4 7
Total 60 (30) 198**
**There are 8 cases where the same Federal statute is nullified in different cases:
Plantation (Big M drug Mart); Laviollette (Vailancourt); Arkel, R v J(jt) & Rodney (Martineau); 
Genereux (Forster); Martin (Wholesale); Kourtessis (Baron)
64 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 656
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Table 4-6 shows significant changes from the previous studies, not in the 
nullification rate, but in the number of statutes tested. Kelly’s study shows that by 1997, 
39% (26/67) of provincial statutes tested, had been nullified.65 However, 35% (9/26) of 
these invalidated statutes were decided on non Charter grounds including: Quebec (AG) 
v. Greater Hull School Board , R. v. Mercure , Reference re Manitoba Language
<ro fTQ nr\ n i
Rights , Bilodeau v. Manitoba (A.G) , Quebec (A.G) v Brunet , R. v. Badger , R. v.
*7 0 7 A
Nikal , R. v. Adams & R. v. Cote. Moreover, one federal case, Singh v. Minister o f 
Employment and Immigration15 was disqualified from the study because the majority
7 ftdecision was based on the Bill of Rights and not entirely on the Charter. After 
accounting for the cases tried on non-Charter grounds, Kelly’s statute nullification rate 
would be 29% (17/58). Since Kelly’s study 47% (8/17) of provincial statutes have been 
nullified by the Court. However the McLachlin Court’s provincial nullification rate is 
38% (5/13) suggesting that the last few years of the Lamer Court (1998 and 1999) was 
marked by indifference to the provincial legislatures, overturning 75% (3/4) of provincial 
statute cases. Nonetheless, according to tables 4-6B and 4-6C, the transition from the 
Lamer Court to the McLachlin Court marked a significant shift in provincial support, 
suggesting that government autonomy is increasingly threatened through judicial 
interference. Since 1997, 25% (8/32) of federal statute challenges have been successful
65 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 656
66 [1984] 2 SCR. 575
67 [1988] 1 SCR. 234
68 [1985] 1 SCR. 721
69 [1986] 1 SCR. 449
70 [1990] 1 SCR. 260
71 [1996] 1 SCR. 771
72 [1996] 1 SCR. 1013
73 [1996] 3 SCR. 101
74 [1996] 3 SCR.139
75 [1985] 1 SCR 177
76 For a complete list o f  cases included in the previous studies, but excluded in this study, refer to appendix 
M-5 for case listings plus reasons for exclusion.
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compared to a 47% (8/17) success rate in overturning provincial statutes, suggesting that 
the court is becoming more deferential to the federal government and exhibiting 
centralizing tendencies through decreasing provincial autonomy. This solidifies the 
principles in Trudeau’s nation building project as discussed in chapter two, and suggests 
that the Charter is beginning to reshape Canadian politics in a centralizing manner.
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Tables 4-6A, B and C show the Court’s nullification rates under each Chief Justice.
Table 4-6A
Nullification of Statutes and Regulations, Dickson Court
Nullified (%) Upheld Total
Federal 10 (22) 36 46 (62)
Provincial 9 (39) 14 23 (31)
Reference (Fed) 0 (0) 1 1(1)
Reference (Prov) 1 (25) 3 4 (5)
20 (27) 54 74*
**There are 5 cases where the same Federal statute is nullified in different cases 
Plantation (Big M  drug Mart); Laviollette (Vailancourt); Arkel, R  v J(jt) & Rodney (Martineau)
Table 4-6B
Nullification of Statutes and Regulations, Lamer Court
Nullified (%) Upheld Total
Federal 20 (33) 41 61 (67)
Provincial 6 (23) 20 26 (29)
Reference (Fed) 0 (0) 1 1(1)
Reference (Prov) 2 (67) 1 3 (3)
28 (31) 63 91*
**There are 3 cases where the same Federal statute is nullified in different cases 
Genereux (Forster); Martin (Wholesale); Kourtessis (Baron)
Table 4-6C
Nullification of Statutes and Regulations, McLachlin Court
Nullified (%) Upheld Total
Federal 7 (37) 12 19 (59)
Provincial 5 (38) 8 13 (41)
Reference (Fed) 0 (0) 0 0 (0)
Reference (Prov) 0 (0) 0 0 (0)
12 (38) 20 32
Morton, Russell and Withey’s study discovered that from 1982 to 1989 more 
provincial statutes were overturned than federal (11-8) which led them to confirm earlier 
predictions that the Charter would act as a vehicle for policy uniformity throughout
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Canada and weaken the Charter’s role as a nation-building instrument.77 After adjusting 
the nullification rate according to this study’s methodology, the Dickson Court evenly 
distributed the nullification of statutes by striking down 10 federal statutes and 10 
provincial statutes. This balance was substantially altered by the Lamer Court: 20 federal 
statutes were nullified compared to 8 provincial, meaning that the Lamer Court was two 
and a half times more likely to strict down a federal statute. The McLachlin Court has 
returned to a more even distribution of nullification rates, striking down 7 federal and 5 
provincial statutes. This indicates that the McLachlin Court may be returning to the early 
confrontational relationship that the Dickson Court established.
The McLachlin Court has been consistent in their approach to federal/provincial 
policy review, overturning 37% of federal statutes and 38% of provincial statutes. The 
Lamer Court appeared to side with the provinces whose nullification rate dipped to 23% 
while the federal rate rose eleven percentage points from Dickson’s Court.78 Janet 
Hiebert’s assertion that the Court is becoming more deferential to the federal government 
due to the impact and importance of the provincial statutes nullified is somewhat
• • • 70misleading, if not erroneous. The federal government has had significant legislation 
nullified in the last few years; in 2002 alone 4 of the 6 federal statute cases heard were 
nullified. In Sauve v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)80 s.51 (e) of the Canada Elections 
Act was overturned, allowing persons imprisoned in federal correctional institutions
77 First study, supra note 3 at 32; also see P.H Russell, “the Political Purpose o f the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms” (1983) 61 Canadian Bar Review. 31.
78 Under Dickson, Federal nullification rate was 22%, while under Lamer it rose to 33%.
79 Janet L. Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma o f Judicial Review (Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1996)
80 [2002] 3 SCR 519
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(offenders serving sentences of two years or more) to vote in federal elections. In Ruzicil 
s. 17 of the Criminal Code, providing for the defense of compulsion by threats, was 
nullified. In Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) sections 24(2), 24(3) and 28(2) of 
the Canada Elections Act were declared unconstitutional, overturning the rule that 
political parties must nominate candidates in at least 50 electoral districts to qualify for 
certain benefits. These three judgments alone had a considerable impact upon the justice 
and electoral systems. The repercussions of Figueroa were so extensive that the 
declaration of unconstitutionality was suspended for 12 months to allow Parliament to 
respond by enacting a new, constitutionally consistent, law.
Provincially, Trociukv British Columbia (AG)83 saw sections 3(1) (b) and 3(6) (b) 
of the Vital Statistics Act declared unconstitutional. Representing a decisive victory for 
paternal rights, the Court overturned a mother’s right to "unacknowledge" the biological 
father on birth registration forms and not to include the father’s surname as the child's.
Due to the far-reaching implications the declaration of invalidity, like Figueroa, was 
suspended for 12 months.
Provincial autonomy was further tested in the court’s controversial 1998 ruling 
Vriend84, when multiple sections of Alberta’s Individual Rights Protection Act were 
judicially amended. When the Supreme Court read sexual orientation as an analogous s. 
15(1) protection into the Alberta human rights act, there was a perceived “strong public 
outcry”85 forcing Ralph Klein’s Progressive Conservative party to consider using s. 33,
81 [2001] 1 SCR 687
82 [2003] 1 SCR 912
83 [2003] 1 SCR 835
84 Vriend, supra note 41
85 F.L Morton, “Dialogue or Monologue?” in Paul Howe and Peter H. Russell, eds., Judicial Power and 
Canadian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 115
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the notwithstanding clause, to overturn the decision. Fortunately for equality rights in 
Canada, the political gratification the Klein administration may have encountered could 
not outweigh the public’s reaction to a government explicitly restricting a right. However 
the end result of this decision saw the courts successfully go against the legislative will 
and in turn, restricted provincial autonomy by implementing universal standards 
supported by the Charter.
Regardless, both levels of government have had important pieces of legislation 
struck down by the Court, which weakens Hiebert’s conclusions. However, the premise 
of her argument, that the Court is becoming more deferential to the federal government, 
may find some validity in the nullification rates since 1997.
Despite the significant shift since 1997, it is difficult to predict whether 
the McLachlin Court will become increasingly deferential to either level of government. 
Strong decisions have been handed down both provincially and federally, nullifying 
socially important statutes. The McLachlin Court appears to have leveled out their 
support for the legislatures, showing no definitive signs of deference towards either level 
of government. However, with the increase in the nullification rate, both provincial and 
federal autonomy have been threatened.
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The Court’s Discretion: Reasonable Limitations and the Exclusion o f  Evidence
In almost 45% of all Charter cases (206/460), after the Court has discovered a 
rights violation, a second stage of analysis, which is either a challenge to the law under 
s. 1 or a challenge under s. 24(2), is undertaken. Section 1 of the Charter tests whether a 
Charter violation is a reasonable limit on Canadian rights and freedoms. In criminal 
cases, the exclusion of evidence, following a Charter breach, is tested through s. 24(2). 
Both sections are highly discretionary. First, the rules created to administer each section 
are judge-made; second, the ruling rests primarily on the judge’s preferences to interpret 
these sections and apply past precedents as they see fit.
In R. v. Oakes86 the Supreme Court developed a two-pronged test for determining 
whether a Charter violation was a reasonable limitation. First, the party seeking to 
uphold the violation must demonstrate that the limitation is pressing and substantial.
86 [1986] 1 SCR 103
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Second, if a pressing objective is discovered, it must be determined to be proportionate to 
the impugned measure. In R v. Big M Drug Mart, the court decided that the objective 
relied on in s. 1 analysis “must also be one which is intra vires the level of government
D O
prescribing the limit.” However as Dickson stated in Canada (Canadian Human Rights
O Q
Commission) v Taylor
The various categories of the Oakes approach to proportionality are simply 
intended to provide an analytical framework. The rigid 
compartmentalization of these categories is illogical... and no bright line 
separates one from the other.90
Kelly concluded that the “Court has redefined the test in a way that incorporates greater
judicial deference to the policy choices of government.”91 Morton, Russell and Withey
found that after 1987 the court began accepting s. 1 arguments, thus curtailing their
“initial activism.”92 When the court rejects the government’s s. 1 argument they are
ultimately ignoring the legislative will, therefore engaging in “active” interpretation.
Table 4-8 shows the Supreme Court’s management of this “second stage of
determination” success rates from 1983 to 2003. During this time 24% (111/460) of all
Charter cases required a section 1 analysis. Table 4-8 only includes cases that directly
deal with a section 1 challenge.
87 [1985] 1 SCR. 295
88 Meehan, Cuddy, Elkin, Fairley, Fera, Martland, Rankin, Richard, Wake, Loignon & Purchase, The 2000 
Annotated Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms (Scarborough: Carswell Publishing, 1999), 14 
[hereinafter 2000 Annotated\
89 [1990] 3 SCR. 75 [hereinafter Taylor]
90 Dickson in Taylor, Ibid., at 598.
91 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 662
92 First study, supra note 3 at 34
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Table 4-8
The Section 1 Reasonable Limits Defense By Year
Accepted (Gov't Wins) Rejected (Claimant Wins) (%) Total
Year
1983 0 0 (0) 0
1984 0 1 (100) 1
1985 0 3 (100) 3
1986 0 3 (100) 3
1987 0 2 (100) 2
1988 5 4 (44) 9
1989 2 5 (71) 7
1990 9 11 (55) 20
1991 3 7 (70) 10
1992 2 8 (80) 10
1993 2 6 (75) 8
1994 0 4 (100) 4
1995 1 2 (66) 3
1996 4 0 (0) 4
1997 0 3 (100) 3
1998 1 2 (66) 3
1999 0 4 (100) 4
2000 1 0 (0) 1
2001 1 2 (67) 3
2002 1 8 (89) 9
2003 1 3(75) 4
Total 33 78 (70) 111
Table 4-8A
Reasonable limits by Court
Accepted Rejected (%) Total
Since 1997 5 19 (79) 24
Dickson Court 16 29 (64) 45
Lamer Court 13 36 (74) 49
McLachlin Court 4 13 (76) 17
Table 4-8 shows the Court ruling against the government in 70% of section 1 
cases between 1983 and 2003. Table 4-8A shows the Dickson court with a 64% rejection 
rate highlighted by the court’s 100% (9/9) rejection rate over the first 4 years of section 1
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analysis. This is considerably lower than the Lamer and McLachlin Courts, thus 
supporting the conclusions of Morton, Russell and Withey that the Dickson Court was
• QTquite active in the first .4 years. They suggest this may have “reflect(ed) the un­
preparedness of government lawyers for section 1 arguments.”94 From 1988 to 1990 the 
Court experienced a change of direction in regards to section 1 cases and sided with the 
government 44% (16/36) of the time. After 1990, the Court’s treatment of section 1 
cases was fairly consistent, siding with the government only 26% of the time (17/66). 
Although s. 1 has seen some “volatile shifts” in the Court’s use, Kelly’s conclusion that 
the Court has moved from an activist to a moderately activist court has appeared to stand 
the test of time.95
In sum, the Court’s propensity to side with the claimants in section 1 cases shows 
the Court’s willingness to challenge the legislative will. In Reference re s. 94(2) o f  the 
Motor Vehicle Act (B.C)96 the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed Lord Sankey’s 
famous “living tree metaphor” by ruling that the Constitution was not static and that 
original intent of the framers should not be conclusive; rather the Charter was flexible 
and capable of growth. Charter critics contend that through this metaphor, the courts read 
in the right to broadly change the wording and meaning of Charter provisions, and to 
change laws according to their own philosophical and ideological views. Charter 
supporters point out that the intent of the document was to reshape Canadian society and
Q7create a constitutional supremacy. Since 1990, the statistics have suggested that the
93 Ibid., 34
94 Ibid., 34
95 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 663
96 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486
97 See Bertha Wilson, “We Didn’t Volunteer” in Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy, ed. Paul Howe 
and Peter Russell (Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001)
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judiciary is willing to challenge the legislative will and has accepted a role in the policy 
process of Canada. However, a more in-depth look at the individual section 1 challenges, 
which will be presented later in this thesis, will allow the necessary testing to determine if 
ideological views influence the court.
Table 4-9 outlines the Court’s treatment of s. 24(2), motions to exclude evidence. 
Like s. 1, the exclusion of evidence rule allows for a high degree of judicial discretion. 
Charter protections in regards to police conduct and the rights of the accused are not
Q O
absolute, unlike our American counterparts with their Bill of Rights. The Court must
determine if  excluding the evidence would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. In R v Collins" the Supreme Court established the framework in which
section 24(2) was to be interpreted in a three part test. First, the Court must determine
whether the admission of the evidence will affect the overall fairness of the trial. Second,
the Court must determine the seriousness of the violation. Lastly, the court must consider
the effect on the reputation of justice if the evidence is excluded.100 Section 24(2) is
considered discretionary because the rights are not absolute and it is the Court’s choice
whether to allow the evidence into the trial. However,
the discoverability principle provides that the admission of conscriptive 
evidence will not render the trial unfair where the impugned evidence 
would have been discovered in any event, either because there was an 
independent source for the discovery of the evidence, or the discovery was 
inevitable.101
98 American Bill o f  Rights, (Amendments I through X ratified December 15, 1791) source: The Constitution 
o f the United States o f  American, as Amended through July 1971, House Coc. 93-215, 93rd Congress., 2nd 
sess. 1974
"[1987] 1 SCR 265
100 Ibid.
101 2000 Annotated, supra note 88 at 755
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Nonetheless, Charter supporters point to the fact that s. 24(2) has rarely been abused by 
the Court, which has only gone too far in a few occasions.102 Since excluding evidence is 
conditional upon the court’s discretion and their interpretation of its effect on the 
administration of justice, high levels of support for accused’s rights are rightly 
accompanied by accusations of judicial activism.
Table 4-9




Accepted (Claimant Wins) 
0 (0)
Rejected (Gov't Wins) 
0 0
1984 0 (0) 0 0
1985 3 (100) 0 3
1986 2 (100) 0 2
1987 4 (67) 2 6
1988 1 (14) 6 7
1989 5 (50) 5 10
1990 4 (40) 6 10
1991 3 (50) 3 6
1992 1 (20) 4 5
1993 3 (38) 5 8
1994 4 (50) 4 8
1995 1 (20) 4 5
1996 2 (20) 8 10
1997 2 (40) 3 5
1998 1 (33) 2 3
1999 0 (0) 2 2
2000 0 (0) 0 0
2001 0 (0) 0 0
2002 1 (25) 3 4
2003 1 (100) 0 1
Total 38 (40) 57 (60) 95
102 A leading example is R v Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, where the Court overturned a murder conviction, 
by excluding conscriptive evidence despite the discoverability principle.
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Table 4-9A




















Since 1983, almost 21% (95/460) of all Charter cases have involved challenges 
under section 24(2); in these 95 cases, evidence has been excluded 40% of the time.
Early activism by the Dickson Court saw the claimants victorious in 50% of the cases. 
The Lamer Court, on the other hand, took a conservative approach to s.24(2) excluding 
evidence in one-third of the cases (17/52). The McLachlin Court has shown an early 
tendency to approach s.24(2) in a similarly restrained fashion; excluding evidence in 40% 
(2/5) of the cases. The McLachlin Court has rejected the claimant in 60% of s.24(2) 
cases; however, they have only tried 5 cases since 2000, thus reliable generalizations are 
somewhat difficult to arrive at. Notably, there is a declining trend in the proportion of 
s.24(2) cases in the Court’s yearly docket. Dickson’s Court heard a s.24(2) appeal in 
25% (38/151) of their Charter cases. The Lamer Court saw a drop in the percentage of 
s.24(2) cases to 21% (52/240), while the McLachlin court plummeted 13 points, to 8%. 
From a consistent decline such as this, the inference can be made that the rules for 
excluding evidence have become sufficiently clear and the lower Courts have coherent 
precedents to follow, or that the police have “learnt their lessons” and are more aware of 
the Charter’s provisions, guarantees and restrictions. Morton103 and Manfredi104 offer
103 F.L Morton, “The Political Impact o f the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms.” Canadian Journal 
o f  Political Science 20., 1987 at 31
104 Christopher Manfredi, The Use o f United States Decisions by the Supreme Court o f Canada Under the 
Charter o f Rights and Freedoms.” (1990) 23 Canadian Journal o f Political Science. 499
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the explanation that the Court has shifted from a stringent crime control approach to 
justice, where evidence is rarely excluded, to a more elastic due process style enjoyed 
during the “honeymoon” stage of Charter jurisprudence, where the rights of the accused 
often supersede those of the victims. Kelly found that between 1993 and 1997, this trend 
was reversed, as the Court refused to exclude evidence in 71 per cent of Charter cases. 
Kelly concluded that this trend illustrated a shift to the more conservative crime control 
methods. Since 1997, Kelly’s findings have been consistent, with the Court admitting 
evidence in 70% (7/10) of section 24(2) cases, thus suggesting that the later years of the 
Lamer Court and the McLachlin Court brought a crime control approach to the exclusion 
of evidence.
In short, the Court’s approach to the discretionary provisions of the Charter has 
fluctuated over the life of the Charter. Morton, Russell and Riddell asserted that due to 
the nature of sections 1 and 24(2) their use would provide a “reliable indicator of judicial 
self-restraint or activism”105 The Lamer Court comes off as the most deferential court, 
showing high support rates for the government in s. 1 cases and being the least likely 
Court to exclude evidence. The Dickson Court on the other hand, showed little support 
for the government’s section 1 defenses, while excluding evidence in almost half of their 
s.24(2) cases. The current McLachlin court has shown a mixed level of self-restraint 
towards government action; being the least deferential to government in s. 1 claims, yet 
being moderately restrained in s.24(2) cases. Despite the previous authors conclusions, 
the composition of the Court appears to influence the balance between the judicial and 
legislative relationship and continues to illustrate the Court’s role in the policy process of 
Canada.
105 Second study, supra note 3 at 29
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Charter Consensus in the Court 
An important shift in the judiciary has materialized since the Charter’s early 
“honeymoon” stages, as the rate of unanimous decisions in the Supreme Court has risen 
subtly each year. As explained in chapter 3, unanimity within a court helps explain the 
cohesiveness, or the division of opinions amongst the Justices. The Dickson Court had 
the most significant divide within the Court, concurring unanimously in 62% of all 
Charter decisions. McCormick has noted that the “most striking development (of the 
Dickson Court) was the return of the separate concurrence.”106 The Lamer Court, on the 
other hand, was characterized by McCormick as “the least fragmented Court in the 
Court’s history.”107 The Lamer Court was unanimous in 68% of all Charter cases, which 
was a significant increase from Lamer’s predecessors. The McLachlin Court has 
continued this trend by voting unanimously in 69% of all Charter Cases.
106 Peter McCormick, Supra note 38 at 111
107 Ibid., 132
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Table 4-10
Unanimity in the Court
Unanimous Total Charter Per Cent
Year Decisions Cases Unanimous
1983 1 1 100%
1984 3 3 100%
1985 10 12 83%
1986 6 9 67%
1987 16 27 59%
1988 16 24 67%
1989 19 32 59%
1990 27 51 53%
1991 18 30 60%
1992 18 29 62%
1993 31 40 78%
1994 13 23 57%
1995 19 29 66%
1996 26 32 81%
1997 14 19 74%
1998 12 21 57%
1999 11 17 65%
2000 5 8 63%
2001 13 17 76%
2002 9 18 50%
2003 15 18 83%
1983-2003 302 460 66%
Since 1997 65 99 66%
Dickson Court 98 158 62%
Lam er Court 162 240 68%
McLachlin Court 42 61 69%
Unanimity in the Court has remained somewhat static since Kelly’s findings. 
Kelly found that from 1984 to 1997 the court was unanimous in 64% of all Charter 
decisions.108 This study has found that from 1984 to 2003 the court voted in unanimity 
66% of the time. Conclusions may be drawn that unanimous decisions in the Court are 
increasing each year; however in 2002 the Court had the lowest rate of unanimity in the 
Charter’s lifetime at a meager 50%. Kelly explains that variations in the Court’s
108 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 667
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inclination to agree are associated on the proportion of procedural versus substantive 
cases.
Procedural questions are less likely to divide the Court than substantive 
policy issues that arise frequently when the Court focuses on challenges to 
statutes. Cases raising substantive policy issues are most likely to raise 
questions about the legitimacy of the Court’s invalidation of the decisions 
of legislative majorities.109
According to Table 4-1OA, in 2002, 56% (10/18) of cases were statute challenges, 
which raised substantive policy appeals and were decided unanimously in only 30% of 
the cases, whereas 83% of the conduct cases in 2002 were decided with unanimity.
Table 4-10A







1998 0 (0) 5 12 (75) 16
1999 8 (67) 12 3 (60) 5
2000 4 (67) 6 1 (50) 2
2001 5 (71) 7 10 (83) 12
2002 3 (30) 10 7 (88) 8
2003 7 (78) 9 8 (89) 9
27 (55) 49 41 (79) 52
Kelly’s assertion that the type of appeal influences the agreement in the court is 
strongly supported by table 4-10A. From 1998 to 2003 challenges to statutes were 
decided unanimously in 55% of all cases. On the other hand, the Court was unanimous in 
79% of all conduct cases. These findings suggest that cases involving challenges to 
statutes are intrinsically more discretionary since they produce more dissent and differing 
opinions, thus requiring greater judicial attention. Theoretically, this reinforces the
109 Ibid., 666
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
136
notion that ideological similarities may play a role injudicial decisions. If the individual 
judge is more deferential to government policy enacted by their appointer, a link between 
deference and the decision can be established. We will return to this argument later in 
the thesis.
Scholars have consistently reinforced the notion that the Court, and the public at 
large, prefers unanimous decisions.110 Unanimity represents absolutism, and leaves little 
to be critiqued.
All judges know that unanimous decisions have the most impact, so they 
know that by writing their own supplementary or competing reasons, even 
in support of the same outcome, they weaken the decision and send signals 
to litigants and lawyers that there are issues here to revisit.111
Unconditional agreement in the Court is seldom studied. The three previous
studies deem a case to be unanimous only in cases where there is not a dissenting
opinion. The previous studies do not account for separate concurrences. Concurring
opinions reflect a disparity in judgment, often formed through disagreements in the
reasoning and interpretation of judicial rules. A corollary effect of concurring opinions in
Canadian case law is the creation of a diluted sense of agreement both on the part of the
public and the legal system. Table 4-1 OB shows the consensus rate on the Court in single
decision judgments, those without dissenting or concurring opinions.
110 See, Jennifer E. Nicol, A study o f  Unanimity on the Court, (Washington University Press, 2001); Perry, 
H. W. Jr. Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991); Lee Epstein and Jack Knight. The Choices Justices Make. (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998) and Susan U. Philips, Ideology in the Language o f  Judges: How 
Judges Practice Law, Politics, and Courtroom Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)
111 McCormick, supra note 3 8 at 111
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Table 4-10B
Unanimity without separate concurrences
Complete Unanimity Total number of Charter
Year (%) Decisic
1983 1 (100) 1
1984 3 (100) 3
1985 6 (50) 12
1986 1 (11) 9
1987 10 (37) 27
1988 11 (46) 24
1989 17 (53) 32
1990 9 (18) 51
1991 9 (30) 30
1992 12 (41) 29
1993 21(53) 40
1994 7 (30) 23
1995 8 (28) 29
1996 21 (66) 32
1997 11 (58) 19
1998 11 (52) 21
1999 5 (29) 17
2000 4 (50) 8
2001 12 (71) 17
2002 8 (44) 18
2003 14 (78) 18
1983-2003 201 (43) 460
Dickson Court 57 (36) 158
Lamer Court 105 (44) 240
McLachlin
Court 38 (62) 61
The McLachlin Court has transformed the judicial decision making process in this 
regard. The Dickson Court was completely unanimous in 36% of all Charter cases. 
Although the Lamer Court increased their proportion to 44%, the McLachlin Court has 
minimized the fragmentation on the Court by deciding cases unanimously in nearly twice 
as many cases as the Dickson Court (62%). Table 4-11 signifies a parallel trend of 
judicial uniformity in their decision making process.
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Table 4-11
Number of Written Opinions Per Charter Case
Number of Charter Number of Opinii
Year Opinions Cases Case
1983 1 1 1.00
1984 3 3 1.00
1985 20 12 1.67
1986 24 9 2.67
1987 62 27 2.30
1988 51 24 2.13
1989 59 32 1.84
1990 130 51 2.55
1991 74 30 2.47
1992 62 29 2.14
1993 82 40 2.05
1994 57 23 2.48
1995 64 29 2.21
1996 56 32 1.75
1997 34 19 1.79
1998 37 21 1.76
1999 32 17 1.88
2000 12 8 1.50
2001 26 17 1.53
2002 34 18 1.89
2003 26 18 1.44
1983-2003 946 460 2.06
Dickson Court 219 107 2.05
Lamer Court 628 291 2.16
McLachlin
Court 98 61 1.61
In 2003, the average number of written opinions dropped to the lowest level 
(1.44) since the Charter’s early stages from 1983 to 1985. Since the Charter’s inception, 
the Court has averaged slightly above 2 written opinions per case; however since 1996 
this average has considerably declined. In each of the last 8 years, the number of written 
opinions has been below the mean, averaging 1.69 opinions per year, with the McLachlin 
averaging 1.61 decisions per year.
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McCormick found that the Laskin Court was the “least fragmented Court in the 
Court’s history, with the highest proportion of unanimous decisions (and) the lowest rates
1 19 « •of dissents and separate concurrences.” McCormick discovered that with the Charter, 
the Dickson Court and the Lamer Court gradually retreated from these practices due to 
larger panel sizes.113 Morton, Russell and Riddell concluded that “Lamer has been less 
interested in or less able to continue the consensus-maker role of Chief Justice that 
Dickson has created.”114 However, Kelly discovered that Lamer had moved from the 
“activist periphery.. .to a consensus-making role”115 within the Court and this encouraged 
a Court-wide trend towards cohesive decision making.
Table 4-11A
Number of written opinions per Charter case by type of Challenge, 2000-2003
Statute Number of Average Number Conduct Number of Average Numt
Cases Opinions of Opinions Cases Opinions of Opinions
2000 6 9 1.50 2 3 1.50
2001 7 13 1.86 12 14 1.17
2002 10 23 2.30 8 11 1.38
2003 9 16 1.78 9 10 1.11
Totals 32 61 1.91 31 38 1.23
Table 4-11A demonstrates that an integral component in determining the 
cohesiveness of the Court is the type of Charter case. The McLachlin Court showed 
much greater unity in their rulings on conduct cases, averaging 1.23 opinions per case 
when compared to statute cases which averaged 1.91 opinions per case. This somewhat 
dispels Kelly’s conclusions that the growing consensus in the Court indicates a
112 McCormick, supra note 38 at 132
113 see discussion o f panel size on page 46-47
114 Second study, supra note 3 at 39 table 14
115 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 673
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rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism116 since the Court remains divided when 
challenging the constitutionality of legislation. Therefore the balance of liberal 
constitutionalism appears to depend on the type of Charter claim brought before the 
Court. The Court approaches statute cases in a more flexible and discretionary manner 
than conduct cases, which in effect can disrupt this perceived balance.
McCormick states that conclusions based on the average number of opinions 
rendered per year is the “poorest measure of how divided the Court might be”117 because 
they tend to fluctuate based on panel size and the type of Charter challenge. As appendix 
A1 shows, the McLachlin Court has significantly increased the reliance on full-panel 
judgments. The Dickson Court sat in plenary panels in 9% (13/159) of all Charter 
decisions, while the Lamer Court increased this proportion to 42% (101/240) of their case 
load. The McLachlin Court has exploded, sitting in 9 panel judgments in 75% (46/61) of 
all Charter. Health problems on the Dickson Court (see Appendix A3), and the large case 
load of the Lamer Court may explain why these Courts were unable to sit in plenary 
panels consistently. However, Justice McLachlin suggests that this shift was caused by
an increase in public scrutiny of the Court’s decisions, producing an institutional demand
11 8for a united and cohesive Court.
Individual Approaches to Rights and Freedoms 
Twenty-five individuals sat on the Supreme Court from 1983-2003 representing 
three different Courts and three Prime Ministers (see Appendix A2). Both Trudeau and
116 Kelly study, supra note 1 at, 668
117 McCormick, supra note 38 at 133
118 Beverly McLachlin, “The Role of Judges in Modem Society,” Supreme Court o f  Canada Website 
available from http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/speeches/role-of-judges_e.asp
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Mulroney “packed”119 the court with 9 appointees (Trudeau appointed 5 in his first term 
and the remaining four after defeating Joe Clark’s minority government in 1980), while 
Jean Chretien appointed 6 Justices. Current Prime Minister Paul Martin recently 
appointed Madam Justices Abella and Charron; however since their appointment dates 
are outside the study, they are not included in this section. Canadian legal theorists such 
as David Beatty120 have suggested that patronage appointments affect the judiciary’s 
decision making process. Beatty determined that the decline injudicial activism during 
the Lamer Court was caused by the shift from the Trudeau to Mulroney appointments. 
Peter Russell and Jacob Ziegel deduced in an early journal contribution that political 
patronage and personal friendships play a prominent role in the appointment process of 
the lower courts. They found that this role was not as central in the Supreme Court,
• 191nonetheless they concluded that it may play a prominent role in the future. However as 
explained in chapter 3, Beatty’s assumption of patronage in the Supreme Court has 
garnished relatively little support. Nonetheless, the notion that ideology plays a factor in 
individual decision making has consistently gained ground. Christopher Manfredi’s 
recent study found that “individual justices...exhibit varying attitudes toward(s) different
119 Court packing is a term developed by Franklin Roosevelt in his judicial reorganization bill, or “The new 
deal.” It assumes the premise that most presidents seek to achieve a politically compatible judiciary and do 
this through the appointment process. American literature is enshrouded with this definition and can be 
further examined in these works: John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A theory o f  Judicial review 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1980); Heman Schwartz, Packing the Courts: The Conservative 
Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988); Terri Jennings Peretti,
In Defense o f  a Political Court (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001); Sheldon Goldman & 
Austin Sarat,American Court Systems: Readings in Judicial Process and Behavior, 2nd ed. (Longman 
Group United Kingdom, 1989); John B. Gates, The Supreme Court and Partisan Realignment: A Macro- 
And Microlevel Perspective, Transforming American Politics (Portland: Book News, Inc. 1992); Henry R. 
Glick, Courts in American Politics: Readings and Introductory Essays (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Publishing, 1990)
120 David Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian Production o f the Constitutional Review 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990)
121 Peter H, Russell and Jacob S. Ziegel, “Federal Judicial Appointments: An Appraisal of the First 
Mulroney Government’s Appointments and the New Judicial Advisory Committees” University o f  Toronto 
Law Journal, Vol.41, no.l (1991)
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types of Charter claims.”122 Both Kelly’s and Morton, Russell and Riddell’s study’s
concluded that the shift from the Trudeau Court to a Mulroney Court did not mark a
“shift in the balance of power away from activism, (but consolidated) the dominance of
1the Court’s grey middle.” The grey middle is meant to describe a “centre-dominant”
Court where tendencies of activism and restraint combine to create a moderated approach
to judicial decisions, thus characterizing justices with Charter support rates consistently
hovered around the average.
Bertha Wilson, a Trudeau appointee, has consistently been considered the most
creative judge by critics, scholars and through her own admissions.124 In fact, Robert E.
Hawkins and Robert Martin concluded that Wilson was:
.. .the most political Supreme Court judge in Canadian history. She did not 
simply transgress the boundaries that restrain the behavior of judges in a 
liberal democracy, she denied their existence.125
Table 4-12A shows that despite Wilson’s high support of the Charter (54%), she
t  n / r
was unable to retain her position as the “most activist judge” Madame Justice Marie 
Deschamps captured this distinction, sporting an impressive 65% support rate for Charter 
claimants. Deschamps, appointed to the Court in August of 2002127 had only sat on 17 
Charter cases before the start of the 2004 campaign, however she decided in favour of the
122 Christopher Manfredi, Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 3
123 Second study, supra note 3 at 39, Kelly study, supra note 1 at 670
124 See: Bertha Wilson, “Guaranteed Freedoms in a Free and Democratic Society. A New Role for the 
Courts?” (Address to the 22nd Australian Legal Convention, Brisbane, Australia, July 1983) in 
Speeches, Speeches Delivered by the Honourable Bertha Wilson: 1976-1991 (Ottawa: Supreme Court o f  
Canada, 1992); Bertha Wilson, "Decision-making in the Supreme Court" (1986) 36 University o f  Toronto 
Law Journal 227.; Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 507.
125 Robert E. Hawkins & Robert Martin “Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson ” (1995) 41 McGill Law 
Journal. 1.
126 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 669 (55% support rate); Second study, supra note 3 at 38, (56%); First 
study, supra note 3 at 40 (53%).
127 Supreme Court o f Canada, Current and Former Puisne Judges, available from http://www.scc- 
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/curformpuisne/index_e.asp
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claimant in 11 of these cases. Recent Chretien appointee Louise Arbour was the third 
most active judge at 53%, while Trudeau appointee Chouinard and Chretien appointee 
Binnie round out the top five.128 The most active Mulroney appointee is current Chief 
Justice Beverly McLachlin, whose 42% support rate places her as the 8th most active 
judge. On the other side, Trudeau-appointed William McIntyre was the most restrained 
judge, supporting the claimant in only 25% of Charter cases. Mulroney-appointed 
Justices, Cory (26%), Gonthier (29%), L’Heureux-Dube (31%) and La Forest (32%) 
represent the remaining five most restrained judges of the Court.
The hypothesis that ideological congruencies influence judicial decisions gains 
validity from the previous findings. As a group, the Mulroney appointees represent the 
most constrained judges at 34%. Moreover, apart from McLachlin and Stevenson, the 
remaining individual Mulroney appointees either show low support rates or are consumed 
in the grey middle.129 Liberal appointees have displayed substantially higher support 
rates for the Charter. Trudeau’s Court favoured the claimant in 40% of all Charter cases, 
which is consistent with the Charter’s early activist or “honeymoon” stages. Justices 
Wilson and Chouinard led the way for the Trudeau Court, both accumulating support 
rates above 50%. The majority130 of the Trudeau Court131 fell into the Court’s grey 
middle, supporting Kelly’s conclusions that the Court was becoming consistent in their 
approach to Charter cases. Justice McIntyre was the only Trudeau Judge to show 
resistance to the claimant. The Chretien judges, under the leadership of Chief Justice
128 Justice Ritchie is ranked 5th, however he was inactive in the Charter era, ruling in only 4 cases before his 
retirement.
129 For the purpose o f this section the figuratively, the grey middle will represent a standard deviation of 
2% from the Court’s average. Therefore, the grey middle is made up o f support between 35% and 39%.
130 Excluding Justices Ritchie and Laskin because combined they appeared in less than 5 Charter cases and 
to make assumptions on these numbers would be injurious to the reliability o f the statistics.
131 Justices Lamer, Estey, Beetz, Dickson and Le Dain
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McLachlin, have shown a strong institutional tendency to support Charter claimants 
averaging slightly over 46%. Moreover, not a single McLachlin Court justice is below 
the Court average of 37%, strongly suggesting that ideology plays a role in the shaping of 
the individual justice’s decisions.
Table 4-12A
Judges Support Rate for Charter Claimants,
Overall, 1983-2003
Charter Claims Total Number Support
Accepted of Cases Rate
Deschamps 11 17 65%
Wilson 80 147 54%
Arbour 33 62 53%
Chouinard 10 20 50%
Ritchie 2 4 50%
Binnie 39 82 48%
LeBel 23 54 43%
McLachlin 127 305 42%
Bastarache 36 90 40%
Stevenson 12 30 40%
Lamer 121 313 39%
Estey 14 36 39%
Sopinka 96 256 38%
Major 78 206 38%
Beetz 25 65 38%
Average 37%
lacobucci 96 265 36%
Dickson 50 139 36%
Le Dain 16 44 36%
La Forest 91 282 32%
L'Heureux-Dube 98 314 31%
Gonthier 94 319 29%
Cory 92 358 26%
McIntyre 21 83 25%
Laskin 0 1 0%
Fish 0 1 0%
Trudeau Appointees 339 852 40%
Mulroney Appointees 784 2335 34%
Chretien Appointees 142 306 46%
Interestingly enough, the three highest Charter supporters (Deschamps, Wilson 
and Arbour), all registering rates above 50%, are women, while McLachlin has led her
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Court to unprecedented levels of Charter support and has maintained an individual 
support rate well above the average of the Court as a whole. This suggests that women 
judges do play a significant role in the judiciary by introducing a feminine perspective to 
Charter adjudication which obviously differs from “the old boys club” style of the past. 
The gender divide also suggests that both women and men may allow personal 
viewpoints to influence judicial reasoning.
Table 4-12B tests the individual justices’ support rates in conduct cases and 
appeals involving the constitutionality of statutes. Kelly suggested that conduct cases 
were “less likely to divide the Court than substantive policy issues”132 which habitually 
split the Court. Given that statute cases involve direct challenges to the legislative will; a 
more “active” judge will show less deference to Parliament than a conservative judge. 
However, high support rates in Conduct cases may suggest that the individual judge 
favours the due process model of justice, over the more conservative crime control 
methods. Kent Roach suggests that since the Charter, the legislatures have embraced 
criminal justice reforms and in doing so, given the victims a new set of rights and 
protections, while the Court has adopted the right to counsel “as the focal point of its due- 
process revolution.”133 However, as table 4-12B shows, on average each justice is only 
slightly more favourable to the rights claimants in conduct cases (38%) than they are in 
statute appeals (36%). Table 4-12B, suggests that the Court is slightly more supportive 
of the Charter claimant in conduct cases, maintaining the findings in Table 4-5.
132 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 666
133 Roach, supra note 23 at 63.
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Table 4-12B
Judges Support Rates for Charter Claimants 
by type of Challenge, 1983-2003 
In Conduct Cases In Statute Cases
Wins Total Support Wins Total Support
Rank cases Rate Rank Cases Rate
1 Deschamps 6 8 75% 1 Chouinard 5 7 71%
2 Arbour 19 30 63% 2 Stevenson 9 15 60%
3 Wilson 39 69 57% 3 Deschamps 5 9 56%
4 Binnie 22 39 56% 4 Wilson 41 78 53%
5 Bastarache 20 43 47% 5 Ritchie 2 4 50%
6 LeBel 12 26 46% 6 Arbour 14 32 44%
7 Major 54 121 45% 7 McLachlin 57 132 43%
8 McLachlin 70 173 40% 8 Beetz 15 37 41%
9 Lamer 65 162 40% 9 Binnie 17 43 40%
10 Estey 8 20 40% 10 Le Dain 7 18 39%
11 Dickson 26 67 39% 11 LeBel 11 28 39%
12 Sopinka 56 148 38% 12 Estey 6 16 38%
13 Chouinard 5 13 38% 13 Lamer 56 151 37%
14 lacobucci 56 154 36% 14 Sopinka 40 108 37%
15 Beetz 10 28 36% 15 Cory 40 107 37%
L'Heureux-
16 La Forest 52 150 35% 16 Dube 55 154 36%
17 Le Dain 9 26 35% 17 lacobucci 40 111 36%
18 Cory 52 151 34% 18 Bastarache 16 47 34%
19 Gonthier 58 175 33% 19 Dickson 24 72 33%
L'Heureux-
20 Dube 43 160 27% 20 La Forest 39 132 30%
21 McIntyre 10 41 24% 21 Major 24 85 28%
22 Stevenson 3 15 20% 22 McIntyre 11 42 26%
23 Laskin 0 0 0% 23 Gonthier 36 144 25%
24 Fish 0 0 0% 24 Laskin 0 1 0%
25 Ritchie 0 0 0% 25 Fish 0 1 0%
Trudeau 172 426 40% Trudeau 143 354 40%
Mulroney 444 1247 36% Mulroney. 340 988 34%
Chretien 79 146 54% Chretien 63 160 39%
The Trudeau and Mulroney Courts both maintain fairly consistent support rates 
with the Trudeau appointees showing identical support for both conduct and statute cases 
with 40%. The conservative Mulroney Court is also consistent with the Court’s overall 
findings, possessing the lowest combined, individual average support rates for
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Conduct cases (36%) and Statutes (34%). Being the least supportive Court when 
deciding on the constitutionality of statutes, the Mulroney appointees displayed the 
greatest deference to the legislative will and showed that they were the least likely to 
nullify a statute. The Chretien appointees were more restrained in statute cases (39%) 
than in conduct cases (54%). This suggests that Roach’s prediction that the Court is 
focusing on a shift towards due process rights is especially prevalent in the Chretien 
Court.
Individually, the majority of the individual justices showed slightly higher rates of 
Charter support in conduct cases than in those involving statutes. However Justices 
Chouinard, Stevenson and L’Heureux-Dube all showed a greater tendency to strike down 
statutes than to rule favourably for the claimant in conduct cases. Stevenson J. had the 
lowest rate of support for the claimant in appeals involving the conduct of public officials 
at 20%, however he had the second highest support rate (60%) in statute cases. Justice 
Chouinard’s support for conduct cases (38%) ranked him as the 12th most active judge, 
solidifying his spot in the grey middle; nevertheless his willingness to go against the 
legislature in statute cases (71%) awarded him the recognition of the least deferential 
judge on the Court. Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s voting habits, while not as visible, 
represent a substantial shift due to the number of cases she tried. Justice L’Heureux- 
Dube ranked 20th in claimant support in conduct cases (27%) and appeared very 
conservative in her approach to criminal justice and the rights of the accused, but her 
level of legislative deference shifted her into the grey middle in statute cases (43%).
On the other hand, Chretien appointees Arbour, Deschamps and Binnie represent 
the three largest deviations of support between conduct and statute cases. Justice Arbour
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showed the largest shift, moving from 63% support in conduct cases to 43% in statutes 
cases; however this 20% drop moved her four places from the second most active judge
thin conduct cases to the 6 most active in statute cases. Similarly, Deschamps’ support 
rate dropped from 75% in conduct cases to 56% in statutes, moving her from the most 
active judge to the 3rd most active in statute appeals. However Justice Major experienced
ththe most significant shift as he moved from the 7 most active judge in conduct cases 
with a very liberal 45% support rate to the 3rd least active judge (with more than 1 
decision) going against the government in only 28% of statute cases, signifying an 
inclination to side with the due process model of criminal justice while adopting a 
deferential approach to the nullification of statutes.
These findings suggest that the individual can be influenced by factors outside 
legal reasoning. However further investigations of the individual and their use of the 
discretionary power of the Charter must be examined before it is possible to conclude that 
patronage appointments and individual preferences influence a court’s decision making 
process.
As explained in Part V of this analysis, the cohesiveness of the Court helps dictate 
the impact of each decision. A decision with several concurring opinions or dissents, 
although “essential to an effective judiciary in a democratic society,”134 often leads to 
division and confusion within the lower courts, lawyers, academia and the public at large. 
Kelly discovered that the number of dissenting opinions in Charter cases averaged 
around 10% from 1982 to 1997. He also found that the three woman judges involved in 
his study made up the top three dissenters on the Court.135
134 Felix Frankfurter, dissenting in, Ferguson v. Moore McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521 (1957) at 528
135 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 670-672
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Table 4-13
Vote Orientation: Dissents 1983-2003
Rank Justice (N) # of Dissents A s a 0/1
1 L'Heureux-Dube; (309) 60 19%
2 Wilson (147) 27 18%
3 Deschamps (17) 3 18%
4 LeBel (52) 9 17%
5 McLachlin (306) 45 15%
6 Arbour(60) 9 15%
7 McIntyre (84) 11 13%
8 La Forest (284) 28 10%
9 Lamer (308) 28 9%
10 Sopinka (257) 23 9%
11 Binnie (79) 7 9%
12 Gonthier (320) 26 8%
13 Major (209) 17 8%
14 Stevenson (30) 2 7%
15 lacobucci (266) 17 6%
16 Cory (260) 15 6%
17 Dickson (137) 8 6%
18 Beetz (64) 4 6%
19 Bastarache (88) 4 5%
20 Estey (37) 1 3%
21 Le Dain (44) 1 2%
22 Laskin (1) 0 0%
23 Chouinard (21) 0 0%
24 Fish (1) 0 0%
25 Ritchie (4) 0 0%
Total (3380) 345 10%
Trudeau Appointees (842) 80 10%
Mulroney Appointees (2241) 233 10%
Chretien Appointees (297) 32 11%
Table 4-13 shows that this dissention in the Court has remained constant at the 
10% level discovered by Kelly in 1997. Similarly, the women justices of the Court 
continue to lead the way in dissenting opinions. The five women judges all ranked within
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the top 6 dissenters on the Court, with Justice LeBel (ranking 4th at 17%) representing the 
lone male opposing voice.
Table 4-13A
Total number of Decisions with a dissenting Opinion by Court per Case
Number of Cases with Total number of Decisions with a 
a dissent Cases dissent as %
Dickson Court (1984-1990) 60 159 38%
Lamer Court (1991-1999) 78 240 33%
McLachlin Court (2000-2003) 19 61 31%
Average (1984-2003) 157 460 34%
According to table 4-13 A this trend is continuing on the McLachlin Court:
Charter decisions with a dissent have dropped to an all time low. Table 4-14 shows the 
inclination of the individual judge to disagree, either through writing a dissenting opinion 
or through a separate concurrence.
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Table 4-14
Disagreement with Majority Opinion
Per Cent Justice Disagrees with 
Separate Concurrences Majority
Rank Judge (%) Rank Justice (%)
1 L'Heureux-Dube; (309) 21% 1 L'Heureux-Dube 41%
2 Wilson (147) 21% 2 Wilson 39%
3 McIntyre (84) 20% 3 McIntyre 33%
4 Le Dain (44) 18% 4 McLachlin 28%
5 Beetz (64) 17% 5 La Forest 25%
6 La Forest (284) 15% 6 Deschamps 24%
7 Sopinka (257) 14% 7 Sopinka 23%
8 Estey (37) 14% 8 LeBel 23%
9 Lamer (308) 13% 9 Beetz 23%
10 McLachlin (306) 13% 10 Lamer 22%
11 Stevenson (30) 13% 11 Le Dain 20%
12 Gonthier (320) 11% 12 Stevenson 20%
13 Major (209) 8% 13 Arbour 20%
14 Dickson (137) 8% 14 Gonthier 19%
15 Cory (260) 7% 15 Estey 16%
16 LeBel; (52) 6% 16 Major 16%
17 Deschamps (17) 6% 17 Dickson 14%
18 Bastarache (88) 5% 18 Cory 13%
19 Arbour (60) 5% 19 lacobucci 10%
20 Chouinard (21) 5% 20 Binnie 10%
21 lacobucci (266) 3% 21 Bastarache 9%
22 Binnie (79) 1% 22 Chouinard 5%
23 Fish (1) 0% 23 Fish 0%
24 Laskin (1) 0% 24 Laskin 0%
25 Ritchie (4) 0% 25 Ritchie 0%
Average 12% 22%
Dickson Court 15% 24%
Lamer Court 12% 22%
McLachlin Court 4% 15%
As McCormick notes, when a judge writes their own “supplementary or 
competing reason, even in support of the same outcome they weaken the [Court’s] 
decision.”136 Concurring opinions show that the Justice does not entirely agree with the 
decision and therefore leaves holes in the force of the Court’s conclusions. Perplexingly,
136 McCormick, supra note 38 at 111
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the McLachlin Court has shown signs of being the most cohesive and agreeable Court 
during Charter jurisprudence despite a Chief Justice who writes in dissension 15% of the 
time and disagrees with the majority in over one quarter (28%) of all Charter cases. 
Therefore, consensus building on the Court may be attributed to the Court’s liberal 
composition. However, with four female justices, and their established tendencies to 
dissent from the Court’s opinion, it will be quite intriguing to see if this trend of 
cohesiveness within McLachlin’s Court continues.
Individual receptiveness to sections 1 and 24(2)
For the final indicator of individual “activist” nature it is necessary to study each 
Justice’s individual approach to the discretionary powers of the Charter. The most active 
judge is expected to utilize s. 1 and s. 24(2) to benefit the rights claimant. Thus, an active 
judge, as described by Charter critics, has two characteristics: first, an active judge would 
deny the government’s attempts to limit rights through section 1 ’s reasonable limitation 
clause; secondly, an active judge would exclude evidence, advancing victims rights and 
moving away from the conservative crime control methods. However, forming 
generalizations on the “active nature” of an individual Justice cannot account for the 
contextual significance of each case; it will only provide a generalized picture of justices’ 
voting habits. Nonetheless, these numbers will appear strikingly different from the ones 
reported in Morton et al., and Kelly’s work as explained in the methodology chapter, 
because their reporting style leads to erroneous data and does not reflect the true impact 
of the Charter.
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Table 4-15
Section 1, Reasonable Limits Defense 
by Judge (1983-2003)
Number # Not Saved Number of
Saved (%) cases
Ritchie 0 1 (100) 1
Chouinard 0 4 (100) 4
Stevenson 2 9 (82) 11
Binnie 4 17 (81) 21
Deschamps 1 3 (75) 4
Le Dain 2 6 (75) 8
lacobucci 15 45 (75) 60
Estey 2 5 (71) 7
Beetz 5 12 (71) 17
Arbour 5 12 (71) 17
Cory 17 42 (71) 59
McLachlin 21 50 (70) 71
Wilson 15 34 (69) 49
Lamer 24 53 (69) 77
Bastarache 7 14 (67) 21
Sopinka 22 42 (66) 64
Dickson 16 27 (63) 43
LeBel 7 10 (59) 17
Major 18 25 (58) 43
La Forest 31 40 (56) 71
L'Heureux-Dube 38 49 (56) 87
Gonthier 36 43 (54) 79
McIntyre 11 10 (48) 21
Fish 1 0 (0) 1
Totals
1983-2003 300 553 (65) 853
Trudeau
Appointees 75 152 (67) 227
Mulroney
Appointees 200 345 (63) 545
Chretien
Appointees 25 56 (69) 81
The Trudeau-appointed Justice McIntyre appeared to be the most restrained judge 
in section 1 cases, siding with the government in over 52% of his decisions. The four 
Mulroney appointees, Gonthier, J. (54% not saved), L’Heureux-Dube J. (56%), La Forest 
J. (56%) and Major J. (58%) round out the top five government-supporting Judges. 
However, conservative appointee Justice Stevenson (82% not saved), is the most active
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judge with more than 5 cases decided. Nonetheless, despite minimal variation between 
the three Courts; overall the Mulroney appointees sided with the government in 37% of 
section 1 cases, compared to 33% for Trudeau judges and 31% for Chretien appointees. 
This indicates that as a group, conservative appointed Justices approached s. 1 in a more 
restrained fashion.
Table 4-16
Section 24(2), Exclusion of Evidence, 1983-2003
# of Times evidence Evidence Excluded Total
admitted (%) Cases
Deschamps 0 1 (100) 1
Chouinard 0 5 (100) 5
Le Dain 3 7 (70) 10
Estey 1 4 (80) 5
Beetz 4 9 (69) 13
Wilson 14 20 (59) 34
La Forest 33 32 (49) 65
McIntyre 12 9 (42) 21
Dickson 18 13 (42) 31
LeBel 3 2 (40) 5
Arbour 3 2 (40) 5
Stevenson 3 2 (40) 5
lacobucci 30 20 (40) 50
Sopinka 35 23 (40) 58
Major 22 16 (44) 38
Lamer 46 27 (37) 73
McLachlin 37 20 (35) 57
Cory 38 20 (35) 58
Binnie 6 3 (33) 9
Gonthier 45 18 (29) 63
Bastarache 8 3 (27) 11
L'Heureux-Dube 51 14 (22) 65
Trudeau
Appointees 98 94 (49) 192
Mulroney
Appointees 294 165 (36) 459
Chretien
Appointees 20 11 (36) 31
1983-2003 412 270 (40) 682
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When Judges who participated in fewer than 10 judgments are eliminated, Justice 
Le Dain becomes the most supportive of the accused’s rights, excluding evidence in 70% 
of section 24(2) cases. Justice Beetz was the second most active Judge at 69 %, followed 
by Justice Wilson at 59%. In contrast, Justice L’Heureux-Dube reaffirmed Kelly’s
• • 1 T7findings that she was the least likely judge to exclude evidence in section 24(2) , doing
so only 22% of the time. Justice Bastarache was the second most restrained judge,
excluding evidence in only 27% of cases brought before him, while Justice Gonthier was
the third most restrained at 29%. In the leading section 24(2) case, R v. Collins, the
majority138 under Justice Lamer’s penmanship, virtually rewrote section 24(2) under a
skillfully guised rhetoric of semantics. It is a well established rule of Canadian
jurisprudence that constitutional text written in both official languages is equally binding.
However, when there is a discrepancy in the interpretation the canons of
constitutionalism allow a judge to choose which interpretation they wish to apply.
Lamer J. explained that although the English version of 24(2) said “would” bring the
administration of justice into disrepute, the French version better describes it as “could”,
thus applying a more liberal interpretation to the document. As Addison and Fraser
explain, this provoked Justice McIntyre’s scathing dissent.
One does not have to be a lawyer or a judge to understand the immense 
importance of changing ‘would’ to ‘could.’ ‘Would’ means ‘will.’ ‘Could’ 
means ‘might possibly.’ This is not a ‘somewhat lower threshold’—it is a 
much lower one.139
137 Kelly study, supra note 1 at 676
138 Justices Dickson, Lamer, Wilson and La Forest with Justice Le Dain writing a separate concurrence
139 Addison, Jennifer A.I. and Richard Fraser, “What’s Truth Got to Do With It? The Supreme Court of 
Canada and Section 24(2).” Queen’s Law Journal (2004) 29., at 823-847.
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Interestingly enough, McIntyre seemed to move from his early conservative 
approach, as established in Collins, to solidifying himself in the grey middle, joining 
most of his opposition in Collins. Ideology does not appear to play a prominent role in 
section 24(2) since the Mulroney and Chretien appointees both have low support rates at 
36%, four points less than the average of the Court (40%). However, the Trudeau 
appointees have taken a very liberal interpretation of 24(2) as outlined in Collins, by 
supporting the accused’s rights in nearly half (49%) of the Charter cases tried before 
them. Morton, Russell and Riddell conclude that the Court’s treatment of the 
discretionary Charter provisions suggests that “Judges tend not to be as sharply or as 
predictably divided on these openly discretionary Charter issues as they are in 
interpreting the meaning and scope of the rights and freedoms themselves.”140 However, 
one consistency between the two discretionary provisions is the propensity of the 
Mulroney Judges to average a higher support rate for government action, thus exhibiting 
a higher degree of deference to the legislatures, while averaging lower support rates for 
the rights of the accused, suggesting that the hypothesis of this study is justified. 
Assuming that victim’s rights and deference to the legislature represent a more 
conservative approach to the law, the hypothesis that ideological congruencies play a role 
injudicial decision, is germane.
140 Second study, supra note 3 at 43
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Discussion
The Court’s application and approach towards Charter has changed significantly 
between 1983 and 2003. Each individual justice has brought a distinct approach to 
Charter adjudication, effectively restructuring Canadian law and jurisprudence. It has 
been argued and shown that the Charter has defined a new relationship between the 
Courts and the legislatures, while challenging the principles of federalism. Moreover, the 
Court’s interpretative approach to the Charter has farther fueled the debate over the 
legitimacy of judicial review and the shift from parliamentary to constitutional 
supremacy. The McLachlin Court, has signaled a new direction in Charter jurisprudence. 
In the four years that the McLachlin has been Chief Justice, her court has consistently 
shown higher support rates for the claimant, furthered victims’ rights and become less 
deferential to governments than its predecessors, all the while showing a greater tendency 
for unanimity, lowering the number of separate concurrences and shifting to a 
dependence on plenary panels.
The proportion of Charter cases in the Court has decreased significantly since the 
1990’s, with the Lamer Court averaging 27 Charter cases per year, and the McLachlin 
Court averaging only 15. The overall Charter support rate has remained fairly constant 
throughout the Charter’s lifetime, averaging 35%; however, the McLachlin Court has 
shown an early support rate of 49% suggesting that her Court is approaching Charter 
adjudication in a very liberal and broad fashion. Despite a decreasing proportion of 
Charter cases, the document is still a very effective tool in social change.
The shift to constitutional supremacy has seen the Courts focus primarily on legal 
rights, which constituted 71% of Charter claims between 1983 and 2003. The McLachlin
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Court has shown unprecedented levels of support for legal rights at 49%, advancing 
accused’s rights, suggesting the Court is heading into an era governed by the due process 
approach to the law. The Court has continued to hear a higher proportion of conduct 
cases (57%) compared to statute cases (43%); however this balance has been leveled by 
the McLachlin Court with 32 appeals in each type of case. This suggests that the 
McLachlin court is more willing to test the legislative will than the Lamer and Dickson 
courts. Moreover, the McLachlin Court has shown a greater propensity to nullify statutes 
than the previous courts at 38%. However, overall the Court has not shown explicit 
deference to either level of government. The provincial legislatures have encountered a 
slightly higher statute nullification rate compared to Parliament (32% to 29%), yet 
Parliament has had 37 statutes struck down compared to only 20 provincial statutes. 
Therefore, the findings suggest that the shift from parliamentary supremacy to 
constitutional supremacy has created a shift in the application of the law, however the 
dialogue between the courts and other two levels of government has not resulted in 
explicit levels of deference.
Trudeau’s nation building project was designed to nationalize Canadian identity 
and create a strong central government. The Court has been exceedingly unsupportive of 
mobility rights, ruling in favour of the rights claimant in only one case (13%). Black, the 
only victorious mobility right case, was decided in 1989; since than, no other s. 6 
claimant has been successful. Overall, the majority of mobility right cases have focused 
on extradition to foreign countries, thus hardly playing a prominent role in the nation-
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building project.1 On the other hand, the Court has been very supportive of language and 
education rights (71%), consistently protecting minority language rights in schools and 
government institutions by implementing federal standards. The Court’s support for 
language and education rights suggests a loss of autonomy for the provinces because 
universal standards are being implemented over the legislatures’ will. However, ss. lb- 
23 have not been the only sections to test language rights in Canada.2 The provinces 
have shown a willingness to implement the notwithstanding clause on pseudo-language 
rights cases made within the scope of s. 33. Thus, suggesting that the power balance 
between the Court and the legislatures is dictated by the specific section of the Charter 
challenged. Furthermore, the proportion of equality cases heard by the Court has grown 
consistently since Andrews.3 Despite the limited exposure to s. 15 claims, equality claims 
have risen from 5% of the Court’s total workload in the Dickson Court, to 11% under 
Lamer and 15% in the McLachlin court. However, support for equality cases has seen a 
downward shift throughout this time. The greatest support for s. 15 was realized under 
the Dickson Court (38%), while the McLachlin Court showed the lowest support in 
equality appeals at 20%. Beyond the statistics, the Lamer Court has approached equality 
the most liberally, with significant rulings laying the ground work for the advancement of 
gay rights.
Despite the McLachlin Courts low support for equality rights, as an individual, 
McLachlin has expressed an interest in advancing equality throughout the country:
1 see United States v Cotroni [1989] 1 SCR 1469; Whitley v. United States o f  America [1996] 1 S.C.R.
467; United States o f America v. Ross, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 469 and United States o f America v. Kwok, [2001] 1 
S.C.R. 532
2 see Ford v Quebec (A.G), [1988] 2 SCR 712 and Devine v Quebec (A.G), [1988] 1 SCR 234; in both cases 
language rights were tested and decided on s. 2(b)
3 Andrews v. Law Society o f  British Columbia, [1989] a SCR 143
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The pervasive violence against women must be eradicated by all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify, or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women.4
With a Chief Justice dedicated to equality, it can be expected that this section’s 
application will continue to increase; however, the success of future s. 15 claims remains 
undetermined.
Overall the nation building project has not had the monumental impact that some 
analysts expected. However, there is a subtle trend in equality and language rights cases 
towards universal standards. The lasting impact of the Charter on centralization remains 
largely vulnerable to provincial legislatures’ willingness, and more importantly ability, to 
implement the legislative override clause.
The influence of the individual judge is quite significant in Charter adjudication. 
Justice Deschamps exhibited the highest support rate for the Charter claimant at 65%
(11/17), with noted Charter enthusiast Justice Wilson supported the claimant in 54% 
(80/147) of Charter cases. In comparison, Justice McIntyre supported the claimant in 
only 25% (21/83) of Charter cases. With a deviation between the most supportive and 
the least supportive justice of 40%, it is clear that each judge brings an individual 
approach and interpretation of the law to the Court.
On average, the women in the Court, except for Justice L’Heureux-Dube, appear 
to be the most receptive and supportive of the Charter claimaint. Moreover, the women, 
guided by L’Heureux-Dube, predominantly lead the Court in dissenting and separate
4 Barbara Amiel, “Feminists, Fascists and other Radicals” National Post (March 06,1999) available online 
at http://www.fact.on.ca/newpaper/np99030t.htm
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opinions: suggesting that women approach the Charter in a more proactive and rights 
enriching manner than their male colleagues.
Voting blocks in the Court have continued to surface throughout the Charter’s 
lifetime. On average, the Mulroney-appointed Justices have collectively exhibited lower 
support for the Charter claimant at 34% compared to the Trudeau (40%) and Chretien 
appointees (46%). In addition, the Mulroney appointees have appeared the most 
deferential to the legislatures, collectively being the least likely justices to overturn a 
statute and the most likely justices to accept a government’s section 1 defence. This 
suggests that ideological congruencies have a significant role in the Court’s approach to 
the Charter and the law. In s. 24(2) cases both the Mulroney and Chretien appointed 
justices have shown a reluctance to exclude evidence when compared to the Trudeau 
appointees. L’Heureux-Dube has continued to show a reluctance to advance Charter 
claims, by being the most unlikely justice to exclude evidence.
Nonetheless, it is apparent from the findings that individual attitudes, biases and 
preferences influence the Court, substantiating justice Abella’s claim that “every 
decision-maker who walks into a courtroom to hear a case is armed not only with the 
relevant legal text but with a set of values, experiences and assumptions that are 
thoroughly embedded.”5 These findings suggest that it clearly matters which judge hears 
an appeal. Moreover, the Mulroney-appointed justices have consistently approached the 
Charter in a more restrained and conservative fashion, suggesting that ideological 
congruencies do influence the Court and the individual.
5 Rosalie Abella, “The dynamic nature of equality” in Shelia Martins and Kathleen Mahoney eds., Equality 
and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto'. Carswell, 1987), 8-9
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The future o f the Court remains to appear quite unpredictable. With the Court’s
recent appointments of Madame Justices Abella and Charron, the Court is now composed
of 4 women (44%), which is the greatest proportion of women to on a country’s high
court in all industrialized nations. Throughout this study, women justices have appeared
to favour the Charter claimant and be more protective of accused’s rights suggesting that
the Court may solidify itself within a due process approach to the law. Moreover, the
propensity of women to dissent and write separate concurrences suggests that legal
system can expect some spirited decisions from the country’s high court.
In a recent journal contribution, Chief Justice McLachlin stated that her focus as
the leader of the Court was to:
enable all judges, indeed all individuals in positions of authority and 
power, to make a difference, and to ensure that the law responds not only 
to the needs of those whose interests it has traditionally served, but to 
those of all members of society.6
The clearest part of the Charter is that its future can not be scripted. The living tree 
doctrine, coupled with the discretionary element of Charter adjudication, suggests that 
any Court, led by any Chief Justice, and composed of any nine individuals has the right, 
the authority, and the constitutional support to lead a country in any direction. Although 
it is too early to conclude, the McLachlin Court has shown a willingness to advance 
Charter rights, nullify unconstitutional statutes and support the accused’s rights, 
suggesting that the current court is approaching their role in a liberal and broad fashion.
6 Claire L'Heureux-Dube, “Making a Difference: The Pursuit o f a Compassionate Justice” (1999) 26 
Manitoba Law Journal 273 at 283-295; 298.
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Appendix M-1A
Explanation of Appendix M-1
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2. Fundamental Freedoms s 2 
2(a-d)
3. Democratic Rights or citizens s 3 
3 pt 1 Gemeral
3 pt 2 Application of Section 3 -  Provincial electoroal boundries
3 pt 3 Constitutionality of the Canada Elections Act
4. Duration and continuation of legislative bodies s 4
5 Annual sitting of legislative bodies s 5
6 Mobility Rights (1,2, 3, 4) s 6
7 Legal Rights s 7
7 pt 1 Civil Context
7 pt 1.1 adminitstrative law a) vagueness, b) Natural Justice, c) Administrative
Remedies
7 pt 1.2 Litigation between private parties
7 pt 1.3 Economic and Commercial Rights a) property rights, b) rights of
corporations, c) individual rights 
7 pt 1.4 standing and Ripeness
7 pt 1.5 labour law
7 pt 1.6 the governing of professions
7 pt 1.7 immigration law a) natural justice, b)constitutionality of immigration law,
c) miscellaneous immigration cases
7 pt 1.8 constitutionality of statutory provisions in civil context
7 pt 1.9 miscellaneous cases in civil context
7 pt 2 criminal context
7 pt 2.1 constitutional challenges to provisions of the criminal code
7 pt 2.2 constitutionality of other statutory provisions in the criminal context
7 pt 2.3 applicability of section 7, including its retrospectivity
7 pt 2.4 corporations, absolute liability and strict liability
7 pt 2.5 mens rea requirement
7 pt 2.6 econcomic rights in a criminal context
7 pt 2.7 the right to remain silent and self-incriminating statements in criminal and
administrative proceedings
7 pt 2.8 principles of fundamental justice a) abuse of process, b) delay and stay of
proceedings, c) indictments and information, d) preliminary inquiry, e) jury f) full answer 
and defence (disclosure) g)Trial procedure h) want of prosecution I) punishment and
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sentencing j) appeals, k) prisoners rights and parole, 1) vagueness and overbreadth m) 
miscellaneous fundamental justice
7 pt 2.9 admissibility of evidence a) breath/blood samples, b) search and seizure,
c) wiretap evidence, d)other 
7pt2.10 young offenders
7 pt 2.11 extradition proceedings
8 Search or Seizure s 8
8 pt 1 gemeral principles 
8 pt 2 search incident to arrest 
8 pt 3 vehicle searches 
8 pt 4 search of premise 
8 pt 5 validity of search warrants
8 pt 6 searches in respect of blood and other bodily products
8 pt 7 drinking and driving cases
8 pt 8 searches and electronic surveillance
8 pt 9 searches and the production of documents
8 pt 10 searches and the narcotic control act
8 pt 11 searches and the income tax act
8 pt 12 searches otherwise authorized by statute
8 pt 13 border searches
9 Detention or Imprisonment, s 9 
9 pt 1 general principles
9 pt 2 meaning or “detention”
9 pt 3 reasonable and probable grounds
9 pt 4 miscellanous




10(b) pt 1 general principles
10(b) pt 2 meaning of detention
10(b) pt 3 “without delay”
10(b) pt 4 reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel
10(b) pt 5 dutry to refrain from questioning
10(b) pt 6 waiver of section 10(b) right
10(b) pt 7 right to exercise sections 10(b) rights in privacy
10(b) pt 8 informationsal component, access to legal aid/duty counsel
10(b)pt9 miscellaneous
10©
11 Proceedings in Criminal and Penal Matters, s 11 
ll(a-i)
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12 Treatment or Punishment s 12
13 Self-Incrimination s 13
14 Interpreter s 14
15 Equality Rights s 15
15 pt 1 age
15 pt 2 ameliaration of conditions
15 pt 3 application
15 pt 4 criminal law
15 pt 5 crown
15 pt 6 discret and insular minority
15 pt 7 discrimination
15 pt 8 enumerated heads of discrimination
15 pt 9 euthanasia
15 pt 10 general
15 pt 11 geographical distinction
15 pt 12 group, disadvantaged
15 pt 13 aboriginals
15 pt 14 jurisidiction
15 pt 15 language
15 pt 16 martial status
15 pt 17 personal characteristics
15 pt 18 physical disability
15 pt 19 retroactive/retrospective
15 pt 20 sex
15 pt 21 sexual orientation
15 pt 22 standing
15 pt 23 taxation
15 pt 24 unemployment insurance
15 pt 25 workers compensation
16 Official Languages s 16 and 16.1
17 Proceedings of Parliament s 17
18 Parliamentary statutes and records s 18
19 Proceedings in Courts established by Parliament s 19
20 Communication by Public with Federal institutions s 20 and 20(1 )(a)
21 Continuation of existing constitutional provisions s 21
22 Rights and Privelages preserved s 22
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23 Minority language rights s 23
24 Enforcement s 24 
24(1) pt 1 civil cases
24(1) pt 1.1 purpose and scope of section 24( 1)
24(1) pt 1.2 standing
24(1) pt 1.3 remedies a) “appropriate and just”, b) declaration, c) damages, d) 
prerogrative remedies, e) stay of proceedings, f) other
24(1) pt 1.4 “Court of comptetent jurisdiction in civil context A) superior courts, b)
administrative tribunals, c) other
24(1) pt 2 Criminal cases
24(1) pt 2.1 prupose and scope of section 24(1)
24(1) pt 2.2 standings and mootness
24(1) pt 2.3 Remedies a) “appropriate and just”, b) declaration, c) damages, d)
exclusion of evidence, e) stay of proceedings, f) right of appeal, g) other remedies 
24(1) pt 2.4 “Court of Commpetent Jurisdiction” in Criminal context A) superior 
courts, b) appellate courts, c) administrative tribunals, d) provincial courts 
Exclusion of Evidence bringing administration of Justice into disrepute s 24(2)
24(2) pt 1 general principles
24(2) pt 2 procedure
24(2) pt 3 role of appeal court
24(2) pt 4 self-incriminating evidence (generally)
24(2) pt 5 real evidence (generally)
24(2) pt 6 statements to persons in authority
24(2) pt 7 blood and breath samples and other bodily products
24(2) pt 8 narcotics and other drugs
24(2) pt 9 electronic surveillance
24(2) pt 10 miscellaneous
25 Aboriginal rights and freedoms not affected by Charter s 25
26 Other rights and freedoms not affected by Charter s 26
27 Multicultural heritage s 27
28 Rights guaranteed equally to both sexes s 28
29 Rights respecting certain schools preserved s 29
30 Application to terrirtoies and terrirorial authorities s 30
31 Legislative powers not extended s 31
32 Application of Charter s 32
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33 Exception where express declaration s 33
34 Citation s 34
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Appendix M-3
Charter Cases* by Total Appeals (1998-2003)
1998 22/106 = 21%
1999 17/75 = 23%
2000 6/78 = 8%
2001 18/96= 19%
2002 18/72= 25%
2003 -> 17*/82= 21%
Total 98/509 = 19%'1
* Total number of Charter Cases were determined by table 4-1
1 Total number o f appeals heard was derived from the Supreme Court website statistics section 
http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/HTML/cat3 e.asp
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Appendix M-4
Comparing the cases included between the studies
YEAR- CASE- (X,0) -  (Y-N)
X = included in th is study 
O = omitted from  th is study
Y = Incuded in the Previous studies
N = omitted from  Previous studies
M = Beyond the scope o f the previous studies
1983 - Westendorp v. the Queen- X-N
1984 - Law society o f Upper Canada v. Skapinker- X-Y
-A.G. (Que.) v. Quebec Protestant School Boards- X-Y
-Hunter v. Southam Inc- X-Y
-A. G. Quebec v. Greater Hull School Boards- O-Y
1985-Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration- O -Y 
-R. v. Big M  Drug Mart Ltd.- X-Y
-Plantation Indoor Plants Ltd. v. A. G. (Alta.)- X-N
-Staranchuk v. The Queen- X-Y
-Operation Dismantle v. The Queen- X-Y
-R. v. Therens- X-Y
-Trask v. The Queen- X-N
-Rahn v. The Queen- X-N
-Re Manitoba Language Rights- O-Y
-Krug v. The Queen- X-Y
-Spencer v. The Queen- X-Y
-Dubois v. The Queen- X-Y
-Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act- X-Y
-Valente v. The Queen- X-Y
1986-R  v. Oakes- X-Y
-Clarkson v. The Queen- X-Y
-Bilodeau v. A.G. Manitoba - O-Y
-MacDonald v. City of Montreal- O-Y
-Societe des Acadiens v. Association of Parents- X-Y
-. Mills v. The Queen- X-Y
-Carter v. The Queen- X-Y
-R. v. Mannion- X-Y
-R. v. Jones- X-Y
-RW DSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.- X-Y
-R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.- X-Y
1987-Manitoba (A.G.) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd.- X-Y
-R. v. Collins- X-Y
-R. v. Sieben- X-N
-R. v. Hamill- X-Y
-Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.)-X-Y 
-PSAC v. Canada- X-Y
-RW DSU v. Saskatchewan- X-Y
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-Canada v. Schmidt- X-Y
-Argentina v. Mellino- X-Y
-United States v. Allard- X-Y
-R. v. Rahey- X-Y
-R. v. Pohoretsky- X-Y
-R. v. Smith (Edward Dewey)- X-Y
-Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.)-X-Y
-R. v. Manninen- X-Y
-R, v. Lyons- X-Y
-R. v. Albright- X-Y
-R. v. Tremblay- X-Y
-R. v. Dawson- X-Y
-R. v. Milne- X-Y
-R. v. Baig- X-Y
-R. v. Wigglesworth- X-Y
-Burnham v. Metropolitan Toronto Poiice- X-Y
-Trumbley and Pugh v. Metropolitan Toronto Police- X-N
-Trimm v. Durham Regional Police- X-N
-R. v. Vaillancourt- X-Y
-R. v. Laviolette- X-N
1988-R. v. Morgentaler- X-Y
-R  v. Mercure- O-Y
-R. v. Cornell- X-N
-R. v. Hufsky- X-Y
-R. v. Thomsen- X-Y
-R. v. Dairy Supplies L td - X-Y
-R. v. James- X-Y
-R. v. Corbett- X-Y
-R. v. Holmes- X-Y
-R. v. Vermette- X-Y
-Corporation Professionelle des Medecins du Quebec v. Thibault-X-Y
-R. v. Upston- X-Y
-R. v. Stevens- X-Y
-R. v. Whyte- X-Y
-Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)-X-Y
-B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Attorney General)- X-Y
-R. v. Beare; R. v. Higgins- X-Y
-R. v. Dyment- X-Y
-R. v. Schwartz- X-Y
-R. v. Simmons- X-Y
R. v. Jacoy- X-Y
-R. v. Gamble- X-Y
-Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General)- X-Y
-Devine v. Quebec (Attorney General)- X-Y
-R. v. Bernard- X-Y
-R. v. Strachan- X-Y
-R. v. Cornell- O-Y
1989-R. v. Ross- X-Y
-R. v. Amway corp.- X-Y
-R. v. Genest, - X-Y
-R. v. Duguay- X-Y
- Andrews v. Law society of british columbia- X-Y
-Borowski v. Canada (Attorney general)- O-Y
-Greater montreal protestant school board v. Quebec (Attorney general)-O-Y
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-R. v. Potvin- X-Y
-Black v. Law society ofalberta- X-Y
-Reference re workers' compensation act, 1983 (Nfld.)- X-Y
-Irwin toy ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney general), - X-Y
-R. v. Lamb- X-Y
-Slaight communications inc. v. Davidson- X-Y
-Air Canada v. British columbia- X-N
-R. v. Turpin- X-Y
-R. v. Mohl,- X-N
-R. v. Lambretta; see also R. v. Adams- X-Y
-United states of america v. Cotroni; united states of america v. el zein-X-Y
-Moysa v. Alberta (Labour relations board)- X-N
-R. v. Leduc- X-Y
-R. v. Lavigne- X-N
-Dupont v. Watier- X-Y
-R. v. Kalanj- X-Y
-R. v. Conway- X-Y
-R. v. Meltzer- X-Y
-R. v. Ouellette- X-N
-R. v. Black- X-Y
-Reference re Workers' Compensation Act, 1983 (Nfld.) (Application to intervene)-X-N
-Mackay v. Manitoba- X-Y
-R. v. Smith- X-Y
-Tremblay v. Daigle- O-Y
-R. v. Szlovak- X-Y
-R. v. Stensrud- X-N
-R. v. Smith- X-Y
-R. v. Debot- X -Y
-Edmonton journal v. Alberta (Attorney general) - X-Y
-R. v. Lee- X-Y
1990-R. v. Shubley- X-Y
-R. v. Duarte- X-Y
-R. v. Wiggins- X-N
-R. v. Brydges- X-Y
-R. v. Van rassel- X-Y
-R. v. Storrey- X-Y
-Stelco inc. v. canada (Attorney general)- X-N
-Rudolph wolff & co. v. Canada- X-N
-R. v. A- X-Y
-Quebec (Procureur general) c. Brunet- O-Y
-Mahe v. Alberta- X-Y
-R. v. Schmautz- X-Y
-Thomson newspapers ltd. v. Canada (Director of investigation and research, restrictive trade
practices commission)- X-Y
-R. v. Mckinlay transport Itd.- X-Y
-Dywidag systems international, canada ltd. v. Zutphen brothers construction ltd.-X-Y
-R. v. Greffe- X-Y
-Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(C) of the criminal code (Man.)-X-Y
-R. v. Ladouceur- X-Y
-R. v. Sparrow- O-Y
-R. v. Stagnitta- X-N
-R. v. Skinner- X-Y
-R. v. Wilson- X-N
-Starr v. Houlden- O-N
-R. v. Hebert- X-Y
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-Rocket v. Royal college of dental surgeons of Ontario- X-Y
-R. v. S. (S.)- X-Y
-R. v. S. (G.)- X-N
-Professional institute of the public service of canada v. Northwest territories (Commissioner)-X-Y
-R. v. Martineau- X-Y
-R. v. Rodney- X-N
-R. v. Logan- X-Y
-R. v. Arkell- X-Y
-R. v. J.(J.T.), - X-Y
-R  v Luxton- X-N
-Paquette v. Canada- O-Y
-R. v. Hess; R. v. nguyen- X-Y
-R. v. Penno- X-Y
-Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General)- O-Y
-R. v. Thompson- X-Y
-R. v. Askov- X-Y
-Steele v. Mountain institution- X-Y
-R. v. Lachance- X-N
-Dersch v. Canada (Attorney General)- X-Y
-R. v. Kokesch- X-Y
-R. v. Wong- X-Y
-R. v. Garofoli- X-Y
-McKinney v. University of Guelph - X-Y
-Harrison v. University of british columbia- X-N
-Stoffman v. Vancouver general hospital- X-Y
-Douglas/kwantlen faculty assn. v. Douglas college- X-N
-R. v. Kuldip- X-Y
-R. v. Keegstra- X-Y
-R. v. Andrews- X-N
-R. v. Scott- X-Y
-Canada (Human rights commission) v. Taylor- X-Y
-R. v. Chaulk- X-Y
1991-R. v. Romeo- X-N
-Committee for the commonwealth of canada v. Canada- X-Y
-R. v. Landry- X-Y
-R. v. Ratti- X-Y
-R. v. Smith- X-Y
-R. v. Evans- X-Y
-R. v. Swain- X-Y
-R. v. L  (W .K.)- X-Y
-R. v. Lippd- X-Y
-Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board)- X-Y
-Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board)- X-Y
-Tdtreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission)-X-Y
-Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.)- X-Y
-Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union- X-Y
-R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme- X-Y
-Kindlerv. Canada (Minister of Justice), - X-Y
-Reference Re Ng Extradition (Can.)- X-Y
-Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee- X-Y
-R. v. Elshaw- X-Y
-R. v. Furtney- X-Y
-R. v. Jones- X-Y
-R. v. Sit- X-Y
-R. v. Grant- X-Y
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-R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.- X-Y
-R. v. Gruenke- X-Y
-R. v. Stinchcombe- O-N
-Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard- X-Y
-Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)-X-Y
-R. Goltz- X-Y
-R. v. Broyles- X-Y
-R. v. Tessier- X-N
1992-R. v. Bain- X-Y
-Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and lmmigration)-0-Y
-Reference re Manitoba Language Rights- O-Y
-R. v. Forster- X-Y
-R. v. Genereux- X-Y
-Sinclair v. Quebec (Attorney General)- O-Y
-R. v. Butler- X-Y
-R. v. Wise- X-Y
-R. v. Sharma- X-Y
-R. v. Morin- X-Y
-Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli-X-Y
-R. v. Duncanson- X-N
-R. v. Martin- X-N
-R. v. Ellis-Don Ltd.- X-N
-R. v. CIP Inc.- X-Y
-United Nurses of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General)- X-Y
-R. v. Van Haarlem- X-N
-R. v. Downey- X-Y
-R. v. Arnold- X-Y
-R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society- X-Y
-Schachter v. Canada- X-Y
-R. v. Zundel- X-Y
-R. v. De Sousa- X-Y
- Videotron Ltee v. Industries Microlec Produits Izlectroniques Inc.-X-Y
-Dickason v. University of Alberta- X-N
-R. v. Hawkins- X-N
-R. v. Rube- X-Y
-Idziakv. Canada (Minister of Justice)- X-Y
-R. v. Morales- X-Y
-R. v. Pearson- X-Y
-R. v. Mellenthin- X-Y
-R. v. Sawyer- X-Y
1993-New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly)-X-Y 
-Baron v. Canada- X-Y
-Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), s. 79(3), (4) and (7J-X-Y 
-R. v. Douglas; R. v. Myers- X-Y
-Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and lmmigration)-X-Y 
-R. v. Schiewe- O-Y
-R. v. Goncalves- X-Y
-Kourtessis v. M.N.R. - X-Y
-Cunningham v. Canada- X-Y
-R. v. Hawkins, - X-Y
-R. v. Slaney- X-Y
-Sauve v. Canada (Attorney General)- X-Y
-R. v. D. (A.)- O-Y
-R. v. Egger- X-N
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-Reference re Education Act (Que.)- O-Y
-R. v. Erickson- X-Y
-Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward- O-N
-R. v. Macooh- X-Y
-R. v. Gallagher- X-Y
-R. v. Frazer- X-Y
-Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General)- X-Y
-R. v. Potvin- X-Y
-R. v. Brown- X-Y
-Haig v. Canada; Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer-X-Y
-Ramsden v. Peterborough (City)- X-Y
-R. v. Creighton- X-Y
-R. v. Finlay- X-Y
-R. v. Naglik- X-Y
-R. v. Grant- X-Y
-R. v. Wiley- X-Y
-R. v. Plant- X-Y
-Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General)- X-Y
-R. v. B. (J.G.)- X-Y
-R. v. Yorke- X-Y
-Hy and Zel's Inc. v. Ontario (Attorney General); Paul M agderFurs Ltd. v. Ontario (Attorney
General)- O-Y
-R. v. Dersch- X-Y
-Young v. Young- X-Y
-P. (D.) v. S. (C.)- X-Y
-R. v. Nuosci- X-Y
-R. v. Brassard- X-Y
-R. v. L. (D. 0 .)- X-Y
-R. v. Levogiannis- X-Y
-R. v. 1. (L R .) and T. (E.)- X-Y
-R. v. Osolin- X-Y
-Symes v. Canada- X-Y
1994-R. v. Colarusso- X-Y
-International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union — Canada Area Local 500 v.
Canada- X-Y
-RJR -  MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)- X-N
-R. v. Durette- X-Y
-R. v. Finta- X-Y
-R. v. Jones- X-Y
-R. v. Howard- O-Y
- Comite paritaire de l'industrie de la chemise v. Potash; Comite paritaire de l'industrie de la
chemise v. Selection Milton- X-Y
-R. v. Mclntyre- X-Y
-R. v. Boersma- X-Y
-R. v. Whittle- X-Y
-R. v. Tran- X-Y
-R. v. Daviault- X-Y
-R. v. Borden- X-Y
-R. v. Bartle- X-Y
-R. v. Prosper- X-Y
-R. v. Pozniak- X-Y
-R. v. Matheson- X-Y
-R. v. Harper- X-Y
-R. v. Cobham- X-Y
-Native Women's Assn. of Canada v. Canada- X-Y
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-R. v. Brown- X-Y
-R. v. Heywood- X-Y
-Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.- X-Y
-R. v. Laba- X-Y
-R. v. Pizzardi; R. v. Levis- O-Y
1995-S. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto-X-Y
-R. v. Simpson- X-Y
-R. v. S. (R.J.)- X-Y
-R. v. Chaplin- X-N
-R. v. Crawford- X-Y
-British Columbia Securities Commission v. Branch- X-Y
-R. v. Primeau- X-Y
-R. v. Jobin- X-Y
-Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy)-X-Y
-R. v. Burlingham- X-Y
-R. v. Silveira- X-Y
-Walker v. Prince Edward Island- X-Y
-R. v. Montour- X-Y
-Miron v. Trudel- X-Y
-Egan v. Canada- X-Y
-Thibaudeau v. Canada- X-Y
-W eber v. Ontario Hydro- X-N
-Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.- X-Y
-R. v. Collins; R. v. Pelfrey- X-Y
-Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto- X-N
-R. v. Pontes- X-Y
-RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)- X-Y
-R. v. Wijesinha- X-Y
-R. v. Harrer- X-Y
-R. v/. Patriquen- X-Y
-R. v. Rogalsky- X-Y
-R. v. Fitzpatrick- X-Y
-Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature- X-Y
-R. v. O'Connor- O-Y
-A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.)- X-N
1996-R v. Evans- X-Y
-R . v. Dewald- X-Y
-R. v. Fitt; R. v. Kouyas- X-Y
-Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board)- X-Y
-R. v. Edwards- X-Y
-R. v. Keegstra- X-Y
-R. v. Martin, - X-Y
-United States of America v. Jamieson- X-Y
-United States of America v. Whitley- X-Y
- United States o f America v. Ross- X-Y
-R. v. Burke- X-Y
-R. v. Calder- X-Y
-R. v. Robinson- O-Y
-R. v. Badger- O-Y
-Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15- X-Y
-R. v. Richard- X-Y
-R. v. Nikal- O-Y
-R. v. Terry- X-Y
-R. v. Liakas- X-Y
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-ft. v. McKarris- X-Y
-R. v. Clement- X-Y
-R. v. McCarthy- X-Y
-R. v. Van der Peet- 0-Y
-R. v. Goldhart- X-Y
-R. v. N. T. C. Smokehouse Ltd- O-Y
-R. v. Gladstone- O-Y
-R. v. Pamjewon- O-Y
-Harvey v. New  Brunswick (Attorney General)- X-Y
-Ontario Home Builders' Association v. York Region Board of Education-X-Y
-Michaud v. Quebec (Attorney General)- X-Y
-R. v. Adams- O-Y
-ft. v/. Cote- O-Y
-R. v. Knox- X-N
-R. v. Jacques- X-Y
- f t  v. Keshane- X-Y
-Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)-X-Y
-ft. v. Richard- X-Y
-R. v. Howell- X-Y
-ft. v. Paternak- X-Y
-Adler v. Ontario- X-Y
-Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission)- X-Y
1997-ft. v. Finn- X-Y
-ft. v. Carosella- X-Y
-ft. v. Delaronde- X-Y
-ft. v. Latimer- X-Y
-Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education- X-Y
-R. v. MacDonnell- X-N
-ft. v. McDonnell- O-Y
-R. i/ . Wickstead- X-Y
-Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State)- X-Y
-ft. i/. Stillman- X-Y
- f t .  i/ . Feeney- X-Y
-R. v. La- X-Y
-R. v. Campbell- O-Y
-Re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island-X-Y
-R ef re Independence and Impartiality o f Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.-O -Y
-Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice) -O-Y
-R. v. Belnavis- X-Y
-Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General)- X-Y
-Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General)- X-Y
-ft. v. Solomon- X-Y
-R. v. Allen- X-Y
-Godbout v. Longueuil (City)- X-Y
-R. v. Skalbania- X-Y
-Delgamuukw v. British Columbia- O-Y
1998- ft. v. Caslake- X-M
-ft. v. Maracle- X-M
-R. i/. Dixon- X-M
-R. v. Robart,- X-M
-ft. i/. McQuaid- X-M
-R. v/. Smith- X-M
-R. v. Skinner- X-M
-ft. v. Lucas- X-M
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-Vriend v. Alberta- X-M
-Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), - X-M
-Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), -X-l
-Corp. professionnelle des medecins v. Thibault- X-M
-R. v. Williams- X-M
-R. v. Cook- X-M
-R. v. Lauda X-M
-R. v. MacDougall- X-M
-R. v. Gallant, - X-M
-Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson- X-M
-R. v. Rose- X-M
-R. v. Arp, - X-M
-R. v. M. (M .R.)- X-M
-R. v. White- X-M
1999-Del Zotto v. Canada- X-M  
-Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M .N.R.,-X-M  
-Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and lmmigration)-X-M
-R. v. Monney- X-M
-M. v. H- X-M
-R. v. White- X-M
-Corbiere v. Canada (Minister o f Indian and Northern Affairs), -X-M
-Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric lnstitute)-X—M
-Bese v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute)- X-M
-Orlowski v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute),-X-M
-R. v. LePage,- X-M
-R. v. Campbell- X-M
-Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General)- X-M
-U.F.C.W., Local 1518, v. KMart Canada Ltd- X-M
-New Brunswick (Minister o f Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.),-X-M
- R. v. Liew- X-M
-R. v. Mills,- X-M
2000-Lovelace v. Ontario- X-M
-R. v. Morrisey- X-M
-Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission)X-M 
-R. v. Darrach- X-M
-Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L. W.- X-M
-Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice)-X-M 
-Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and lmmigration)-X-M 
-Public School Board Assn. of Alberta v Alberta (AG) - O-M  
-Arsenault-Cameron v Prince Edward Island- X -M
2001-R. v. Latimer- X -M
-R. v. Sharpe, - X-M -
-United States v. Burns- X -M
-Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney G eneral)-0-M
-United States o f America v. Kwok, - X -M
-United States of America v. Cobb- X-M
-United States of America v. Tsioubris- X-M -
-United States of America v. Shulman- X-M
-R. v. Ruzic, - X -M
-Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and lmmigration)-X-M
-R. v. Dutra, - X -M
-Mitchell v. M .N .R .- O-M
-R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer- X-M
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-R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd- X -M
-R. v, Jabarianha- X-M -
-R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc- X -M
-R. v. Hynes, - X -M
-R. v. Golden- X -M
-Smith v. Canada (Attorney General)- X -M
-Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General)- X -M
2002-Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and lmmigration)-X-M  
-Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick-X-M  
-R. v. Law- X -M
-R.W .D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd-X-M  
-R. v. Fliss,- X -M
-R. v. Guignard- X -M
-Lavoie v. Canada,- X -M
-Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and lmmigration)-X-M
-Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v. Canada
(Attorney General); R. v. Fink,- X -M
-R. v. Hall- X -M
-R. v. Nodi- X -M
-Sauvev. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)- X -M
-Quebec (Attorney General) v. Laroche- X -M
-R. v. Jarvis- X -M
-R. v. Ling- X -M
-Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General)- X -M
-Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh- X -M
-Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General)- X -M
2003-Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General)- X -M
-R. v. Allen- X -M
-R. v. Blais- O-M
-R. v. P.A- X -M
-R. v. Buhay- X -M
-Trociul v. British Columbia (Attorney General)- X -M
-Ell v. Alberta- X -M
-Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General),- X -M
-R. v. Johnson- X -M
-R. v. Edgar,- X -M
-R. v. Smith- X -M
-R. v. Mitchell- X -M
-Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation
Board) v. Laseur- X -M
-Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commssion)- O-M
-R. v. S.A.B.- X -M
-Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education)-X-M
-Vann Niagara Ltd. v. Oakville (Town)- X -M
-R. v. Taillefer; R. v. Duguay- X-M
-R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine- X -M
-Beals v. Saldanha- O-M
Statistics
From the First study, 10% (10/100) of the cases were omitted and 15 new cases were 
added. From the Second study, of the next 95 cases that the second study considers,
9.5% (9/95) of the cases were omitted, with 23 cases being added to the database 
From Kelly’s study, 14.7% (23/157) of the cases were omitted, with 9 cases being added.
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Appendix M-5
Excluded Judgments from Database
Year Case
A.G. Quebec v. Greater Hull School
1984 Boards
Singh v. Minister o f Employment and
1985 Immigration
1985 Re Manitoba Language Rights
1986 Bilodeau v. A.G. Manitoba 
1986 MacDonald v. City o f  Montreal 
1988 R v. Mercure
1988 R. v. Cornell
Greater montreal protestant school board
1989 v. Quebec (Attorney general)
1989 Tremblay v. Daigle
1989 Borowski v. Canada (Attorney general)
1989 Moysa v. Alberta (Labour relations board)
1990 Quebec (Procureur general) c. Brunet 
1990 R. v. Sparrow
1990 R. v. Paquette
1990 Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General)
1990 Starr v. Houlden
1991 R. v. Stinchcombe
1992 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights
Canadian Council o f  Churches v. Canada 
1992 (Minister o f  Employment and Immigration
Reason to exclude judgment
Constitution Act, 1867, s.93
Majority decision on Canadian Bill o f Rights 
1960, c44.
Manitoba Act 1870, s.23 and sec 133 Constitution 
Act 1867
Manitoba Act, 1870, s.23 
Constitution Act 1867, s. 133 
Saskatchewan Act, S.C. 1905, c. 42, s.16 
Based on Canadian Bill o f  Rights, 1960
Constitution Act 1867, s. 93(1) and 93(2)
No State Action, Charter arguments not 
considered
Case in moot
No Charter arugment, Charter Values case
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 133
s. 35(1) and s. 52(1) o f  Constitution Act, 1982
The North-West Territories Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 
5 0 , s. 110
No Section Challenged
Charter Sections of the Argument not decided
Charter Values, s. 7 o f  Charter
Manitoba Act 1870, s.23
Appealant has no standing to make the Charter 
claim
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1992 Sinclair v. Quebec (Attorney General)
1993 R. v. Schiewe
Hy and Zel's Inc. v. Ontario (Attorney 
General); Paul Magder Furs Ltd. v.
1993 Ontario (Attorney General)
1993 R. v. D. (A.)
1993 Reference re Education Act (Que.)
1993 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward
1994 R. v. Howard
1994 R. v. Pizzardi; R. v. Levis
1995 R. v. O'Connor
1996 R. v. Robinson
1996 R. v. Badger
1996 R. v.Nikal
1996 R. v. Van der Peet
1996 R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd
1996 R. v. Gladstone
1996 R. v. Pamjewon
1996 R. v. Adams
1996 R. v. Cote
1997 R. v. McDonnell
1997 R. v. Campbell
Ref re Independence and Impartiality of 
1997 Judges o f  the Prov. Court o f P.E.I.
No Charter argument decided by municipal law, 
S.Q. 1985, c. 48.
No section Challenged
Appealant has no standing to make the Charter 
claim
No section Challenged
Constitution Act, 1867, s.93
Charter challenge not addressed
Constitution Act, 1982, s.35(1)
No section Challenged
No section challenged - Charter values via 
Stinchcombe
Charter Values, s. 1, s. 7, s. 11(d)
Constitution Act 1982, s.35(l)
Constitution Act 1982, s.35(l)
Constitution Act 1982, s.35(l) and Constitution 
Act 1867, s.91(24)
Constitution Act 1982, s.35(l)
Constitution Act, 1982, s.35(l) & 52(1)
Constitution Act 1982, s.35(1)
Constitution Act 1982, s.35(l)
Constitution Act 1982, s.35(l)
Charter Values, s 7
Referenced as Re Remuneration o f Judges o f the 
Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island [1997] 
3 S.C.R. 3
referenced [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (see R. v. Cambell)






Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. 
v.Manitoba (Minister o f Justice)
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
Public School Board Assn. o f Alberta v 
Alberta (AG)
Beals v. Saldanha
referenced [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (see R. v. Cambell) 
Constitution Act 1982, s.35(1)
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 93 & Alberta Act, S.C. 
1905, c. 3, s. 17
No standing - International Courts not bound by 
Charter
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Appendix A1
Panels that Dealt with Charter Cases 1983-2003
9 8 7
1983 1 0 0
1984 0 1 2
1985 2 3 5
1986 1 0 8
1987 0 3 15
1988 0 1 9
1989 4 0 13
1990 7 0 36
1991 8 0 19
1992 6 0 15
1993 12 1 16
1994 15 0 7
1995 16 1 9
1996 16 0 6
1997 14 0 2
1998 6 3 4
1999 8 1 7
2000 5 0 3
2001 10 0 5
2002 15 0 3
2003 16 0 1
Total 162 14 185
6 5 4 Total
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 3
2 0 0 12
0 0 0 9
7 2 0 27
7 6 1 24
5 10 0 32
3 5 0 51
0 3 0 30
1 6  1 29
2 9 0 40
0 1 0  23
0 3 0 29
0 10 0 32
0 3 0 19
0 8 0 21
0 1 0  17
0 0 0 8
0 2 0 17
0 0 0 18
0 1 0  18
27 70 2 460
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Section Coding
1. s. 1 (Reasonable Limitations)
2. s. 2 (Fundamental Freedoms)
3. s. 3, 4, 5 (Democratic Rights)
4. s. 6 (Mobility Rights)
5. s. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 24 (Legal Rights)
6. s. 15 (Equality Rights)
7. s. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29 (Language and Education Rights)
8. s. 25, 27, 28, 31 (Aboriginal and other Minority Rights)
9. s. 26, 30, 32, 33 (General Rights and Application of Charter)
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La Forest 0 284
McLachlin 0 306
Lamer 0 308
Le H'Heureux Dube 0 309
Gonthier 0 320
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